The classification model

After outlining different conceptual frameworks, this section elaborates the model employed for mapping party stances on the EU, which amends and combines the existing conceptual frameworks (Table 2.1). The thesis draws upon the reformulated Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008b) model to categorise Eurosceptic parties, Conti’s (2003) framework to map Euroenthusiastic stances as well as Rovny’s (2004) elaboration of the motives behind individual party positions. It argues that party attitudes towards the EU are essentially qualitative data that would lose its quality and depth if quantified (see Chapter 2).

Therefore, the model consists of ordinal categories of party positions. It depicts different degrees of enthusiasm for European integration as well as opposition to it, while the precise distance between different categories is not specified.

Table 2.1: Model of party positions on Europe and their underpinnings in (potential) candidate countries

Sources: Adapted Conti (2003)/Rovny (2004)/Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008b) underlying attitudes towards the substance of European integration. As a result, this model classifies parties into the four categories: hard and soft Euroscepticism as well as hard and soft Euroenthusiasm. Drawing on Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008b), hard Euroscepticism is defined as principled opposition to both the general ideas underlying the process of European integration (primarily cooperation among European states by ceding their sovereignty to supranational bodies) as well as principled opposition to the EU’s current or future planned trajectory. Hard Euroenthusiasm is, consequently, conceptualised as principled support for both elements that constitute the substance of European integration.

Finally, soft Euroscepticism and soft Euroenthusiasm are defined as contingent opposition to and support for these principles, respectively.

Factors that may determine party stances on Europe will be addressed in great detail in the following chapters; here it is important to note the distinction between ideologically and strategically motivated party positions that underpins the model. The thesis argues that

both hard and soft positive and negative positions on the EU may be ideologically or strategically driven. It draws upon Rovny’s (2004, p.35) argument that ‘parties are expected to act more or less ideologically or strategically and their programmatic stances are expected to be more or less strategically or ideologically driven’. As a result, Rovny (2004, p.35) claimed, ‘purely ideological or purely strategic considerations are unlikely to occur in reality, but can be understood as extreme ends of a motivation continuum’. Party position on the EU would depend on whether a party is more policy-seeking or office-/vote-seeking (Muller and Strom 1999; Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008b), but it is also the result of the interplay between these two motivations in the specific national contexts.

In most cases, policy-seeking parties would formulate ideologically motivated positions on the EU, particularly if the general ideas of European integration run deeply counter to or are fully in accordance with the party’s fundamental values. Similarly, parties that are office-/vote-seeking, by nature would mostly form strategically driven positions on the EU (as on any other political issue) with a view to maximising electoral support.⁷ However, there is no linear relationship between the inherent nature of parties and the drivers of their stances on the EU. In other words, parties that are generally ideologically driven may adopt strategically motivated responses to the EU. This may be explained by the logic of the domestic party systems and strong electoral incentives to adopt an electorally profitable stance on the EU, irrespective of embedded ideological values. In particular, this may be the case if the principles underlying the process of EU integration do not constitute the core values of these parties. As a result, such ideologically driven parties may be indifferent to the EU or prone to strategically respond to it. In contrast, stances on the EU may be an element of the basic beliefs of some otherwise weakly ideologically rooted parties, provided that parties adopted rudimentary basic principles. Such strategically driven parties may take up an ideologically motivated position on the EU. This may be seen as a consequence of the nature of EU issues in particular national contexts, which may create disincentives for such parties to exploit this issue despite intrinsic drives to do so. This is the case when the significance of EU-related issues, particularly in (potential) candidate countries, challenges the most fundamental convictions of all political parties, including those that do not draw deeply on fundamental principles, and compels them to react ideologically.

7 There are however parties whose position on the EU may be determined by what they perceive to be the interests of their supporters. This is not necessarily the same as ideology (which involves reference to some more or less abstract set of values) or strategy (which involves considering the likely response of the parties’ voters or potential voters).

Following this logic of the model and drawing on the existing theoretical concepts, a hard Eurosceptic category is conceptualised as principled opposition to the values underpinning the process of European integration as well asthe EU as it is and as it is developing. These parties explicitly favour an international, rather than supranational, form of cooperation among sovereign nations and oppose the ceding or transfer of powers to supranational institutions such as the EU and an integrated liberal market economy. They also express a principled opposition to the current and future extension of EU competencies as well as consistent opposition to their countries’ EU membership. In most cases, this is the position that parties adopt when motivated by their ideological convictions. Underlying principles of EU integration may run counter to such parties’ original ideological positions and fundamental identity values. As Rovny argued (2004, p.36), ‘the particular values and normative political goals vested in the initial ideology are at odds with some values, normative goals, or particular policies of the European integration project’. These parties are not likely to compromise on this issue and moderate their stances, even if the logic of party competition or an overwhelmingly pro-EU electorate creates incentives to do so.

