The opportunity seems to exist for U.S. strategy to coincide with armament innovation to prevent significantly expanded Chinese force posture and operations. The Pentagon and
Congress recognize the implications of the growing Chinese threat. Public statements and policy documents support rapid advanced technological development. Calculated and intentional employment of these new systems in a way tailored to the disposition of Chinese forces and culture is equally as necessary. While the strategy of the Cold War may have been imperfect, it was constant. Legislators and policy makers spoke the language of theorists like Herman Kahn and Thomas Schelling. Concepts of nuclear deterrence such as survivability, damage limitation, assured destruction, assured second strike, escalation rungs, etc. - while often misquoted were nevertheless ubiquitous in the media and to some extent the general populace. The question I will examine below is how effective was this type of comparatively advanced strategic
contemplation. This section will seek to prove that high-level strategic thought was very effective at rightly organizing and preparing the U.S. against the adversarial strategic threat. It will postulate characteristically why this type of strategy was successful. Lastly, I will discuss if this type of policy development is applicable to the U.S. – China security environment.
Rightly Ordered Cold War Documentation and Practice
“The Long Telegram”, as it came to be known, was essentially an intelligence estimate based off an intimate study of political climate, culture, policy, and somewhat from supporting force posture for that policy. This document was detailed and well informed. George Kennan’s
telegram was so logically based on a strategic assessment that it set the tone for the containment policy and a similar mode of assessment throughout the Cold War. The telegram reviewed basic features of post-war Soviet outlook, background for that outlook, its projection in practical policy on an official level, its projection on an unofficial level, and practical deductions or recommendations from a U.S. policy standpoint.85 Notice that the telegram depicted sections of
tailored top-level political culture. In a post-World War II milieu, force structure would have been a readily suggestible and somewhat knowable undertone with respect to this recent U.S. ally. However, it is not one of the sections Kennan completed to inform his President of the world-shaping policy imperatives facing the U.S. This Soviet specific and in-depth strategic type of assessment drove home the urgency of the document’s recommendation. More importantly, it formulated a policy that most would agree significantly contributed to ultimate American success.
Kennan’s reasonable and convincing strategic assessment matriculated throughout the US. Government. Its legacy led to the establishment (indirectly) of a science advisory steering committee with a technology capabilities assessment panel. This document laid out a timetable of relative force posture development between the U.S. and Russia. The purpose for this was apparent, “to clarify the effects of evolving technology on our military position relative to Russia… inherent in the development of technology over the next decade or so.”86 This 1950s
policy provided context and direction to technology development beyond the costly model of matching capabilities.
The steering committee’s projections for the Cold War were as follows:
85. George Kennan, Received by The Secretary of State, United States, “The Long Telegram,” (Moscow, Soviet Union, February 22, 1946).
86. Report by the Technological Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Committee, National Security Policy vol. XIX, (Department of State Office of the Historian, 1955), (accessed January 2019) 42.
Period I—The Present Phase: we have an offensive advantage but are vulnerable to surprise attack…
Period II (Starting 1956/57—Ending 1958/60): We will have a very great
offensive advantage relative to USSR and will be less vulnerable than previously to surprise attack…
Period III This is a period of transition from Period II to Period IV involving the occurrence in some order of the following characteristics: The development of advanced weapon capabilities by the Soviets…Substantial strengthening of U.S. defenses...Continued improvement in U.S. delivery capabilities…
Period IV (Indefinite in length; possibly beginning within a decade):
An attack by either side would result in mutual destruction. This is the period when both the U.S. and Russia will be in a position from which neither country can derive a winning advantage87
These periods defined how the U.S. envisioned the nuclear dynamics of the Cold War. While the estimated dates may have been inaccurate, their conceptual chronology and framework were critical tools in planning for the challenges of the Cold War. However, for the utility of the policy maker, the panel textured their characterization so much further. Each period discussed specific capability characteristics, and effects or implications on policy and the security environment therein. The periods included friendly and adversarial assessments of operational latitude for certain provocations or security actions, and even recommendations for further analysis and study.88 The work by this panel was good strategy because it identified a problem,
extrapolated its conditions for long-term planning, looked realistically at the nature of the problem, and provided a series of conditional actionable guidelines for navigating the problem. Conditional analysis is key when dealing with uncertainty, lest the nuclear force ends up prepared for a very specific and never occurring posited eventuality. Moving beneath the
87. Ibid, 42-45 88. Ibid, 42-46
theoretical to a call for specific actions within specific periods is also key. This process charges subordinate elements and bodies with tangible goals. Abstract conjecture alone cannot win a war.
