Coherence

The fifth and final variable concerns the coherence of the regime, that is the extent to which its internal social structure is conflictual or consensual. A more coherent regime is, ideally at least, likely to enjoy few contests for leadership, consensual decision making, no open denouncement of the 48

49

50

Regimes, when analysed in this light can be seen as performing a service for their members by reducing transaction costs and helping members cope with uncertainty. See Keohane 1982, op cit especially pp 336- 345.

Haggard and Simmons, op cit p497.

Ibid pp499-500. On the Tokyo Round see Stephen Krasner "The Tokyo Round: Pluralistic Interests and Prospects for Stability in the Global Trading System" International Studies Ouarterlv 1979, 23:491-531. Krasner highlights that whereas the trade regime exemplified by GATT weakened during the 1970’s, its scope actually increased as a result of the Tokyo Round negotiations.

organisation by participants, and a highly socialised and loyal membership. REGIME THEORIES

A number of theoretical perspectives on regime development and change have been identified in the literature on regimes. The most common theories are usually agreed to be the cognitive, functional,®^ and structural. More recently a further category, termed the structurationist has been developed, although as yet relatively little research appears to have been undertaken in this vein. These various approaches will be further examined in ascending order of aggregation, beginning with the cognitivist approach.

Cognitivism

Cognitive theory, although particularly identified with works on the role of individual decision makers,®^ has come to represent a rather eclectic group of approaches. The commonalities among various cognitive writings emphasise ideology, belief systems and knowledge as explanations of regime evolution and change.®® As Haggard and Simmons note:

"cognitivists pose a simple yet profound question: can interests in an issue area be unambiguously deduced from power and situational constraints? Frequently they cannot. Without shifts in power position, interests change as a result of learning, persuasion and divine revelation. Knowledge and ideology may then become an important explanation of regime change."®^

The concerns of cognitive theory, whilst frequently acknowledged by structural and functional theorists, are usually bracketed as subsidiary, less important variables. A 51

52

53 54

Functional theories are sometimes termed "situational". Jonsson (op cit p i8), for example says: "to avoid the ambiguity and teleological implications on the term function, I shall instead refer to situational explanations. This means that the question I pursue is "What kind of situations trigger the creation and revision of regimes?" rather than "What functions do regimes perform?"

See for example Robert Jervis Perception and Misoerceotion in International Politics 1976, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Haggard and Simmons, op cit p509 fh 66 Ibid pp 512-13

good example can be found in the work of Jonsson, who briefly discusses cognitive concerns, but finds that:

"the differences between the structural and situational (or functional) explanations, on the one hand, and cognitive explanations on the other, should not be exaggerated ... The obvious conclusion is that structural and situational theories and cognitive theories are complementary rather than mutually exclusive. "®®

Jonsson believes that cognitive theories lack the explanatory power to be regarded as independent explanations of regime change. He, therefore, includes actor cognitions in his structural and situational analyses, rather than treating cognitive theories as a separate mode of explanation. It is difficult to generalise from the central cognitive insight which holds that:

"cooperation cannot be completely explained without reference to ideology, the values of actors, the beliefs they hold about the interdependence of issues, and the knowledge available to them about how they can realise specific goals. Cooperation is affected by perception and misperception, the capacity to process information, and learning"®®

The individualist basis of cognitivist theory, therefore, comes about by virtue of the concentration on actor cognitions and learning. It is difficult to see how such factors could ever be readily measured in relation to the explanation of regime change, or indeed to usage in the social sciences generally. This is not to say, however that cognitive theories have no utility at aU. Unlike other approaches, cognitivism accepts that cooperation takes place inside complex and very ambiguous issue areas. Structural and functional theories usually assume that issue areas are unambiguous givens.®^ The prospect that knowledge and ideology (the two most common cognitive insights studied in the literature) affect the evolution of international cooperation is not difficult to comprehend. The problem for cognitive analysts is how to translate the acknowledged effects of ideology and learning into theoretically useful 55

56 57

Jonsson, op cit p24

Haggard and Simmons, op cit p511.

