3.5 Describing ideological collocation
3.5.4 Collocation and argumentation schemes: pragm atic fallacies
Other than the sem antic strand o f theoretically describing ideological collocation (classification schemes), there could be a rhetorical strand that stands out as an argumentative dim ension to collocability in discourse; this will collectively be referred to as argumentation schemes. Thus, with this part introduced into the present theoretical model, a descriptive semantico-rhetorical toolkit is full-fledged. I intend to use this toolkit to critically describe the collocations identified to be used by Schwartz and DeLong-Bas in the research data; and now it has becom e initially clear that the description is semantically and argumentatively oriented.
However, before tackling the argumentative aspect o f collocational analysis, let us first elaborate on the rhetorical aspect o f collocation in the present model o f description.
-88-Rhetoric, in A ristotle’s classic definition, is ‘an ability to observe in each case the possible means o f persuasion’ (Ars Rhetorica 1.2.1355b25-26). It is hardly surprising that the rhetorical and the political are dialectically inseparable. ‘The notion o f rhetoric’, Wetherell argues (2001: 17), ‘comes from ancient studies o f political oratory’, after all. However, W etherell continues to argue, rhetoric has a certain ‘modern resonance’, suggesting that
‘discourse is often
functional’
(Potter and W etherell 1987, cited in W etherell 2001: 17, emphasis in original). This may lead us into the serviceable concept o f ‘rhetorical discourse’, probably first introduced by Bitzer (1999: 217), w here the pragm atics o f the rhetorical situation renders discourse argumentative in essence, with the express purpose o f persuadingor
dissuading an Other.According to Johnson (2000: 154), ‘argumentation is the sociocultural activity o f constructing, presenting, interpreting, criticizing, and revising argum ents’. By definition, argumentation suggests the imposing presence o f persuasion. This is even clear in Johnson’s definition o f the concept o f ‘argum ent’: ‘An argum ent is a type o f discourse or text - the distillate o f the practice o f argumentation - in which the arguer seeks to persuade the Other(s) of truth o f a thesis by producing the reasons that support it’ {ibid.: 168). It can be said that words (and perhaps collocations) matter significantly to the structure o f an argument. In discussing w hat he calls ‘the micro-units o f argum ents’, Cox (1990: 11) explains that words are the building blocks o f an argument; he makes it clear that words can be argumentatively structured and ordered in discourse and then, I would add, materialize in text. Indeed, Cox {ibid.: 12) makes a strong case for the fact that the rationality required for any argument is
‘not ju st a social product but is contingent upon a certain kind o f discourse’. It seems, then, that it is discourse that (re)shapes the essence o f any argument, and that texts are the communicative channels via which the argument can (probably fallaciously) be realized (as lexical patterns).
In a parallel fashion to H oey’s argument about the lexis-gram m ar formula (see Chapter 1, Subsection 1.3.2), one w ould argue that the lexical-structure (namely, collocational structure) could constitute C ox’s argument micro-units, and thereby set up propositional contents. In this connection, what began as an attempt to account ideologically for collocation could turn into ‘an exploration o f grammatical, semantic, sociolinguistic and text-linguistic [and, in our case, rhetorical] phenom ena’ (Hoey 2005: 1). The collocational patterns peculiar to one text may m anifest rhetorically significant aspects o f argum entation in favour o f or against a certain ideology (or, what is in argumentation theory known as ‘standpoint’). Thus, here, I shall be interested in collocation as a textual resource for constructing, or contributing to, fallacious arguments.
In Hansen (2002), H am blin (1970) states that a ‘fallacious argum ent [...] is one that seems to be valid but is not s o ’ (Hamblin 1970: 12, cited in H ansen 2002: 133; italics in original). V an Eem eren et al. (1996: 70) comment that this is ‘the standard definition of fallacy’. This could be one o f the reasons why one should adopt H am blin’s (1970) definition of ‘argumentative fallacy’. A second reason is that this definition has m uch bearing on the ideological representation that collocations may im plicitly encode. However, considering the second reason, one needs to be selective of the fallacies put forward in the literature of argumentation theory. N ot every argumentative fallacy is readily recognized at the lexical level in general and the collocational in particular. Therefore, I shall be concerned with those argumentative fallacies that could be realized in the collocational structure o f one text.
