Collaborative environmental governance

Collaborative environmental governance is based on the notion that inclusive dialogue in which opinions and ideas are articulated, debated and potentially transformed is the best way to effect environmentally sustainable change (Glasbergen 1998; Kronsell and Bäckstrand 2010). In collaborative processes, organizations and individuals pool resources, share knowledge and learn from each other to address a common problem (Fish, et al. 2010; Gray 1989; Holley, et al. 2012). Collaborative governance is celebrated for encouraging learning about diverse perspectives and creating innovative solutions participants find acceptable, even in contexts of power asymmetry or high stakes decision-making (Ansell and Gash 2007; Emerson, et al. 2012; Innes and Booher 2010). Collaboration may take place at local, regional and basin-wide jurisdictional levels (Heikkila and Gerlak 2005; Lane and Robinson 2009; Margerum 2008). Characteristics of

collaboration and collaboration’s use at multiple levels make it a promising approach to governance in transboundary contexts (Dore 2014; Green, et al. 2013; Raadgever, et al. 2008).

The label, collaboration, has been assigned to a diverse class of governance activities. In general, it reflects a perceived shift from government-based, command and control forms of governance to more inclusive and deliberative forms (Holley, et al. 2012). Forms of collaboration differ based on the level and scale (local, regional, basin-wide) at which they operate, whether government actors are involved and the extent to which ideals of deliberative democracy inform the collaborative processes. They can also range from voluntary, grassroots initiatives to legislatively mandated processes initiated by government (Moore and Koontz 2003). For example, collaborative planning exercises are based on Habermasian ideals of deliberative democracy related to inclusion, interdependence and authentic dialogue (Innes and Booher 2010). They tend to take place at the local level and involve local level government officials (Healey 2003). In contrast, collaborative public management involves horizontal and vertical information sharing and cooperation between government ministries at various levels; non-governmental actors may or may not be involved and the process may not require deliberation (McGuire 2006). Cross-sectoral collaboration emphasizes voluntary problem-solving among the business

community, non-governmental organizations and government (Selsky and Parker 2005). However, government may not be involved in this form of collaboration. Collaborative environmental governance, the form used to identify cases of collaboration in this study, emphasizes information sharing, dialogue and cooperative problem-solving between

governmental and non-governmental actors at a variety of levels (Holley, et al. 2012; Margerum 2011). They may or may not be state-mandated (Moore and Koontz 2003).

Features of collaborative environmental governance such as inclusion, knowledge sharing and cooperative problem-solving make it potentially important in transboundary contexts where upstream-downstream challenges and a diversity of perspectives and values for water exist (Birdsong 2008). In transboundary contexts, collaboration that occurs at multiple levels and is linked may contribute to more adaptive and inclusive transboundary water governance (Akamani and Wilson 2011; Green, et al. 2013). It may promote the inclusion of actors and perspectives necessary to enable sustainable transboundary water governance (Dore 2014) and well-informed problem solving at the appropriate level (Cosens 2010). However, one important shortcoming in the collaborative water governance literature is that it has tended to neglect power (Brisbois and de Loë 2015), which may temper the role of collaboration in transboundary contexts. It also undermines the usefulness of the collaboration literature for transboundary contexts in which

power dynamics exist. Underdeveloped considerations of power in the collaboration literature may follow a general trend wherein forms of governance perceived to be novel, or departures from traditional, state-based approaches, such as collaboration, are analyzed without attention to important ‘traditional’ concepts such as power (Arts and Van Tatenhove 2004). It may also be the result of the uncritical adoption of normative theoretical ideals in empirical settings where power dynamics are at play but are undertheorized (Murray 2005). Regardless of the reasons, the collaboration literature does not yet have all the tools needed to assess and consider the role that power dynamics might have in informing what collaboration actually achieves.

Hence, while power asymmetries have been identified as an important precursor to

collaboration (Ansell and Gash 2007), there has been relatively little systematic exploration of the ways in which power dynamics impact collaborative processes and outcomes. Important

exceptions exist. For example, Purdy (2012) suggests that resources, authority and the ability to construct issues are important power-related factors that can impact collaboration. However, this work does not engage with the extensive and well-developed literature regarding theories of power which may be important for identifying subtle power-related effects. It also does not conceptualize a role for political-economic contexts. Other empirical studies have demonstrated that industry actors have disproportionate influence over collaborative processes in the

environmental realm, through setting agendas and information control (Cook 2015). The political and economic contexts in which collaborations are embedded can constrain collaborative

outcomes (Brisbois and de Loë 2016). Yet other empirical research, although it does not explicitly use a power analysis, suggests that power dynamics may be at work in collaborative processes. For example, research on collaborations in Australia (Holley, et al. 2012), South Africa (Mirumachi and Van Wyk 2010) and Canada (Norman and Bakker 2008) suggest that government actors are not always willing to cede authority to collaborative groups. For example, collaborations may serve advisory functions, leaving decisions regarding implementation to government actors. Critical analyses of large-scale collaborations in the US suggest that some interests will continue to be marginalized through collaborative processes (Kallis, et al. 2009). These findings challenge assumptions that collaboration results in inclusive, productive dialogue that can enable environmentally sustainable change. More systematic assessments of how power impacts collaboration can enrich the collaboration literature by identifying the ways in which power may challenge some of collaboration’s promising appeal. Such an analysis is critical for understanding the role that collaboration can play in transboundary basins.