They are therefore not expected to change their negative position on Europe over time, although they may sometimes moderate rhetoric for strategic electoral reasons. Hard Eurosceptic positions can be also strategically motivated. Such parties find it electorally profitable to advocate this position, although their ideologies do not necessarily have to be counter to the principles of EU integration – or if they lack any elaborated ideologies.

Rovny (2004, p.45) found that some Central European parties, which he termed populist (such as the Polish Law and Justice Party and Self-Defence, as well as the marginal Coalition for Republic-Republican Party of Czechoslovakia) are inclined to hard Euroscepticism that is strongly strategically driven.

Hard Euroenthusiasts express principled support for the substance of European integration. This category resonates with what Conti (2003, p.18) termed ‘identity Europeanism’ – i.e., parties that consider European integration as good in itself. In most cases, these are ideologically motivated positions (although they can also be strategically driven). In other words, the EU integration process is ‘not presented in terms of costs and benefits upon the domestic arena or upon the party itself’ (Conti 2003, p. 18). The fundamental principles of these parties are in line with the values underpinning the process of EU integration: they are committed to the closest cooperation among European nations and the transfer of power to supranational institutions. They strongly and consistently support their countries’ EU membership as well as fulfilling all preconditions for EU

accession in candidate countries. These are parties that advocate and support the EU even at the price of losing out – for example, despite growing Eurosceptic sentiments in the public or their core electorate. As Rovny (2004, p. 35) pointed out, they would accept

‘losing voters at the cost of pursuing specific value based ends’ that the EU embodies.

On the other side, soft Eurosceptic parties express contingent opposition to the project of transferring powers to a supranational body such as the EU, as well as further extension of EU competencies. These parties also tend to oppose their countries’ EU membership

‘under current conditions’, but not in principle. In most cases, these are strategically driven positions. In other words, soft Eurosceptic parties may express qualified opposition to the EU and a country’s EU accession in order to secure more votes and in response to the concerns of their core electorate or the general public about the EU. These parties primarily react to incentives coming from the public and the logic of domestic party politics (such as coalition building and the positioning of other parties on this issue). Their approach to the EU is therefore tactically and context-driven, and couched in instrumental terms, primarily on a cost-benefit analysis of the expected benefits for voters or the party itself (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008b). In most cases, these are generally not deeply ideologically rooted parties. As such, their policies on the EU are prone to changes as a reaction to these external challenges. As Rovny (2004) argued, they are willing to amend their programmes by more or less Eurosceptic positions and discourses in the hope of gaining new voters and greater political influence, even at the cost of abandoning some of the parties’ original fundamental principles. This, however, may also be an ideologically motivated position. For example, Rovny (2004, p.40-41) argued that some parties in Central Europe (such as the Christian National Union in Poland and the Smallholders’

Party in Hungary) seem to be ‘mildly ideologically driven’ soft Eurosceptics. This may be the result of the fact that ideologies compel these parties to express neither hard Eurosceptic nor Euroenthisiastic attitudes. They are rather predisposed, by their fundamental values, to be consistently ‘cautious’ about EU issues and inclined to critically assess the EU in principle (not to reject it), regardless of electoral incentives.

Finally, a soft Euroenthusiastic position mostly resonates with Kopecký and Mudde’s (2002, p. 303) Europragmatist category of parties that ‘do not hold a firm ideological opinion on European integration, and on the basis of pragmatic (often utilitarian) considerations decide to assess the EU positively because they deem it profitable for their own country or constituency’. Conti (2003, p.17) argued that this is ‘functional

Europeanism’ which describes parties that express strategic, rather than principled, support for the EU or their countries’ EU membership. They are not committed to further integration unless it is proved that it would serve other, more important interests, such as maximising votes. Conti argued that conditional supports for European integration (and EU membership) are sensitive to contextual factors and these parties therefore can experience shifts according to contextual interest. However, soft Euroenthusiasm may also be an ideologically motivated stance of parties that are not predisposed by their ideology to strongly support the EU, nor to oppose it. They critically assess the EU in principle, but also lean in favour of supporting the EU, irrespective of strategic incentives.