Classifying, Labeling & Coding Parties by Religiosity

Several interviewees stress that the civil war widened religious cleavages and restructured the party system, but also shifted party membership and transformed attitudes

towards women. Widening religious cleavages also created separate enclaves across various religious communities focusing on religious affiliation as an identity. As observed earlier, these cleavages are reflected in the mushrooming of diverse types of parties with confessional and single-sect domination. Some of those parties incorporate religious doctrine into their platforms, while others with civil and secular agendas treat religion as a private matter. I used the

opportunity of the interviews in order to generate a coding system for religiosity that is sensitive to the conceptions that practitioners themselves use. In order to gauge how these politicians understood both their party and its differences from others, I asked them how they describe and classify their parties.

1. Classifying parties into three generic categories: secular, confessional, and religious Examining the responses of party officials reveals the complexity of developing a classification that captures the intensity of religiosity in party platforms. Views offered by interlocutors or national scholars dismiss a left-right or religious-secular divide but also highlight the complex process of developing a realistic classification of parties in Lebanon.

Noting these difficulties, a leader of a pre-war progressive party remarks that,

Classifying Lebanese parties is complex, since there are no left or right parties. There are confessional parties with civil, national or religious orientations, which confuse secular with religious parties. However, by looking at their agendas, you can separate them.

Religious parties are sectarian and anti-secular in which religion acts supreme. These do not separate their religious from political goals. Secular parties do not have religious objectives. Some are pluralist, but few are democratic. I believe in separating religion from politics, but I am skeptical that a religious-secular divide is not realistic.

Scholars also recognize the blurred line that separates religiosity from secularism, but also that, ―…, the traditional unidimensional Left/Right ideological continuum may be too simple to describe how ideology affects women‘s representation.‖ (Kittilson, 1979: 4)²⁸

28 A similar conclusion is reached in studying parties in Western Europe that, ―The standard approach to the programmatic orientation of political parties is to employ the right-left continuum. Although it is true … the simple

Statements of party leaders and elites as well as female party activist did not only dismiss a left-right dichotomy but also highlight that party platforms carry varying religiosities. Programmatic orientations and goals are indicators of party religiosity, which is also central for labeling and coding parties by religiosity.

Even the most committed secularists in Lebanon do not give up their confessional identity. The intertwining of religion and politics in Lebanon is a fact that all interviewees recognize. Therefore, it is imperative for the sustainability of multiple secularisms in Lebanon to do so by remaining within the realm of religious and confessional politics.²⁹ Secularism and religiosity co-exist in varying proportions on parties‘ agendas. This is why a continuum of multiple religiosities and secularisms is adopted to capture party variation in religiosity. The realization that there are varying religiosities guides the process of classifying parties away from a right left or religious secular divide and along a continuum of religiosities and secularisms. A female in a post-war party alludes to this duality between confessionalism and secularism by stating that, ―This is a secular party with a civil intonation and confessional domination. A secular party calls for separation between religion and politics, while a civil party may have religious orientations.

These nuances highlight that religion is a private matter but it also organizes the party along secular interests.‖ These distinctions are worthwhile noting in examining how parties with religious platforms self-identify. In his book on Hizbullah, Sheikh Qassem self-locates the party as an ‗ideological and not a sectarian party‘, where members join because of their allegiance to the doctrine and not to the religious sect they belong to. He explains that,

right-left model is too crude to capture crucial distinctions between party ideologies and party practices…‖ (Lane &

Ersson, 1987: 131

29 See, As.Safir, September 10, 2008.

There is quite a difference between a sectarian, confessional confederacy and a

systematic, doctrinal one. The first draws its disciples based on the influence of birth and belonging irrespective of substance, while the second is founded on conviction and commitment, and harbours a set of guidelines as to moral and practical execution.

(Qassem, 2005: 33).

