A cognitive error

Consider what it’s like when you push a finger down onto a hard object like a table. Nowadays we know that the vast majority of the mass of an object is concentrated in the nuclei of the atoms that comprise it. And we know that these nuclei are separated by empty space – so much of it that the composition of objects is 99.9% empty space. If we were to ask someone in the eighteenth century if the table felt like it was mostly empty space, they would say ‘no’. They would say the table feels ‘solid’ – by which they would mean the table feels ‘saturated’ or ‘full’ of mass. Call the property of being ‘full of mass’ solidity*. Even though today we know that tables are not solid*, we might even be tempted to agree that they nevertheless feel solid*, devoid of the empty space we know they largely consist of. But it would wrong to conclude that our, or anyone’s experience for that matter, represents solidity*; it would be a mistake to characterise our experience as being as of solidity* - even as an illusion.

We understand and characterise the content of a non-veridical experience on the basis of what the experience would be of, were it veridical. We know what it is like to have a veridical experience of a red ball, so we know what an experience as of a red ball is like

– whether it be veridical or non-veridical. An experience of X is in this sense logically prior to an experience as of X. We could say that non-veridical experiences are parasitic on veridical experiences in this way.14 So to find out what an experience as of solidity* would be like, we need to ask what a veridical experience of solidity* would be like. What would a veridical experience of solidity* be like, then? Well, if a volume the size of a table was saturated with mass – if the atoms were compressed such that there was no empty space between the nuclei and electrons – then there would be all manner of forces in play, and touching it would be nothing like touching a table. It can’t therefore be right to say that we ever have experiences as of solidity*, even illusory ones. Instead, our deeply-held pre-scientific intuitions about mass and what it should feel like lead us astray when we characterise our experiences.

This example shows us something important about the relationships between phenomenology, belief, and the content of experience. ‘Phenomenology’ is traditionally put in terms of ‘seemings’: the phenomenology of X is how X seems to the subject. But as the solidity* example shows, a subject’s phenomenological reports – what they would say an experience seems like – is infected by their beliefs and intuitions about the way the world is. Someone from the eighteenth century believes that tables are solid*, and they have no reason to believe their experience isn’t representing the world accurately, so they would say the table seems solid*. But this shows that what a subject’s experience is actually representing does not always align with how it seems to them. A subject’s beliefs and intuitions about the way the world is can lead them astray in characterising the content of their experience. The error is not perceptual; it is, if you like, cognitive. This is the basis of the PT error theory I will be proposing. Just as faulty intuitions lead us astray in characterising the content of experience when we touch hard objects, so our faulty intuitions lead us astray when we characterise temporal experience. More specifically I propose that what leads us astray when we think about our experience of time is the way we think about ourselves as subjects of experience. The way we intuitively think about

14 _{One potential objection with this principle – that veridical experiences are logically prior to}

non-veridical experiences – might make use of the waterfall illusion. In the waterfall illusion we have an experience as of a scene which appears to be both moving and not moving. So the content of the experience is contradictory. But it is surely impossible to have a veridical experience with a contradictory content, so it cannot be the case that non-veridical experiences are parasitic on veridical ones. We can respond to this objection by utilising the distinction that was drawn in chapter 3 between the perception of ‘pure motion’ and the perception of positional change. The waterfall illusion does not have a contradictory content so long as we distinguish between these two representations. The waterfall illusion represents ‘pure motion’ without representing positional change (see Mellor 1988 for a similar argument).

ourselves is essentially Non-Reductionist. If we could free ourselves from our Non- Reductionist shackles, it would make no sense to suppose that time seems to pass. If we could assimilate Reductionism into our belief system, we wouldn’t mischaracterise temporal experience.

The outline of the account is as follows. The belief that we have experiences as of A- change necessarily presupposes the concept of personal identity. Without the concept of personal identity – that the same subject can exist at two different times – it would make no sense to suppose that a subject could experience P at t1 and Q at t2.15 That is, it would make no sense to suppose that one could experience Q replacing P. And if it would make no sense to suppose that one could experience Q replacing P, it would make no sense to suppose that one could have an experience as of Q replacing P; if it is impossible to conceptualise an experience of X, it is impossible to conceptualise an experience as of X. Because Parfittian Reductionism is true, a conceptual scheme which lacked the concept of personal identity would be just as metaphysically accurate as ours. This Reductionist scheme should be preferred, as were we equipped with it we would not fall into the Non- Reductionist trap of thinking that our persistence is metaphysically significant. And, further, we would not fall into another Non-Reductionist trap of thinking that time seems to pass.

