Collective action and multiple use-multiple user interaction

Collective action can be defined as an action by more than one person directed towards the achievement of a common goal or the satisfaction of a common interest (that is, a goal or interest that cannot be obtained by an individual acting on his own) (Wade, 1987). As discussed in the previous section (sub-section 2.5.1), the debate about collective action in CPR management and governance has been distorted by a conceptual misunderstanding about the nature of such resources, caused by Garrett Hardin’s unfortunate use of the term

“commons” and its’ ‘‘tragedy’’ to describe an “open access” regime (Steins and Edwards, 1999). As a result for a long time, there was a prevailing belief among policy-makers that the problems associated with CPRs could only be solved through either privatization of the resource or through state intervention (ibid). However, during the past decades empirical evidence has been brought forward that local user groups are capable of managing and governing such resources through collective action (McCay and Acheson, 1990 cited in Steins and Edwards; Ostrom, 1990; Bromley, 1992) which is often considered as a prerequisite for the development of community-based institutions and the devolution of authority that is required from central to local authorities (Meinzen-Dick and Di Gregorio, 2004).

On the other hand, as indicated by Swallow et al. (1997) most analyses of the efficiency of natural resource management and governance have failed to recognize that resources often have multiple uses and that there tends to be sub-groups of users who are characterized by their use patterns. For example the same water source can be used for irrigating, hydropower, fishing, navigating, washing, watering animals, or other enterprises by multiple stakeholders.

They further argued that some resource uses are complementary, others are competitive, most are somewhere between. Some groups of resource users are mutually exclusive, others are overlapping, most are somewhere between. However issues of accommodating multiple uses and multiple-users are especially critical in the case of the commons.

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The context of multiple-use can have a significant impact on the use of common-pool resources as a diversity of interests is linked with the common-pool resources, partly preserving and partly exploiting them. A multiple user context is defined if more than one person uses the resource for the same purpose. Multiple user scenarios are widely discussed and common-pool resources (CPRs) are defined for multiple user situations. The presence of multiple users in CPR situation can increase transaction costs in a dramatic way, especially by creating free rider problems and undermining negotiations about the optimal use (Smajgl, 2007).

According to Steins and Edwards (1999) complex, multiple-use CPRs are resources that are used for different types of extractive and non-extractive purposes by different stakeholder groups (multiple users) often with divergent interests and are managed under a mixture of property rights regimes. In such a scenario, collective action becomes increasingly complicated. Different resource uses will be regulated and governed through different decision-making arrangements by different user groups. Therefore when commons evolve into multiple-use resources, the institutional framework within which collective resource use takes place has to be re-negotiated among resource users and other stakeholders to avoid externalities associated with increased access of new users to the resource system, such as overexploitation, alienation of traditional users, and inter/intra-user group conflicts.

Collective action among the user groups is required to agree upon decision making arrangements, regulations about access to, allocation of, and control over the resource.

However, the presence of a well established set of decision-making arrangements is not sufficient to guarantee sustained and negotiated collective action in the long term. For this Steins and Edwards (1999) introduce the concept of ‘platforms for resource use negotiation’

as one way of re-negotiating institutional frameworks to deal with the complexities involved in the management and governance of multiple-use CPRs and to coordinate collective action by multiple users.

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On the other hand, Dietz et al. (2003) pointed out that successful commons management and governance is easier to achieve when: (1) use of resources can be monitored by community members, and the information can be verified and understood at relatively low cost (trees are easier to monitor than fish, and lakes are easier to monitor than rivers (2) rates of change in resources, resource -user populations, technology, and other economic and social factors are moderate (3) community members maintain direct communications and increase their trust of one another; (4) outsiders can be excluded from using the resource at relatively low cost and (5) users are able to monitor and enforce their collectively designed agreements themselves.

Successful self-organized resource regimes and institutions can initially draw upon locally evolved norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness and the likely presence of local leaders in most community settings (Ostrom, 2000). Local institutions such as chiefs and headmen can also played an important ecological role, setting boundaries that restricted natural resources use and enforcing them (Fabricius et al. 2013). Ostrom (1990) in her empirical research into the management and governance of local CPRs has identified eight (8) design principles (see Table 2.2) underlying successful collective action and long term institutions where fragile institutions tend to be characterized by only some of these design principles and failed institutions are characterized by very few of these principles (Ostrom, 2005).

These principles identify characteristics of common-pool resource management and governance systems that have been observed to be regularly associated with the long-term sustainability of that system. However, not all principles need to be realized in all circumstances, but the prospects for sustainable governance tend to increase when more of these principles are in place (McGinnis, 2011).

26 Table 2.2: Design principles underlying successful long-term institutions

Design Principle Explanation Function

1. Clearly defined boundaries

Individuals or households with rights to withdraw resource units from the CPR and the boundaries of the CPR itself are clearly defined

Enables participants to know who is in and who is out of a defined set of relationships and thus with whom to cooperate

2. Congruence a. The distribution of benefits from appropriation rules is roughly proportionate to the costs imposed by provisional rules.

modifying operational rules should be possible Enables most of the individuals affected by a resource regime participate in making and modifying their rules governing their commons 4. Monitoring Either the local users themselves or persons accountable to the

local user are responsible for monitoring the biophysical conditions and compliance with collective decisions

Enables users to keep an eye on resource conditions as well as on user behavior

5. Graduated sanctions Sanctions should be graduated to reflect the severity, frequency, and context of resource use violation depending on the seriousness and context of the offense

Enables users who violate rules-in-use are likely to receive graduated sanctions from other users, from officials accountable to these users, or from both 6. Conflict resolution

mechanisms

Low-cost and readily available conflict-resolution mechanisms must exist to mediate conflicts among resource users and between users and officials

Enables users and their officials have rapid access to low-cost, local arenas to resolve conflict among users or between users and officials

7. Minimum recognition of rights to organize

Users must have recognition of their own rights to organize institutions

Enables users to devise their own institutions that are not challenged by external authorities, have long-term tenure rights to the resource

8. Nested enterprises⁵ Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution and governance activities are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises

Enables to understand governance activities that are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises Source: Based on Ostrom (1990, 2009)

5When common-pool resources that are being managed by a group are large and parts of larger systems, an eighth design principle may be present in robust systems (Ostrom, 2009).

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