Furthermore, reactive technological development tends to pigeonhole new systems to single purposes. Limited systems may find themselves behind a threat that pivots as the counter technology gets released - and behind at a great cost. Beyond potential technological
obsolescence, continuously reacting to foreign force developments creates a myriad of costly projects without overarching control or assessment of what is most imperative or feasible. To determine this, a desired end state is necessary. The development requires a context of the environment of employment, and strategically what the system needs to establish or re-establish based on dynamic security policy. This panel was acutely aware that a framework for
comparison was critical for complex analysis and planning. With finite resources and the risk of strategic surprise, informed organization techniques keep planning bodies and policy makers on task. These techniques generally help with visualizing complex problems. Unfortunately, the U.S is currently engrossed in a period of reactive technological development. The U.S. stands amidst phase one of two or three, etc., and largely shows a lack of impetus to move beyond this current step in the process of strategizing.
Each of the U.S. Congress people quoted in this paper’s introduction recognized a threat from a different perspective. If the DoD could once again articulate a phased methodology that classified threats and broad strategic responses beyond technologically complex explanations, they would likely find resonance of their mission within the legislature and their electorate. With the background of Soviet policy and designs, the U.S. assessed relative force postures and the projections for those forces. This led to a time bound and particularized plan of action that formulated the superstructure of nuclear strategy throughout the Cold War. This articulated
framework gave intellectuals, engineers, and policy makers a platform for discussion. The discussion helped prepare a metric system for gauging long-term efficacy of policymaking. This became part of the culture of the political and nuclear elite of the time. The policy that came forth from those elite was better because of it. Now we will look at a sample of the continued complex and detailed development of strategy within the Cold War.
Mindful of period two above, U.S. Policy makers were taking advantage of the assessed lack of vulnerability, to war game further active and passive defense measures. A few days prior to the publishing of the well-know Gaither Report in 1957, the council that developed the report met with the President. White House staff entered that conference into the official record by way of a memorandum. This was another instance of academic analysis driving force investments due to the “growing power of Soviet forces”.89 Recognizing that during the current nuclear “period”
the U.S. could deliver a “greater blow”, the council was assessing five years into the future when true strategic vulnerability might come based on Soviet capability advancement. The council found that the U.S. “must educate our people for the scientific and technological needs, and must also educate our people so they will support what is required… The President said that groups must be organized throughout universities, business groups, and other elements…to put across the needs of the situation.90 Essentially, by navigating the comparative framework for projected
implications of losing preeminence, and sounding that against intelligence, the council was assessing future needs. This merging of academic and strategic thought recommended the investment into what became science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) programs. Recognizing a deficiency, critical analysis helped ensure technical proficiency for
89. Memorandum of a Conference with the President, National Security Policy vol. XIX, (Department of State Office of the Historian, 1957), (accessed January 2019).
generations into the future (through federal interest in STEM education). The educational focus of this initiative and its long-term scope is not particularly characteristic of a Joint Staff or DoD solution. Yet, thinking strategically beyond near-term weapon-system prototyping birthed the next generation of developers and technically proficient strategists.
