CHECKS AND BALANCES

It does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. [Angara v. Electoral Commission]

Congressional oversight is not per se violative, but is integral, to separation of powers. However, for a post-enactment congressional measure to be valid, it must be limited to:

(1) Scrutiny - Congress’ power of appropriation, i.e. budget hearings, and power of confirmation

(2) Investigation and monitoring of implementation of laws – using its power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. [Abakada Guro Partylist v. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008]

A legislative veto, i.e. statutory provision (which may take the form of a congressional oversight committee) that requires the President or an agency to submit the proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress for approval, is unconstitutional. It encroaches on:

(1) The executive - it allows Congress to take a direct role in the enforcement of its laws;

(2) The judiciary - administrative issuances enjoy a presumption of validity, and only the courts may decide whether or not they conform to statutes or the Constitution. [Abakada Guro Partylist v. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008]

The Pork Barrel system is unconstitutional, among others, because it violates the system of checks and balances.

(1) It deprives the president of his item-veto power. As lump-sum appropriations, the actual projects under each congressman’s PDAF are determined (by the congressman) only after the GAA is passed. The president, then, would not be able to discern whether or not he should veto the appropriation.

(2) It has a detrimental effect on Congressional Oversight. Because legislators effectively intervene in project implementation, it becomes difficult for them to exercise their (valid) post- enactment role of scrutinizing, investigating, or monitoring the implementation of the law, when they are no longer disinterested observers. [Belgica, supra]

Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770, providing that the President may remove a Deputy Ombudsman, is unconstitutional. Subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and removal by the President, whose own alter egos and officials in the Executive department are subject to the Ombudsman’s disciplinary authority, cannot but seriously place at risk the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman itself. Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 intruded upon the constitutionally-

granted independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. By so doing, the law directly collided not only with the independence that the Constitution guarantees to the Office of the Ombudsman, but inevitably with the principle of checks and balances that the creation of an Ombudsman office seeks to revitalize. What is true for the Ombudsman must equally and necessarily be true for her Deputies who act as agents of the Ombudsman in the performance of their duties. The Ombudsman can hardly be expected to place her complete trust in her subordinate officials who are not as independent as she is, if only because they are subject to pressures and controls external to her Office. [Gonzales III v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 196231, Jan. 28, 2014]

F. DELEGATION OF POWERS

F.1. RULE OF NON-DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER

Principle: Delegata potestas non potest delegari – What has been delegated can no longer be delegated.

Rationale: Since the powers of the government have been delegated to them by the people, who possess original sovereignty, these powers cannot be further delegated by the different government departments to some other branch or instrumentality of the government.

General Rule: Only Congress (as a body) may exercise legislative power

Exceptions:

(1) Delegated legislative power to local governments – Local governments, as an immemorial practice, may be allowed to legislate on purely local matters. [See Rubi v. Provincial Board (1919), cited in Belgica, supra. See also Const., Art. IX, Sec. 9, explicitly mentioning “legislative bodies of local governments;” and Sec. 20 providing for the coverage of legislative powers delegated to autonomous regions via the latter’s organic acts.]

(2) Constitutionally-grafted Excep-tions (a) Emergency power delegated to the Executive during State of War or National Emergency [Const., art. VI, sec. 23(2)]

(b) Certain taxing powers of the President [Const., art. VI, sec. 28(2)]. The Congress may authorize the President to fix, within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government. (3) The extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum [Const. Art. VI, Sec. 1]

N.B. Subordinate legislation made by administrative agencies – The principle of non-delegability should not be confused with the delegated rule-making authority of implementing agencies. [Belgica, supra] Strictly speaking, what is delegate is not “law-making” power, but rule-making power, limited to (a) filling up the details of the law or (b) ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation.

Traditional/Simplified Formulation: Who may exercise legislative powers:

General Rule: Congress only Exceptions:

(1) Delegated power to local governments (2) Delegated emergency powers of the president

(3) Delegated taxing powers of the president (4) Subordinate legislation of administrative agencies

(5) Power reserved to people for initiative and referendum

F.2. TESTS FOR VALID DELEGATION

Rule – There is a valid delegation of legislative power when:

(1) Completeness test – The law sets forth the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate (Abakada, supra), such that there is nothing left for the delegate to do but to enforce the law [Pelaez v.Auditor General (1965)]; AND (2) Sufficient standard test – The standard is

sufficient if it defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. [Edu v. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481 (1970)]

N.B.: Acts which are purely legislative in character cannot be delegated to an administrative body (in contrast to the ascertainment of facts or the filing in of details which can be delegated to administrative agencies).