Lindberg, op cit p368 maintains that an automomous organisation deals with an area of politics which is well insulated and differentiated from other areas.

generalisations, leading to an understanding of why cooperation develops in an anarchic international system.

From a cognitivist stand point, learning and ideology have a direct influence on international cooperation by demonstrating the virtue of certain lines of action. Further, as a result of their unstructured view of issue areas, cognitivists posit that history, knowledge and ideology are important variables in attempting to understand why actors (be they individuals or states) respond differently to the same structural constraints and opportunities.

The central difficulty of operationalising cognitivist theories becomes apparent using this line of reasoning. Essentially, cognitive explanation can never be fully explored except via an historicist, post hoc analysis. It has, as a result, been criticised for exhibiting traits of contingency and path dependence.®* Cognitive approaches, since they deal with what are, in the final analysis, unknowable and unquantifiable factors such as individual motivation, learning and perception, are likely to prove quite unable to predict when consensual knowledge and values will yield a cooperative outcome. Indeed, consensus may not be enough in itself to overcome the problems inherent in collective action. It is this problem which led Ernst Haas to note that cognitive notions of regime evolution accept the

"existence of power differentials and the importance of hierarchy among states without sacrificing to such a view the possibility of choice based on perception and cognition inspired by additional calculations. "®®

In short, however consensual the basis in cognitive terms, structural or functional factors might conspire to prevent the emergence of furtherance of cooperation. Cognitive explanations are also ül-suited to explain changes in regimes or cooperative procedures in that it is not always possible to maintain that a given regime is the only

58

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Haggard and Simmons, op cit p511.

Ernst Haas "Why Collaborate? Issue Linkage and International Regimes" World Politics 1980, 32:357- 405, especially p360.

possible structure able to ensure realisation of common values.^ Cognitive theory cannot predict with any certainty at what juncture consensual beliefs or knowledge will result in actors exhibiting cooperative behaviour, nor can it predict the changes fiilly, since cognitive approaches can only provide post justificadoiis for what has already taken place. The cognitivist dilemma is that; | |

"historical episodes of cooperation may be inexplicable without reference to shared knowledge and meanings, but since future knowledge is by definition, impossible to foresee, prediction about the substantive content of cooperation is ruled out. Nonetheless, the

degree of ideological consensus and agreement over casual relationships, regardless of the nature of the issue, is an important variable in explaining cooperation.

Though it can be demonstrated that the evolution of knowledge and intellectual currents can affect concrete strategies,®^ it is more problematic in practice to ascertain the autonomous influence of knowledge or ideology in the evolution of international cooperation.

The preliminary, though by no means authoritative, conclusion on the role of cognitive theories in the analysis of regime evolution must be that whilst they provide useful insights into the process of cooperation, they are not sufficient m themselves. Rather, cognitive insights niust, as . Jonsson realised, be integrated with

60 61 62

Haggard and Simmons, op cit p510 Ibid p511 Emphasis in the Original.

See for example Beverley Crawford and Stephanie Lenway’s treatment of East-West trade, "Decision Modes and International Regime Change: Western Collaboration and East-West Trade" World Politics 1985,37:375-402; and Emmanuel Adler "Ideological Guerilla’s and the Quest for Technological Autonomy: Brazil’s Domestic Computer Industry." International Organisation 1986, 40:673-706.

It has even been suggested, although more rarely, that ideological variables can explain the evolution of cooperation, see Judith Goldstein "The Political Economy of Trade: Institutions of Protection" American Political Science Review 1986, 80:161-84, who argues that institutionalised liberalism has embedded free trade as an ideology which systematically conditions the propensity to cooperate even where'defection might be more rational. John Ruggie coined the phrase "embedded liberalism" to signify the common social purpose which developed among advanced capitalist societies after the Great Depression, to enjoy the advantages of liberalism in international trade, but to be& the costs of a free market system via regimes. John Ruggie "Continuity and Transformation in the World Policy: Toward a Neo-realist Synthesis" World Politics 1983 , 35:261-85. On the role of ideology in regime maintenance and change, see Robert Cox "Ideologies and the New International Economic Order: Reflections on Some ^Recent Literature" International Organisation 1979, 33:257-302.

complementary modes of analysis.