Parallels can be drawn between my proposal and Simon Prosser’s (2016). Prosser also denies that we experience time as passing, since he considers the notion of temporal passage to be unintelligible. If experience were to represent time passing, it would therefore have a ‘necessarily false’ content. But, Prosser urges, experience cannot have a necessarily false content; so it cannot represent time passing. Prosser is, as such, a PT error theorist.

However, Prosser is not always read as a PT error theorist. Hoerl (2014) for example appears to have him down as a PT intuitionist (i.e. someone who thinks temporal passage is represented in experience). The reason for this misclassification might, I suggest, be due in part to Prosser’s account of why time seems to pass. He thinks that the putative ‘dynamic’ phenomenology of temporal experience can be explained by our experience representing objects as enduring. He invokes the Kantian idea (1787 [1996]: 257) that

change requires identity: ‘only the permanent (i.e. substance) undergoes change […] this permanent makes possible the presentation of the transition from one state to another’. It is natural to read ‘the transition from one state to another’ as describing A-theoretic change. Now, Prosser thinks ‘permanence’ is represented – insofar as we have experiences as of enduring objects. So, since he holds that permanence is represented in experience, and he invokes the claim that this ‘permanence’ is required for the presentation of (A-theoretic) change, we might reasonably expect him to also hold that A-change is (re)presented. The fact that he doesn’t think so might be thought to create something of a tension in his account; and one that is perhaps evidenced by Hoerl’s misclassification of his position.

What I propose shares the general idea that change requires identity, but differs in several respects. Prosser proposes, in short, that time seems to pass because:

Experience (mis)represents objects (and ourselves qua subjects of experience) as enduring.

Whereas I propose that time seems to pass because:

We conceive of ourselves qua subjects of experience as persisting.

There are a few key differences. Firstly, my account locates the error at (and restricts it to) the level of conceptualisation, rather than experience. Because of this, the account sits squarely within the providence of the PT error theorist, and avoids any tension that might be thought to be present in Prosser’s account. It says that the error is cognitive, rather than perceptual.

One immediate objection here would be that the distinction between conceptualisation and experience might not be so cut-and-dried: how we conceptualise the world bleeds into the way we experience it. This is the basic idea behind conceptualism (but a nonconceptualist would presumably be willing to accept this claim up to a point). To respond to this objection, we may reconsider the solidity* example. The solidity* example shows that we can distinguish between perceptual and cognitive errors. As was argued, we cannot regard the experience we have when we touch solid objects as a perceptual illusion. Our experience cannot be representing solidity*; the mistake can only be one of characterisation. Further, it is not even clear that this commits us against the

claim that the way we experience the world depends on our concepts. All we need to claim is that we are able to distinguish between perceptual and cognitive errors. And we don’t even need to claim that there is always a neat distinction between perceptual and cognitive errors; it will suffice to show that in some cases there is. And this is precisely what the solidity* example establishes.

Secondly, my account focuses exclusively on the identity of subjects, and ignores objects. This is because, for it to make sense that one could experience A-change, it is necessary and sufficient that subject identity is preserved through the change; but it is neither necessary nor sufficient that object identity is. To explain: If you experience P (and not Q) and I experience Q (and not P), clearly neither of us has an experience of Q replacing P – even if the set of objects in P and Q are the same. So subject identity is necessary, but object identity is not sufficient, for the experience of A-change. On the other hand, P and Q could be states of affairs with distinct objects. When we awake suddenly from a vivid dream, for example, the objects that were represented are replaced by an entirely new set. So we can make sense of experiencing A-change without object identity, provided the same subject experiences both sets of objects. Hence, subject identity is sufficient, but object identity is not necessary.

Thirdly, Prosser’s account focuses on a particular kind of persistence (viz. endurance), whereas mine is concerned with persistence per se. Prosser’s account relies on the falsity of endurance theory to explain temporal phenomenology. The problem with this approach is that endurance theory is naturally aligned with the A-theory, so Prosser’s account won’t do anything to convince many A-theorists that temporal passage is not represented in experience. Further, it’s not clear that B-theorists are forced to reject endurance theory, so his solution won’t necessarily appeal to all B-theorists either. The account I propose, on the other hand, engages both sides of the debate. Everyone should recognise that the way we naturally conceive of ourselves as subjects of experience is flawed. Whether you think that persons persist by perduring, enduring, or exduring, you must, if you accept Reductionism (which you should), accept that we could equally well describe persons as non-persisting.