( 3) that Clodius in 38 had attacked Caesar's legislation.

From his breach with Pompey over the. Tigranes affair until they were reconciled after Luca, Clodius showed himself unremittingly hostile to Pompey and to Pompey's friends. At no time, with the possible exceptions of the trials of Sestius .and of Caelius, which will be discussed below, does he seem to have acted against the interests of Crassus, or indeed of Caesar. He was helped by L.Piso and Vatinius, and invoked Crassus' name against Pompey. It must be considered how far his actions will have

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suited Crassus' own. policy. It has been argued above that, when it suited him, Crassus was able to induce Clodius to make his peace with Pompey, It would seem reasonable to assume, therefore, that Crassus did not try to restrain him earlier. It is indeed possible that he may have encouraged Clodius, in an attempt to achieve Pompey's total ruin. It

could be argued that the events of 59 had in fact left Pompey weaker than before. That he had been unable earlier to provide land for his veterans had been damaging to his prestige, but the hostility aroused by the manner of that eventual provision may, in the long run, have been more serious. His Eastern acta had been ratified, but were now being questioned and his authority assailed. Caesar, the agent he had used to achieve these ends, seemed perhaps rather less subservient than Pompey was accustomed to

expect, Afranius, and even M.Piso, despite a possible brief

embarrassment over the Bona Pea affair, had been firmly his men. After an attempt to break with Crassus, Pompey had been persuaded, perhaps partly by Caesar, that such a move was dangerous, and that Clodius must be allowed to have his way with Cicero. More unpopular than ever with the boni, who blamed him for all of Caesar's acts, Pompey was now attacked by Clodius, and reduced to total impotence for the rest of the year. He became eager to secure Cicero's recall, both for the symbolic value of such a move as a blow to Clodius, and also perhaps because Cicero may have

represented what he felt to be his only hope at this point, some kind of reconciliation with the boni.

This latter consideration is likely to have been a strong inducement for crassus to try to keep Cicero away. Whether he ever.expected to'be able indefinitely to prevent Cicero's return must be uncertain. ' Cicero's absence.and Clodius' ascendency must together have promised as good a chance to crush Pompey completely as he was likely to find. With Pompey

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eclipsed, Cato out of the way, and Caesar friendly but occupied in Gaul, Crassus alone would remain, unquestionably the strongest political figure in Rome.

The bulk of Clodius' legislation seems aimed at securing his own power base. He sought popular support by distributing free grain, and organised it by restoring the collegia. He provided against obstruction by his modification of the leges Aelia et Fufia. His limitation of a censor's powers to distribute notae may have had the same motive. He disarmed, at least for a while, any possible opposition from the consuls, Piso and Gabinius, by laws giving them provinces. He got rid of both Cato and Cicero (MRR2.196). Nothing in this programme is likely to have been displeasing to Crassus, nor as has been shown, does he seem to have needed to worry that Clodius, having achieved power, might turn on him.

Clodius and Crassus miscalculated if they did hope to crush Pompey. He seems to have been caught unprepared by Clodius* volte face, unable to

meet the challenge, and driven to seek ignominious'refuge in his own house (Cic.Pis.28;Asc.46-7G)- The optimates were delighted by Clodius' assault on Pompey (Cic.Har.Resp.50), and seem to have cooperated with Clodius (Cic.QF.2.2.2-3;cf-Faim.1.9»10). It may be at this time that approaches were made to Caesar by the optimates, offering to have all the legislation of 59 resubmitted to the comitia, this time with due

observance of the niceties of the laws (Cic.Prov.Cons.46). This could seem to constitute an invitation formally to abandon his alliance with Pompey,.and. to be received into the optimate fold. It was not accepted. Caesar was careful not to make any move himself that could be ' construed as "hostile to Pompey. L.Piso and Vatinius may have sided with Clodius

.against Pompey at various times, but Caesar maintained correct relations with his son-in-law. Thus Pompey continued to honour the alliance by

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consulting Caesar on the subject of Cicero's recall (Cic.Att.5.l8.1). It would be interesting to know whether Crassus was also consulted. It is possible, Cicero was particularly concerned to know what was Pompey's attitude in the matter. In September 58 Cicero was delighted with the news that, if Caesar agreed, Pompey would take up the case (Att.5-18.1). Some two months later, Atticus had written to him analysing the various political factors involved, "de Crasso, de Pompeio, de ceteris" (Att.5 -25-5)- Crassus may have tried to delay matters, but nevertheless have accepted that Cicero's return was inevitable. He greeted Cicero when he reached Rome (Plut.Cic.55-5), and indeed later agreed to defend Sestius, who had been prominent in procuring the recall (Schol.Bob.125 St.). He had no wish for an open breach with Pompey, but was scrupulous in fulfilling his duties as an ally. Even Metellus Nepos, Clodius' kinsman and at this time regular supporter in other matters (Cic.Att.4.5-5;Dio 49-7-4-8.1),

eventually cooperated in promoting Cicero's return (Cic.Att.5-22.2;5-25-1; 5.24.2;Red.in Sen.25;cf-Att.5-12.1).