However, irrespective of semantics and motivations for joining the party, membership in Hizbullah is strictly limited to Muslim Shiites or those who convert and adopt Shi‘ism. Sheikh Qassem defends the party‘s goal in establishing an Islamic state in Lebanon. He explains that,

Such a project is the natural expression of allegiance for any committed Muslim holding on to Islamic conviction and persuaded by its code. It represents the ultimate justice to which man aspires. However, we seek here to detail the difference between the intellectual vision and its practical manifestation, where in the first we summon the creation of an Islamic state and encourage others to adopt it as the supreme representation of human happiness;

while on the second, practical level, we recognize that such development requires a proper foundation that accommodates the creation of the state. ³⁰ (Qassem, 2005: 30)

However, he stresses that there is no compulsion in Islam, leaving it in the hands of the Lebanese to decide whether or not to establish an Islamic state:

We confirm our conviction in Islam as a tenet and system, both intellectual and

legislative, calling on all to learn of it and abide by its code. And we summon the people to adopt it and commit to its instructions, at the individual, political and social levels.

Where the freedom of choosing a governing system is attributed to our people in Lebanon, they will not find a better alternative to Islam. Hence, we call for the

implementation of the Islamic system based on direct and free choice of the people, and not through forceful imposition as may be assumed by some. (Qassem, 2005:31)

This demonstrates, in no uncertain terms, that Hizbullah‘s ultimate goal is to establish an Islamic state in Lebanon when it becomes timely to do so. ³¹ Such religious goals aim to change the political system, an indication of the intensity of religiosity in the party platform, which is useful for labeling and coding parties.

30 A similar argument was advanced by Rachid Al-Ghannoushi, a major Islamic leader in Tunisia, in an interview conducted by Alfred Stepan: ―… that the ideal form of government would be an Islamic government. He acknowledged that in the modern pluralist world it is extremely difficult to achieve this ideal.‖ (Stepan, 2001: 235).

31 Interviews with the Secretary-General of Hizbullah or his deputy were not granted because of the security situation following the July 2006 war. However, his book “Hizbullah: The Story from Within”, provided some answers to my questions.

This information is invaluable in that it distinguishes between parties with confessional membership: some have religious while others have civil platforms. In the latter, religious affiliation is an identity and religion is confined to the private sphere but programmatic orientations are civil and national. In the former, party platforms have religious components.

Parties that self-identify as civil or secular and nationalist are often confessionally dominated, but keep religion in the private realm while retaining it as an identity. They market themselves away from confessionalism by claiming secularity in order to distance themselves from being labeled ‗religious parties‘. In post-war Lebanon, it is a stigma for civil and confessional parties to be labeled ‗religious‘ based only on confessionally-dominated membership, especially with the negative connotation attached to ‗extremists‘ in the aftermath of the civil war. Even, Hizbullah, the most powerful religious party, has been calling for elimination of political sectarianism in the country.³²

Further, confessional parties maintain strong links with their confessional constituencies and identify with their religious affiliation and sect. This religious affiliation is not only an identity, but it is also a ticket to amass voters from the same religious denomination. Voting behavior is a case in point, as some scholars suggest that, ―…, one‘s religious identity provided a cue that oriented voters toward political parties, and helped define one‘s ideological position on the political spectrum.‖ (Norris and Inglehart, 2004:228). For instance, it is considered an act of treason to the sect if someone votes outside her/his religious sect, or for the party that represents that sect, or declares support for the party of another sect, religious or non-religious. Several

32 It has been suggested that the ulterior motive is that Shiites will get a bigger share of the political pie, since they outnumber other communities in Lebanon (An-Nahar, 25 and 30 July 2009). When Hizbullah published its political platform in April 2009, it was also pointed out that, ―The document calls for the abolition of sectarian politics and enactment of a new election law… in order to emphasize the group‘s priorities … to attract optimal representation and perhaps even a majority in parliament…. This will advance Hizbullah toward its fundamental goal: the establishment of an Islamic state that provides expression to the Shiite majority.‖ (Jerusalem Post, June 7, 2009).

scholars have addressed this contentious issue especially after the July 2006 Israeli invasion of Lebanon.³³ This denotes that these parties are protective of their constituencies, controlling of their allegiances, and less tolerant to diversity or differences in opinion.