In fact, it is the discourse-prosody element in the collocational process that may reveal this rhetorical aspect. Therefore, we need to emphasize the pragm atic nature o f the argumentative fallacy itse lf restricting ourselves to what Reisigl and W odak (2001: 71) refer to as ‘pragmatic fallacies’. Actually, I shall make use o f only some o f Reisigl and W odak’s series o f pragmatic fallacies (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 7 Iff), based on what might best serve
-90-the ideological function o f -90-the collocating items in -90-the present context o f research. Some o f the collocations identified in the textual data stand as the nucleus o f an argument that irrationally appeals to a certain emotion or passion or that unjustifiably attack the Other (the antagonist); these collocations can be said to be a clear sign or symptom o f the fallacies underlying the whole text (either by Schwartz or by DeLong-Bas). H ence the need to examine not only the collocations p e r se, but to go beyond the concordance lines and home in on the weak links in the whole argument, wherein the designated collocations are recurrently and subtly inserted.
In this connection, in my data I found that there are five pragmatic fallacies - or, m ore specifically, ad fa lla cies - that could be identified through the analysis o f collocations in both texts, so that one aspect o f discursive reality can be justified.27 (Indeed, [pragmatic] ad fallacies constitute a category o f arguments which ‘was first distinguished by the seventeenth- century philosopher John Locke (1632-1704)’ [Van Eemeren et a l 2009: 6].) First, there is what Reisigl and W odak (2001: 72) refer to as argumentum ad hom inem : ‘a verbal attack on the antagonist’s personality and character [...] instead o f argum entatively trying to refute the antagonist’s argum ents’. According to them, this argumentum a d hominem does not take account o f ‘the “facts” o f the matter in question’, but o f attacking ‘concealed motives o f those who advance an argum ent’.
The second pragmatic fallacy, discussed by Reisigl and W odak (ibid.: 72), is argumentum ad m isericordiam , which consists o f ‘unjustifiably appealing for compassion and empathy in cases where a specific situation o f serious difficulties, crisis or plight intended to evoke com passion and to win an antagonist over to one’s side is faked or pretended’. Thus, it can be said to be predicated on what van Eemeren (2009: 88) had recently referred to as
27 This set o f fallacies that 1 found was not exhaustive. Other researchers w orking on other texts are likely to find other fallacies b ein g articulated via collocational patterns.
‘appeal to p i t y ’. The third is the argumentum ad verecundiam, which Reisigl and Wodak (ibid.) define as ‘the misplaced appeal to deep respect and reverence [...] for authorities’; and it consists o f ‘backing one’s own standpoint by means o f reference to authorities considered to be or passed o ff as being competent, superior, sacrosanct, unim peachable and so on’. This echoes Locke’s treatm ent o f the argumentum ad verecundiam as often occurring when arguers
‘draw on som eone o f eminence, using that person’s word as backing for a claim ’; and this is w hat precisely ‘gives weight or pow er to the argument because audience, feeling an appropriate awe in the face o f such an eminent authority, would be asham ed to challenge that person’s word and hence is led to accept the argum ent’ (Tindale 2007: 128).
The last two pragmatic fallacies that can be identified through analysis o f collocation serve the function o f legitimizing a certain aspect o f reality at the level o f discourse are the fallacy o f ‘hasty generalisation’ (or ‘secundum quid') and the fallacy o f petitio principii (or
‘begging the question’ or ‘circular reasoning’). Reisigl and Wodak (ibid.: 73) define the first as ‘a generalisation on the basis o f a quantitative sample that is not representative’; they argue that this fallacy can take one o f two forms, either a compositio (i.e. replacing the whole by a part) or a divisio (i.e. replacing a part by the whole). The second {petitio principii) means that
‘what is controversial and in question, and thus to be proved, is presupposed as the starting point o f the argum entation’ {ibid.). A frequently cited example o f this pragm atic fallacy is given by Van Eem eren et al. (2009: 10): ‘God exists because the Bible says so, and the Bible is G od’s w ord’. (In the methodology chapter, it will be made clear that there is a close relation between pragm atic fallacies - as defined here - and the discourse prosodies o f the designated collocations w hich reflect each text producer’s stance towards the polem ic topic o f Wahhabi Islam and Saudi Wahhabism [Chapter 4, Subsection 4.4.2.3].)
H aving presented the micro level o f the theoretical model, which involves identifying and describing the ideological meaning(s) of collocation, let us move on to the macro level
-92-that is concerned with the discourse context o f ideological collocation; -92-that is, production, interpretation and explanation.