"In the realm of politics what is real is what men perceive to be real. Thus structural and situational factors become functional through the mediation of actor cognitions. Changes in the power structure and the emergence of bargaining situations as perceived by the principal actors, explain the evolution of international regimes."®^

It is to these alternative explanations of how cooperation and regimes emerge that the analysis will now turn.

Functionalism

Functional theories as utilised in this context, must be distinguished at the outset from functional and neofiinctional theories of international organisation.®^ Functional theory explains the emergence of cooperation in terms of such an outcome being the effect, or function, of certain behaviour or action by institutions. For example, the persistence of regimes and compliance with their injunctions may be explained with reference to their anticipated consequences. Where the activities of a regime reduce information and transaction costs among adherents, they are likely to be reinforced. Conversely, should a regime become dysfunctional, it wiU be weakened and perhaps modified, or it may begin to decay. Functional theories attempt to account for the strength of regimes, and more especially to explain why they should persist when their original raison d'etre in a structural sense has changed.

Functional analysis is not particularly suited to explain the causes of any demand for a regime, since it concentrates on the functions performed by such a cooperative construct, rather than the underlying factors and situations which promote the creation and maintenance of regimes. It may provide an insight into the condition necessary before a regime wül be demanded, but it is likely to prove less useful in suggesting how and when the regime will come about. ®^ Rather than simply taking the process

®^ Jonsson op cit p24. Emphasis in the original 64

65

For a discussion of this earlier usage, see Ernst Haas Beyond the Nation State 1964, Stanford: Stanford University Press, especially Chapters 1-5, and 13-14. The distinction is sometimes reinforced by renaming the approach situational when used in this context.

by which regimes are created as givens, and examining the functions they assume, it is important to investigate the process and specify how this operates. Not to do so, risks the teleological imputation that international cooperation is a response to presumed "systems maintenance" or equilibrating functions.®® The notional equilibrium point is never satisfactorily explained however. Regimes are, according to this line of argument, almost an inevitable outcome of the problem of how best to promote international cooperation. Notionally, according to functionalist belief, there is an overriding desire on the part of members of the system to maintain the presumed benefits of cooperation, or at least the equilibrium of the system. Where this equilibrium is more efficiently provided by collective, rather than individual action, a demand for cooperative structures such as regimes wül develop. This sequence of events must, however, be regarded as only one possible response on the part of members of the system, to the problem of how to promote their individual welfare within an increasingly interdependent system.

Functionalist theorising has drawn heavily from work on transaction costs in economics, which posits that organisations evolve in response to the difficulties inherent in arms length market transactions, or in conditions of market failure (or anarchy). Among these difficulties are opportunism, measurement problems, information costs and difficulties in contract enforcement.®^ Writers in international relations have drawn a parallel between the action of the market and the uncoordinated action of states, to demonstrate that regimes reduce transaction costs and facilitate decentralised decision making.®* As Haggard and Simmons note:

"we are interested not only in the fact that regimes perform certain tasks, but the importance or weight regimes have in motivating and explaining states behaviour. The proper test of a functional theory is not the mere existence of a regime, but the demonstration that actors’ 66

67

See Keohane After hegemony op cit p81.