Pompey engaged force to counter that of Clodius. T.Annius Milo and P.Sestius, tribunes in 57, gathered their own street gangs, but, despite the support of six other tribunes, were prevented for some time from

securing Cicero's recall by Clodius, who, although no longer tribune, still had his own popular following and the aid of the remaining two tribunes

(MRR2.201-2). Eventually, however, on 4 August 57, tbe bill recalling Cicero was passed, and he returned to Rome a month later (Cic.Dorn.90; Att.4.1.4-5)- This, and the fact that Cicero at once successfully

proposed in the senate that Pompey should be invested with special imperium to supervise the city's grain supply (Cic.Att.4.1.6), have been taken to show that Pompey had at last succeeded in overcoming optimate suspicions. .This may not be thè case, A bill to put into effect Cicero'.s proposal '

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was presented the next day by the consuls, P.Lentulus Spinther and Metellus Nepos (Att.4.1.7). At the same time, a tribune, C.Messius, proposed a measure, similar in application, but vastly greater in the

power to be conferred, Messius' bill included control over all the state's finances, an army, a fleet, and maius imperium throughout the empire (ibid.). It could be that Messius was deliberately making his proposals unreasonable, with the intention that the more modest consular proposal would be

gratefully accepted as the lesser evil. On the other hand, it is not impossible that Pompey did hope that, in his rediscovered auctoritas, he might indeed secure the vast power offered by Messius. Cicero clearly suspected Pompey's true wishes, but he did not wish to compromise himself too far with the optimates by supporting Messius, since he was still

awaiting the judgement of the pontifices about his house, of which the site had been consecrated as a temple, in his absence, by Clodius (ibid.).

Cicero had felt free to make his original proposal, and indeed claimed that all the consulars were willing to grant Pompey anything at all (ibid.). In the same passage, however, he records the fury of the consulars at Messius' proposals. Clearly their willingness was not infinite.

In view of the hostility shown towards Pompey by the boni, earlier in 58, and later in 56, when, for example, Sex.Cloelius is said to have been acquitted by the senatorial votes out of enmity for Pompey (Cic.QF.2.4.6), their apparent .friendliness in this matter of the corn command might seem surprising. It could be that Clodius^ had gone too far in the violence of his opposition to Pompey and to Cicero's recall, and that the boni were prepared to recall Cicero, and to honour Pompey, in order to impose a curb on Clodius. Another factor may have been the matter of

Ptolemy Auletes, who arrived in Rome in the summer of 57, having been driven from Egypt by his subjects. There-ensued a lengthy debate whether

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he should be restored, and, if so, how and by whom. At first it was agreed that he should be restored by the governor of Cilicia, the province assigned to Spinther for 56 (Dio 59.12.1-5;Cic.Fam.1.1.5). Auletes had been recognised as King in 59, in return for a considerable sum of money promised to Caesar and Pompey (Dio 39-12.'1;Suet.Iul.54.2), which had not been paid in full by 57-^^ Besides this financial motive, Pompey was unwilling that anyone else should have the opportunity to gain influence in the East. Since Spinther was a friend and adherent of his

(Cic.Att.2.22.2), Pompey did not canvass openly for the post, but arranged for others to maice proposals on his behalf. Three tribunes worked to that end in 58, L.Caninius Callus, A.Plautius, and P.Rutilius Lupus

(MRR.2.209). It is specifically stated in one source that Spinther cooperated in proposing Pompey's grain commission, in order to remove Pompey from the running for Auletes' restoration (Plut.Pomp.4-9-5)« Messius' proposal could then be seen as an attempt to win back the

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initiative over Egypt for Pompey, Egypt was a vital supplier of grain to the Roman market, and, with an army and maius imperium, Pompey could have had the physical capability and the legal right to supplant Spinther, without the need for any further legislation. By ensuring that his corn commission was essentially unmilitary, Pompey's opponents made such a step much more difficult. By giving him the commission at all, they were able to argue that Pompey was occupied, and surely too busy to be

burdened with any further responsibility. From his arrival, Ptolemy, who stayed in Pompey's house, had made plain his preference for Pompey as the .man to restore him (Dio 59*14.3;16.2;cf^QF.2.2.5)« Pompey's aspirations

being thus plain, the corn commission may have been a deliberate concession of the lesser evil, to prevent.the greater.

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contention between Clodius and Pompey. In 57, no longer immune from prosecution, Clodius was twice indicted by Milo, In the first instance he was protected by the consul Nepos, his cousin, by his brother Appius, then praetor, and by one of the two tribunes who supported him in that year (Cic,Sest.89). It was Milo's failure in this that led him to resort to the use of armed bands (Cic.Red.in Sen.19), which helped to effect Cicero's recall. He then renewed the prosecution, Clodius was seeking the aedileship for 56, which would confer fresh immunity. Milo blocked the elections with the backing of the consul designate,

Cn.Lentulus Marcellinus. Nepos, Appius Claudius, and Hortensius all in various ways helped Clodius to secure election unprosecuted (Cic.Att. 4.3-3-5), which he did early in 58 (Dio 39-18.1).

Crassus may have been disappointed by Clodius* relative failure in 57 to subdue Pompey. By the end of that year, however, Pompey had been, to some extent, contained. Cicero had returned, and Pompey had gained a prestigious command. .The command could, however, have been more

dangerous, and Cicero was behaving cautiously as he awaited the various verdicts concerning his house. This could be the reason that Cicero proposed a supplicatio of unprecedented length for Caesar's successes in Gaul (Cic.Prov.Cons.26;cf.Caes.BG.2.35-4;Dio 39-9-1;Plut.Caes.21.1). Caesar as Pontifex Maximus, though absent, may have been able to retain considerable influence in the deliberations of the pontifices. It is

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