The 1957 Gaither report, released three days later dealt primarily with assessing the efficacy of defense measures and deterrent capability of our retaliatory forces. Again, prior to allocating funding, the decision makers in the national capital region desired informed theory. The report found that the Strategic Air Command (SAC) provided the primary deterrence for the U.S. population. Yet, SAC was significantly vulnerable to Soviet surprise attack. Some
prescriptions included specific force increases for ICBMs and other ballistic missiles, various hardening measures for the defense of the force, fielding a sea leg of the triad to bolster
deterrence, and the report bound most of these measures for completion by 1958 or 1959.91 This
analysis identified where the United States needed to focus efforts. Were the specific measures eventually employed just enough, too much, maybe not enough, or was the U.S. simply lucky? Unfortunately, the efficacy of deterrence is hard to claim because one cannot prove a negative. However a scientific and intelligence based assessment found a weakness in deterrence, that our counterparts were likely to exploit – or so we thought. Increasing and improving ICBMs,
hardening SAC forces, and adding a sea leg to our nuclear triad undoubtedly made our nuclear forces more survivable and more effective. These elements likely contributed to deterrence at the time. Regardless, offering deadlines, specific force goals, and a responsible agent to execute, helped these goals quickly become official funded policy. Today, our strategic weapons policy
91. Horace Gaither, “Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age, ‘The Gaither Report,’” The Cold War, (President's Science Advisory Committee, Security Resources Panel, 7 Nov. 1957),
documents do not often offer such actionable metrics coupled with clearly charged offices. This report bolstered what became the most critical element of our nuclear deterrence. Policymakers and lawmakers alike continue to agree on the importance of its tenants.
The aforementioned policy planning was not unique to the early cold war. National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 242 was the employment of modified measures originally investigated in the National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 169, on U.S. nuclear policy or posture. NSDM 242 did not only follow NSSM 169, it followed Presidential Directives (PD) 18, 41, 53, 57, and 58 - and 59 shortly succeeded it. These are certainly not the only relevant studies or nuclear policy documents of the seventeen years between the Gaither Report and NSDM 242, just the best known. The very fact that U.S. leadership studied,
evaluated, and amended nuclear policy in a significant way every two years, stands in contrast to our post-Cold War once every 10 year argument to keep nuclear weapons. NSDM 242 stated that should nuclear deterrence fail, the U.S. needed to prepare to terminate war as quickly as possible and at the lowest level of conflict as possible. This objective required planning a wide range of limited nuclear employment and targeting measures to use in conjunction with political and other military action to control escalation.92 The very intent of Cold War nuclear warfighting planning
for the U.S. was to control escalation of such existentially menacing weapons. While deterrence remained an imperfect gamble, the U.S. afforded considerable attention and assets to limiting the potential for assured destruction through NSDM 242. This memorandum more specifically called to maintain reserve nuclear forces, increase the amount of particularly costly Soviet targets, and limit the damage to U.S. forces and infrastructure.93 The document took the findings of a study
92. National Security Council United States, National Security Decision Memorandum 242, Policy for Planning the
Employment of Nuclear Weapons, (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1974), (accessed January 2019).
and laid out courses of action to rectify force deficiencies. The memorandum set the tone for U.S. posture and dialogue from 1974 through the end of the Cold War. In depth analysis and complex strategic planning allowed the U.S. to pursue tailored courses of action that presumably maintained deterrence. This policy further confounded the adversary with questions of parity.
Equally as important, the document goes on to say:
Within three months, the Secretary of Defense shall present for Presidential review an initial set of limited employment options. At quarterly intervals thereafter, the Secretary of Defense shall present for Presidential review a summary of available options and an analysis of any additional recommended options. Each presentation should include illustrative scenarios for each limited employment options.94
I kept this quote in full because it once again demonstrates the specific and confident requirements that came from an intellectual and well-maintained strategic tradition. These documents did not banter over the purpose of the dialogue, it navigated a robust tradition, and expanded on an in depth study. Lastly, it had specific requests and requirements to execute quickly its intent. Great power competition seems to necessitate this kind of quick analysis, accountably, and speed in response.
