Giddens (1979), Ortner (2006a; 2006b), and Robb (2010) have all theorized ideas of agency within the realm of social theory. Ortner argues that all social life is
intentional and that all actively played social life is goal-driven. She acknowledges that goals change over time but makes the important distinction between “routine
practices,” which can be understood as habitus and “more intentionalized action” which she defines as agency (Ortner 2006b: 135). The agent is not completely free in his or her ability to make decisions and act accordingly. The agent is free only to an extent and is constrained by unequal power relations and competition, or societal structure.
Therefore, agency is “always culturally constructed and maintained” (Ortner 2006b: 139).
All agents have the capacity to transform and be transformed. But certain limitations of agency exist. Time and power relations are both important variables governing agency (Giddens 1979: 55). Likewise, forms of power, such as dominance and resistance affect agency because they limit both what an agent can do and what an agent is more likely to do. Giddens states that “it is a necessary feature of action that, at any point in time, the agent ‘could have acted otherwise’ [sic]” (Giddens 1979: 56). Multiple variables and multiple possibilities increase the complexity of a social system. Similarly, Giddens understands agency as an intentional process. Giddens (1979)
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stresses the importance of institutions and rules. He argues that people act according to certain rules, but this action feeds back into the rules. Certain conscious and
unconscious social and cultural rules are accepted by agents and need to be understood in historical context; these rules can be evidenced in the behaviors and daily practices that they produce. These ideas express the interconnectedness of theories involving structure and agency.
Robb (2010: 493) also understands agency as “a capacity for action.” Agency is contextual and depends on relationships. He states that it is “not a characteristic of individuals but of relationships” (Robb 2010: 494). Archaeologists need to understand the historical background and specific contextual situation of agency for proper interpretation. Agency is also inherently material because people use objects and
objects effect people’s decisions. Therefore, a discussion of materiality is also necessary. Robb (2010) specifically discusses agency from the view point of archaeology. He
acknowledges that agency has been a “notoriously ambiguous concept” (Robb 2010: 493). However, it can also be very useful.
Robb discusses past approaches to agency within archaeology in three thematic stages. The first trend formed around the basis that agency could be understood as intentional action (1970s and 1980s). Research at this time focused on the perspective of ambitious individuals seeking power. These past actions were seen to lead to the institutionalization of social hierarchy. In this way, agency was seen as “the individual’s ability to effect his or her will or intention” (Robb 2010: 496). However, Robb states that this view makes assumptions about human behavior: action is only analyzed in terms of
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intentionality and it is assumed that some people are not motivated to seek power. Robb critiques this approach, asserting that it may work for an analysis of elites, but what about the rest of society? He argues that agency is not something possessed by individuals; rather, relationships are fundamentally important. The author states that “the intentional pursuit of goals is possible only through complicity with power structures, cultural ideas, [and] ways of behaving” (Robb 2010: 499).
The second trend of agency in archaeology is that it came to be understood as dialectic (1990s). Agency was “not an individual’s ability to affect others; it is the dual, socially reproductive quality of action” (Robb 2010: 497). However, Robb states that this approach also makes assumptions. He asserts that people act within culturally specific social structures, but action is not limited by these structures. Additionally, actions can cause both intentional and unintentional modifications to structures and lead to social change. He addresses all of these factors as the “landscape of action” defined as the “set of possibilities and challenges formed by the past” (Robb 2010: 498).
Agency needs to be understood within specific historical contexts or “fields of action” (Robb 2010: 499). Agency is best understood in terms of ‘projects’ through which goals are pursued. Agency develops from certain “shared understandings” that are contextually developed (Robb 2010: 500). Robb asserts that “in acting within a field of action, people act creatively, varying what they do to accomplish a proximate
intention. Individual actions are often less embedded in habit, time and space; though often habitual, they are readily learnt and unlearnt” (Robb 2010: 501). How an
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variation occurs. Robb states that “such variation encompasses many of the individual strategies of competition, emulation, innovation, redefinition, resistance and
subversion” (Robb 2010: 501).
The third change that Robb discusses is that agency came to be seen as relational (2000s). This approach deals with material agency, networks, and “the mutually constitutive relationships between agents and their material and social
contexts” (Robb 2010: 502). Specifically, linking relationships are important because the capacity for action stems from participation in these relationships; the individual cannot act in isolation. Robb also discusses the possibility of collective agency. He gives the example of a soldier, saying that it is “really a collectivity which is acting through the individual hand” (Robb 2010: 503). However, just because a soldier has been trained to act collectively does not mean that the individual soldier will always do so. Robb goes on to state that “group behavior is usually a negotiated compromise which is shaped by both individual and group agendas but is reducible to neither” (Robb 2010: 503).
The particular context of agency needs to be analyzed by looking at fields of action. A person decides why to act, the field of action determines how. Relationships between people and things are also important to an archaeological analysis involving agency as the production and use of an object depends on and recreates specific cultural relationships (Robb 2010: 513).