See Douglas North "Government and the Cost of Exchange in History." Journal of Economic History 1984, 44:255-64; Oliver Williamson "The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes." Journal of Economic Literature 1981, 19: 1537-68; and "Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations" The Journal of Law and Economics 1979, 22:233-61, by tiie same author. ®* Keohane After Hegemony op cit Chap 6; Kenneth Oye "Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy:

Hypotheses and Strategies" World Politics 1985,38:1-24, especially pp 16-18; and Haggard and Simmons,

op cit p507. I

!

behaviour was motivated by benefits provided uniquely, or at least more efficiently, through the regime."®^

A strong liberal bias is evident in much of functionalist literature, with a presumption that institutions "provided" to enhance the collective welfare of the adherents will produce optimal or superior outcomes in comparison with conditions of market failure. Regimes can, however, result in different distributional outcomes, and cannot be seen as invariably providing greater shares of collective goods to all members of the system. By emphasising how the intervening role of regimes as facilitating structures helps states realise common interests, functional analysis assumes convergent states, and downplays differences. Regimes can, however, be the focus of conflicts, and may even institutionalise inequalities.^®

It was noted above that the functional explanations represented the next rank of explanation above cognitivism in aggregative terms. This statement requires qualification in light of the above discussions of the assumed liberalism and convergent interests of functional analysis. The basic problem appears to lie with the attitude of functional theory toward the interfaces between states and the system. The neo-reaüst conception of international system structures is important in this context, since the functionalist attitude to the agent-structure problem in the creation of international regimes is heavily coloured by neo-realist attitudes.

Superficially, neo-realism embraces a strongly structural and anti-reductionist theoretical orientation. Following the lead of Ashley, and also of Wendt,^^ it is possible to characterise neo-realism as exhibiting an individualist conception of the international system structure, that is the international system is defined in terms of its constituent units; states. Although neo-realism avoids what Wendt terms

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Ibid p508

Seen in these terms, the functionalist view of regimes is to regard them as more or less optimal institutional responses to failures in international cooperation. This understanding demotes regimes to a type of conduit, performing a function desired by the unit level actors of the system. Far from becoming a focus of the analysis, with an independent role as a forum for debate, conflict and negotiation, regimes are relegated to the status of little more than the playthings of state actors.

See Richard Ashley "The Poverty of Neo-realism" International Organisation 1984,38:225-86, particularly pp238-42; also A Wendt op cit passim.

"explanatory reductionism"^^ due to the acceptance that system structures act as intervening variables in the translation of domestic interests into foreign policy behaviour, it does so at some considerable theoretical cost. Neo-realism rationalises an underlying state centric approach to the agent-structure relationship, by accepting that system structures, as well as states, play a causal role in international relations. This compromise position, which is strictly speaking a systemic rather than a truly structural approach, allows neo-realists to utilise their state centric beliefs within the systemic logic of systems theory in a coherent whole. Despite this assumption of systemic logic, however, neo-realism remains reductionist in its view of the agent- structure problem. The international system is seen as reducible to the properties of states, that is, to the distribution of capabilities among them. This can be seen as representing "ontological reductionism" as opposed to the explanatory reductionism discussed above. Ontological reductionism posits that the behaviour of states within the international system is determined by their situation, (situational determinism) and as a result, system structures are seen as external constraints on the action of states, rather than as potential areas for state action.^^

The shortcomings of neo-realist theorising has engendered an attempt to develop systemic theory purely on the basis of assumptions about the relationship between states, their interests and power, and cooperation. Waltz, for example, argues that the development of an explicit theory of the state is incidental to the development of systemic theories of international relations.^'^

"The issue ... is not whether some understanding of the state is necessary to build systemic theories (it is), but whether that understanding follows from a theory grounded in a coherent set of propositions with some correspondence to reality, or simply from a set of pre-theoretical assumptions, grounded in intuition and ideology. 72

73

Defined by Wendt, ibid p341 as "the kind of reductionism which neo-realists oppose is defined as theory which tries to explain behaviour in terms of strictly agent level properties."

Ibid p342.

Kenneth Waltz Theory of International Politics 1979, Reading, Mass: Addison Wesley; and "Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to my Critics" in R O Keohane (ed) Neo-realism and its Critics 1986, New York: Columbia University Press, especially p340.

Whatever its advantages in terms of analytical convenience, a reliance on untheorised assumptions about primitive terms (in this case states and the system) leaves us unable to justify particular conceptualisations of interaction situations and leads, therefore, to an untenable "as if" approach to systemic theorising."’^

The major criticism operative here, is that neo-realist individualism is falsely