The views of other party officials point to a preference for separating religion from political agendas but recognize that this is a difficult goal. In this context, a male MP states that,

This party functions within a confessional society but has civil goals. It pursues a bottom-up approach to instill secularism at the grassroots level. But, this is a difficult task. Secularism is like democracy, cannot be imported or imposed from the top. Both should be woven into the fabric of society early on.

What is a certainty, however, is that religion will always be an integral component of the political and party system.³⁴ This is explained by the leader of a post-war party:

Parties form around one religious sect, rally around a leader or founder from that sect, and their membership is dominated by that same single sect. Since parties form along confessional lines instead of socio-economic or political ideologies, any classification into left, right or center of the political spectrum or religious-secular divide becomes meaningless in a country like Lebanon.

This leader concludes by proposing a listing of parties in terms of their agendas and memberships. For instance, in the South, Hizbullah and Amal are dominated by Muslim Shiites.

In the North and Mount Lebanon, the Giants (Marada) and Free Patriotic (Tayyar) parties are dominated by Christian Maronites. In the Shouf district, parties are Druze-dominated, while in Beirut, the Future is Sunni-dominated. In the post-war era, the closest to a concept of a secular

33 See, Op-Eds and articles debating this issue by Lebanese scholars and political scientists, viz., Mona Fayyad, and responses by Sami Efeish, among others, in An-Nahar daily, July and September 2006, various issues.

34 In a society marred by wide conflict-bearing religious cleavages, individuals are born, raised and registered into one of the 18 confessional communities. In this society, secularism and religiosity carry different connotations.

Indeed, religious affiliations and identities matter more to constituencies as an organizing principle and in

‗aggregating interests‘ of religious communities than left-right, economic, political or other ideologies. Therefore, an objective of full secularism starting at the grassroots is utopian in a country like Lebanon, where secularism is socially constructed but not imposed. Nevertheless, efforts to separate religion from politics continue. A new civil society movement composed of male and female scholars and political activists was established in May 2010 calling for secularization and freeing the state from religious domination.

party is Tajaddod, given its plural membership and non-religious platform. However, in the pre-war era, Al-Kutlah was a secular and plural party until its founder went into exile in France during the civil war. This party, like all the pre-war leftist parties, lost clout in the wake of the civil war. This enumeration of relevant and powerful parties in terms of their agendas and memberships lays down the foundations of a framework for classifying and labeling these parties. (Table 3.1 lists the 18 relevant parties)

There is consensus among scholars, political activists and practitioners (interviewees) on the presence of a continuum of multiple secularisms and religiosities, which rules out left-right or religious-secular dichotomies. I extend the multivocal approach to religion, which this dissertation adopts, from the individual to institutional level of political parties.³⁵ Such a

spectrum of religiosities and secularisms in party platforms produces party variation in religiosity and offers a working basis for classifying, labeling and coding parties to capture variation in women‘s leadership. The statements of party officials so far guided the process of grouping parties into three generic categories: (1) secular and a-religious, (2) civil-secularism and

confessional (hereafter civil-confessional), and (3) religious with varying religiosities (hereafter religious). Parties with religious platforms are split into three sub-categories upon examining their platforms and determining the extent to which religion penetrates each of their agendas. In the following section, the process of labeling and coding of parties is described.

2. Labeling and coding parties

The process of coding parties on a spectrum of religiosity and secularism is based on content analysis of mission statements, charters, and more specifically, political platforms.