A few years later, in 1980, PD-59 elaborated on specific upgrades to weapon systems and an increase and modification to the targeting tactics and procedures.95 The United States took
further measures regarding what to do if deterrence failed. At the time, the U.S. believed that the Soviets had a robust nuclear war concept.96 We know now this assessment of the Soviets was
correct. The tradition of evolving policy to match the adversary and parry it when necessary was successful. Success was in the usurping of the Soviet policy advantage through deep strategic
94. Ibid.
95. William H. Kincade, “Of Special Interest: U.S. Targeting Plans,” Arms Control Today, vol. 10, no. 8, 1980, pp. 11–11. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/23622912.
96. William Burr, “How to Fight a Nuclear War,” Foreign Policy (Foreign Policy, September 14, 2012), https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/09/14/how-to-fight-a-nuclear-war/.
analysis superimposed on nuclear force posture. In fact, one month after the release and leak of PD-59, Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote a letter to the President. In this letter he was addressing the concerns regarding overturning of previous policy with the endorsement of PD-59. Mr.
Brzezinski very effectively provides the intentional narrative throughout each major nuclear policy document of the previous 20 years or so. He explains their implications, and why our nuclear force posture required each one.97 What is incredibly evident in this description is the
continuity of intentional, tailored policy. This tradition led to a non-partisan continuity of much of the actual policies, themselves. This kind of unity of process and objective allowed for a much more coherent, well-practiced nuclear policy during the Cold War. These documents are not just relics of an obscure nuclear thing. They are evidence of an intellectual tradition, that while flawed at times, critically analyzed and implemented policy with an efficiency and proficiency largely lost in today’s reemergence of great power politics.
Responding to General Deterrence Criticism
The opponents of deterrence are more so opponents of some of the deterrence concepts from the Cold War. Mostly the assumption of reciprocal applicability of what could reasonably deter the U.S. political machine would deter the Soviet political machine. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, declassified documentation proved that this mirror imaging of perceptions was often incorrect. Deterrence expert Keith Payne characterizes this sentiment well, “Nevertheless, confident assertions and promises continue unabated predictably…such assertions and promises should now be recognized as hubris” (Payne, Gamble Ch. 7).98 To be clear, this is not the kind of
97. Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Carter Transformation of Our Strategic Doctrine, (Washington D.C.: United States White House, 1980), (accessed January 2019).
98. Keith B. Payne, The Great American Gamble: Deterrence Theory and Practice from the Cold War to the
theorizing this paper suggests or champions from the Cold War. This type of truncated analysis and mirror imaging seeks to shorten the exhaustive and tailored intellectual process Dr. Payne and the fourth section of this paper claim is so central to effective deterrence. Informed dialogue, routine studies, and responsive force structures, along with synchronized science, policy, and theory are the tenants of Cold War deterrence thought. Such a tradition seems so central to what in fact prepared America to parry the Soviet Union. “Further… there is no logical basis for anticipating that China could be inspired by Schelling’s reciprocal fear of surprise attack to strike first at U.S. retaliatory forces. Unless the U.S. behaves very foolishly by abandoning its
retaliatory capabilities.”99 Payne’s error here is that he assumes a proficiency of strategic or
nuclear deterrence thought that I would argue the United Sates largely has lost; and that China is only beginning to have. In fact, without reference to Chinese strategic culture and a
contextualization of scenario-based analysis, this assumption seems based upon a largely Western rationality. His, and many others’, initial critique disproves the very common second assertion above. Payne, a critic of simplified and culturally projected modes of deterrence, concludes his analysis by stating: “for the purposes of post-Cold War deterrence, it is important to know the opponent to the extent feasible, acknowledge that which is not known, and to establish deterrence policies informed by what can be known about the specific opponent’s beliefs and modes of thought.”100 This type of deterrence policy is the kind my study seeks to