6.1.1 Introduction to the concept of duality
It has been argued that the emotion of surprise, which is triggered in the unconscious and automatic state, will lead the individual into a reflective and conscious mode of thinking (q.v. ch.5). While in principle this transition seems to be valid the either/or distinction doesn’t explain the complexity of human mind (see Carruthers, 2012). As
Lieberman, et al. (2002) suggests, based on their conceptualisation of the cognitive duality, when the reflective mind (C-system) gets engaged the non-reflective mind (X- system) continues to operate. From a consistent perspective, Evans (2008) challenges the traditional distinction between system 1 and system 2 thinking, by supporting that it is possible to have a system 2 which involves not only conscious, slow and controlled cognitions, but also, fast, uncontrolled and unconscious ones. It seems, therefore, that whilst the individual has become consciously aware of the potentially discrepant evidence, unconscious and intuitive cognitions affect the change process in this latter reflective state (i.e. Marcel, 1983). This idea will be elaborated in the following sections. However, before proceeding in the analysis of how the two systems dynamically interact, it is essential to present them “in isolation” and explain how they are conceptualized within the scope of this work.
Researchers in dual theories have suggested various characteristics according to which the cognitive processes could be categorized (see Evans, 2008 for a review). Recent
scientific evidence on change readiness, though, advocates a main distinction between cognitive and affective evaluations (Rafferty, Jimmieson & Armenakis, 2013; Stevens, 2013). Similarly, LeDoux (2007) argues that emotional-affective cognitions, which belong to intuitive-experiential thinking (Evans, 2008; Epstein, 1994), are different from various cognitive functions that are well developed in humans. These emotional cognitions evaluate the evidence in reference to someone’s well-being (Cunningham & Kirkland, 2012; LeDoux, 2007) which, not only results in some sort of feeling (the classic notion of appraisal) but also determines if the evaluated reality will be accepted or not (Frijda, 2007b).
Table 15. Various considerations of the duality
Ego-driven mind Gnosis-driven mind Reference
C ha nge theor ie s
Affective evaluations Cognitive Interpretations Gibson (1995); Rafferty, et al. (2013); Stevens (2013) Appr aisal theor ies o f emot ion
Affective appraisal Cognitive evaluation Castelfranchi (2000) Associative Rule - Based Smith & Neumann, (2005) Emotional processing Cognitive Processing LeDoux (2007)
Intuitive Appraisal Deliberate appraisal Arnold (1960) Schematic system Propositional system Schaefer, et al. (2003)
Appraisal Inferential strategies Lazarus & Smith (1988) Implications for
someone’s well-being
Non- evaluative and fact oriented
Kuppens & Van Mechelen (2007)
Reinstatement Computation Clore & Ortony (2000)
Dua l- P roc ess t he o rie s
Hot Cold Abelson (1963)
Experiential Rational Epstein (1994)
System 1 System 2 Stanovich (1999)
Type 1 Type 2 Evans (2008)
X-system C-system Lieberman, et al. (2002) Intutive systems Reflective architecture Carruthers (2009)
Accosiative Propositional Gawronski & Bodenhausen (2007) Hot “Go” system Cool “Know” system Metcalfe & Mischel (1999)
P
hil
osophy
Protagorian
Subjectivity Platonic Objectivity
Versenyi (1962); Goldstein & Alexander (2006) Current perspective to which individual is beholden Considers additional perspectives
Nagel (1989); Nietzsche (in Anderson, 1998)
Following the duality which is recommended by change management theorists, it is argued that an individual, during the reflective state, not only cognitively interprets the evidence for change but also emotionally evaluates it in the light of personal concerns
(Gibson, 1995). This proposed cognitive-affective duality is conceptualized in two systems, the ego-driven (hot) and the gnosis-driven (cold), the properties of which are demonstrated in table 15. Generally speaking, the systems consist of cognitive and affective processes which continually interact (Goel & Dolan, 2003) and jointly determine behaviours (Pessoa, 2008) as well as create mental-models of conscious understanding (Christensen & Olson, 2002). Consequently, any action that an individual may undertake, like accept or decline the proposed evidence for change, depends on the mental model that will be triggered (Senge, 2006:8) as a result of their function (analysed throughout the chapter). It should be noted, though, that the suggested categorization is by no means restrictive since there are important differences between concepts that belong in the same column (cf. Evans, 2008). Thus, each box should not be considered an absolute representation of the general system to which it belongs, but as a building block for its development.
6.1.2 The ego-driven system
The ego-driven mind comprises the implicit and personal schematic beliefs (Lazarus, 1991a:140; Lazarus & Smith, 1988: General Knowledge), or else the unconscious mental models which are developed mainly through past experiences (Fiske & Linville, 1980) and influence someone’s understanding about how the world works (Senge, 2006:8). In addition, it includes superordinate goals (ego-ideals: refer to sec 4.3), which along with the previous construct a global meaning system (enduring knowledge) that guides schematic interpretations as well as associations and, thereby, formulates understanding of a particular encounter (Park, 2010; Park, & Folkman, 1997; Cervone, 2004). Similarly, individuals in organizations, like leaders, hold schematic beliefs and mental constructs in order to make sense of their organizational life (see Harris, 1994). Based on them, they generate, automatically and fast, the stream of consciousness (Lieberman, et al. 2002: X-system) in the context of their organizational environment, and proceed to actions that have been developed after years of accumulated learning and experience (Lieberman, 2003).