Content analysis of party platforms revealed a host of goals ranging from secular, leftist, national

35 I am aware that religiosity of individuals, especially when in leadership and decision-making positions, would necessarily influence their attitude towards women‘s leadership. Therefore, an element of subjectivity in interviewees‘ responses is inevitable but is factored into the findings.

and civil to religious objectives which aim to change the political system in line with religious doctrine. In addition, the literature on parties and different ways of classifying them was

extensively reviewed, with a special focus on researchers studying parties in Lebanon. Moreover, in an initial phase of the field research I posed questions to party leaders and elites on how they classify their parties. This information was also essential for developing a preliminary

classification to propose to party leaders and female activists during the second and third round of structured and semi-structured interviews. I sought their views, as politicians and

practitioners, on labeling and coding parties and refined the classification based on the data and information they offered, or on the adjustments they proposed. The process of consultation with party leaders, male and female party activists, national experts and scholars was conducted over the three-year field research. During 2006-2009, the process of labeling and coding parties was transparent and underwent several adjustments and refinements until consensus was reached.

Several interviewees note that secular parties with leftist orientations contain no religious goals. Indeed, a female activist in a pre-war leftist party stresses that,

I do not practice any religious rituals. I cannot carry two faiths and have double allegiance. My faith lies in the ideology of the party that I belong to and I am at peace with myself. I have no choice of being born as a Christian. This is the main problem in Lebanon: the interference of religion and confessionalism with our social and political lives.

Thus, the three pre-war leftist parties (Communist, Baath and Syrian Social) have the least religiosity among the other parties. However, their being anti-religion did not prevent these parties from building alliances with strong religious parties in the post-war era. This was essential to survive and for strategic and electoral reasons.

The second generic category includes those parties whose platforms contain a mixture of secular, civil, national sovereignty, and the goals to ensure continued existence as a confessional

community. These parties include religious affiliation concerns in their agendas but they do not aim to change the political system to match their confessional concerns. They are merely issues of survival, especially for parties whose membership is dominated by, but not limited to, a Christian majority. The Muslim-dominated confessional party (Mustaqbal) does not have any concerns and qualms in this respect, since Lebanon is a Muslim-majority country, after all. In an attempt to compare goals and agendas even within the same category, a female party activist points out that,

The Kata‘éb, Marada, or Lebanese Forces tend to have more religious components in their platforms than the Tayyar or Wa‘ad. Also, Mustaqbal has less religiosity than the extremist Jama‘a Islamiah, where there are no women in leadership. These are extremely conservative, especially the Sunni Islamist parties, closer to the ‗Wahabi‘ in Saudi Arabia.

Taking this comparison in stride, one would further split the nine post-war civil-confessional parties into different religiosities, as this respondent suggests. However, reverting to the content analysis of their platforms, consulting with other party elites and scholars, and also noting that there are only 18 parties, these parties are retained within the same category. Another female activist states that,

Civil-confessional parties are premised on religious value system but have a civil

agenda. They are pluralist, tolerant, democratic and gender-sensitive. Secular parties are not religious at all, but lapsed into traditionalism after the war. Religious parties are conservative and look at the doctrine as a political and social contract.

Moreover, officials in a couple of Christian-dominated parties highlight that they start their meetings with prayer and that their party logo carries the cross. In addition, their platform is guided by Christian values while their main concern is to exist as a community in Lebanon. A case in point is the testimony of a female official in one of these parties:

I am committed to Christianity before politics. The party is existential and our priority is protecting Christians in Lebanon and the Middle East. This takes precedence over other political goals. The party‘s logo -- the cross -- attests to this and so does our mission

statement which is premised on Christian values. We pledge to defend our religion when we join and start our meetings with prayers. Maintaining our Christian identity is our concern.³⁶

Essentially, these parties do not aim to change the political system, but they definitely have few religious-related goals. Therefore, this category is labeled civil-confessional parties and

assigned a coding on the religiosity scale less than that assigned to secular parties, because of their concerns about maintaining their confessional identity qua goal of existence as a religious community.

The third generic category is parties with religious platforms and varying religiosities.

Three of these parties are led by clergymen. They are Sunni-dominated and incorporate the doctrine in their platforms. These parties are guided by the doctrine in their social and political lives. Their ultimate goal and objective is to change the political system into an Islamic state and

Three of these parties are led by clergymen. They are Sunni-dominated and incorporate the doctrine in their platforms. These parties are guided by the doctrine in their social and political lives. Their ultimate goal and objective is to change the political system into an Islamic state and