The ego-driven system precedes the gnosis-driven one, since it consists of rapid and automatic cognitions and takes place in the intuitive-experiential mind (Evans, 2008;
Epstein, 1994). Its processes refer to hot-affective cognitions (Abelson, 1963), the core of which is the automatic (Lazarus, 1991b; Moors, 2010), schematic (Leventhal & Scherer, 1987) or else intuitive (Arnold, 1960:182) appraisals. They are necessarily evoked and evaluate the evidence based on past experiences, current goals and unconscious schematic expectations (Ellsworth, 2013; Smith & Neumann, 2005) that belong to someone’s global meaning system, as described above. Consistent with the classic notion of appraisals (i.e. Moors, Ellsworth, Scherer, & Frijda, 2013), their role is to evaluate the implications of an encounter for someone’s well-being by considering any kind of concerns and, thereby, to produce an emotional experience. Following this logic, the word “ego” aims on the one hand to conceptualize the close relation between “hot” cognitions and the self-ego (Chandler, & Birch, 2010:695), on the other hand to separate these cognitions from other ‘colder’ ones, like various attributional and inferential strategies (Lazarus & Smith, 1988; Lazarus, 2001:57), which within the scope of this work will be included in the gnosis-driven system.
If an individual could appraise evidence only with ego-driven processes, the outcomes would be extremely susceptible to ego-centric subjectivity (see subsequent sections for in depth analysis). Apparently, ego-driven cognitions are consistent with the classic notion of appraisal and, therefore, are based on subjective, instead of objective, evaluations of the evidence at hand (Kuppens & Van Mechelen, 2007; Scherer, 1999a). More precisely, appraisals draw upon various types of information, like personal goals, that lie in the “repository” of the unconscious (Borgh, & Borndollor, 1996) global meaning system in order to subjectively evaluate specific stimuli (Moors, 2013b), and, thereby, construct the personal and unique reality for any individual (Ben-Ze'Ev, 2003:155). Thus, consistent with the concept that “the man is the measure of all things”
(Protagoras famous doctrine in Versenyi, 1962), it could be argued that the close relationship between the self-ego and the appraisals make the outcomes of this system subjective in their very essence.
6.1.3 The gnosis-driven system
Awareness of (emotional) mental processes (Scherer, 2004) along with any contextual knowledge (Lazarus & Smith, 1988), or else understanding, of a particular encounter at a given moment are realized in the conscious gnosis-driven system (consciousness: Schneider & Velmans, 2008). From a traditional theoretical perspective, it could be argued that various construal related cognitions, such as inferential strategies and
attributions, evaluate the received evidence by drawing upon the personal global meaning system (Lazarus & Smith, 1988: General Knowledge; Park, 2010; Park, & Folkman, 1997) and formulate what individuals understand (Lazarus, 1991b). This seems to suggest that inferential strategies and attributions function similarly to appraisals (sec. 6.1.2), which explains why various authors have treated them as either being the same thing or the cold counterparts of appraisals (Lazarus, 1991a; Lazarus & Smith, 1988). Within the scope of this work, a distinction between the processes of the two systems will be accepted without though falling into the trap of the illusionary competition between hot/heart and cold/mind reasoning (Phelps, Lempert & Sokol- Hessner, 2014).
In essence, the cognitive processes of the gnosis-driven system allow human beings to reflect on thestream of consciousness that has already been produced by the ego-driven system (Lieberman, et al. 2002: non-reflective consciousness) and, thus, offer the basis for a “re-evaluation” of the evidence (Lieberman, et al. 2002: reflective consciousness). In contrast to Lazarus & Smith (1988; but see Smith, Haynes, Lazarus & Pope, 1993), this revaluation defers from previous ego-driven appraisals by coming later and consistent with the main characteristics of system 2 thinking, is reflective, conscious and deliberate (Evans, 2008). That is, cognitions in the gnosis-driven system are able to place the individual in a relative distance, compared to intuitive appraisals, from the object-ego and its activities (Sartre’s notion of reflection in Morris, 1985) and, thereby, review the emotional outcomes of the ego-driven system (refer to sec. 6.1.2) in a thoughtful and strategic way (Evans, 2006b). On this basis, it can be argued that reflective cognitions refer to a “cold” processing of the already generated emotion that aims, mainly yet not exclusively (analysed below), to regulate and control (Smith & Neumann, 2005) rather than produce the emotional experience (Schaefer, et al. 2003). Let’s for a moment leave aside the notion of reflection and consider an imaginary scenario in which a situation is appraised solely with gnosis-driven processes that operate autonomously and without the support or contribution of the ego-driven system. It is argued that in such imaginary cases, the absolute objectivity as this is reflected in nature’s unchanging true “forms” (Plato’s “external” conception of truth in Goldstein & Alexander, 2006) would have been approximated or even realized (if it exists at all). This is because, this kind of cognition is mainly, yet not exclusively (see below), driven by the evidence (Kuppens & Van Mechelen, 2007) that describes the
objective reality which is distanced, or more precisely separated, from the individual
(Ben-Ze'Ev, 2003:155). Yet, this is probably impossible, as the ego even in the conscious and reflective state affects understanding and continues to ascribe meaning to the world (Husserl in Ratcliffe, 2002). As Lazarus (1991b) supports, attributions and inferential strategies which are responsible for producing “cold” contextual knowledge include to a limited extent the self, which, as it will be analysed in the following section, is mainly due to the fact that gnosis-driven evaluations are intertwined with ego-driven appraisals (Lazarus, 1991a; Storbeck & Clore, 2007).