COMMAND AND CONTROL FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION

4-9. The command and control element for C-RAM operations will be either the BDOC or the TOC if the site does not have a BDOC. This center should have the ability to directly view the status of and request U.S. and multinational weapons to include indirect and direct fire weapons, rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft and other ISR support in order to defeat enemy IDF. This C² node also includes access to and display of sensor information. If tasking of sensors is necessary to support the C-RAM mission, coordination must be accomplished through the TOC or BDOC to the owning units, as required. Additionally, C-RAM personnel must be part of the planning, decision making, and execution processes within the TOC or BDOC. The TOC/BDOC is the C² element for C-RAM operations. This includes the ability to directly view the status of and task U.S./multinational weapons to include indirect and direct fire weapons, rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft, and special operations forces that may be employed to defend U.S./multinational bases against enemy RAM attacks. This C² node also includes access to and display of sensor information to include the authority to task and re-task sensors when required. All sensor, C², and shooter information in the TOC/BDOC is available to all operators on a computer client. Additionally, the TOC/BDOC must be functionally configured, manned, and equipped to enable parallel planning, decision making, and execution of the find, fix, target, track, engage, and assess operations required to defeat the RAM threat.

4-10. The TOC/BDOC is responsible for coordinating other base support actions to include medical evacuation teams, firefighting units, and other first responders in the event of RAM impact within the installation/base perimeter.

C-RAM T

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4-11. The C-RAM theater LNO is responsible for establishing a staff organization composed of all affected services and multinational partners with on-going operational activities at the subject installation/base. The C-RAM theater LNO and his staff are responsible for the planning, coordination, and execution of all required operations to effectively carry out C-RAM base defense activities for the commander. The commander requires a C² system that supports the find, fix, track, and target, engage, and assess functions of joint C² to execute the C-RAM responsibilities. To effectively support sense, warn, and intercept functions at U.S./multinational installations/bases, an integrated C² system must be employed which provides timely operational environment awareness; continuous assessment; and horizontal/vertical coordination within, and external to, the TOC/BDOC.

4-12. The synchronization of the many systems and procedures from the seven functional areas enables the FOB decision makers to have SA which improves their ability to make time-sensitive decisions.

4-13. An information network must be developed for all the C-RAM functions to attain maximum effectiveness. It is the method by which operational forces will develop the requisite SA needed to develop and gain battlefield dominance. The information network will provide the C² capability required to execute planning and the ability to execute all aspects of the C-RAM mission rapidly. It should support BDOCs and the rapid integration, correlation, and assessment of data from multiple sources. This enables immediate decision, warning, intercept, and attack/counterstrike actions.

C-RAM P

4-14. Identify Key Assets. Planners must identify and list key assets for consideration as part of the risk analysis. Key assets can be located both inside and outside the perimeter. Critical infrastructure may be located outside the physical confines of the perimeter and not under the commander’s control. Locations in and of themselves are not normally considered key assets. However, a location can be used to identify a key asset. A high concentration of personnel in that location could cause the dining facility to be identified as a key asset.

4-15. At a minimum, the key asset list should include—

 Personnel (military and civilian).

 Mission-essential personnel.

 General population.

 Property (essential to the mission or high in monetary or symbolic value).

 Equipment.

 Materiel.

 Infrastructure.

 Facilities/buildings.

IPOE, I

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MDMP

4-16. The C-RAM MDMP can begin with the receipt of a mission from a higher headquarters; or by a headquarter’s anticipation of a new mission based on SA and the commander’s intent. Commanders and staff receive and post the most recent friendly and enemy information, in continuous refinement of the COP.

4-17. Based on the threat analysis and defense plan, the EOC reviews the RAM capability, considering the commander’s intent. When the resultant level of protection is inadequate to satisfy the commander’s intent, the EOC designs various augmentation plans that provide adequate force protection to the FOB. The defense accommodates all projected operations, branches, and sequels. The plans must consider increased logistical support and deployment timelines. At the conclusion of this design process, the EOC war games the various plans and recommends COAs to the commander.

4-18. The analysis of a mission and the subsequent planning are conducted in parallel. The mission statement of the headquarters is posted on the information network, which is a WARNO designed to ensure understanding of the mission and the commander’s guidance for action. Parallel and collaborative planning continues among the staff on the net, updating and ensuring SA is a continuous process that provides the environment for all other actions within the decision-making process.

4-19. The established architecture allows the C-RAM section to concentrate on a scheme of maneuver that best accomplishes the mission at hand. The BDOC staff conducts integrated staff planning and prepares running estimates in support of the MDMP. It coordinates vertically and horizontally to ensure synchronization of defense; in support of the planning; by analyzing the mission and by defining the battlefield environment. BDOC personnel analyze the command’s OA and operational environment, and identify areas of influence/interest from a C-RAM perspective. They identify both specified and implied essential tasks applicable to the force, review availability of assets for mission planning, and analyze threat factors bearing on the operational environment by providing the information in Table 4-1.

Table 4-1. Threat factors Tactical Considerations

Locations of RAM launch sites.

Range, altitude, and capabilities of threats in the OA.

Flight profiles, capabilities, and aspects of the threats outside of the OA that may impact on operations.

All critical facts, assumptions, constraints, and limitations associated with or impacting operations.

A list of identified assets that may require dedicated protection.

Assessment of required detail within the time available for IPOE; determining and submitting initial CCIR, identifying intelligence gaps, and submitting requests for information to the S-2.

S

A

C

O

P

4-20. Good planning begins with good SA. The shared local COP provides the backbone for SA. The use of shared databases and virtual collaboration to build the COP gives the commander and staff the ability to study the enemy and friendly situations in real time. This sharing of information, to build a COP, streamlines planning and optimizes execution of tactical operations. The COP may look the same at all levels, but its use differs with the level of command and the scope of the operation.

4-21. To build the local COP, the C-RAM section displays the current OA ground and air SA displays, tactical charts, and situation map. It defines the map area to a particular scale, zoom, and center to launch the local COP, and populates the AMDWS with the current C-RAM battlefield graphics. It establishes chart tabs containing active overlays created by various staff sections according to the SOP. It also sets the CP picture and function to automatically populate the AMDWS with the current ―Blue Feed‖ or ―Blue Agent‖

friendly unit status input from the maneuver control system, using Force XXI battle command—brigade and below (FBCB²). The AMDWS sets the CP picture and overlay situation map function to populate the AMDWS automatically with the current live ―Red Feed‖ from the All Source Analysis System (ASAS). It establishes a CP filter and unit long name to distinguish between live Blue Feed and ―Blue Agent.‖

4-22. Live feeds are displayed per the filtering procedures in the TSOP with mission-specific requirements.

Settings for friendly (Blue Feed) data must be set for the current operation. Live Blue Feed displays all platforms with functioning FBCB² systems as individual icons. Filter settings declutter platform data to collective unit locations with a default update. The collective unit data must be set for the current situation to optimize performance of the maneuver control system. ASAS and S-2 sections at each echelon correlate enemy (Red) unit data.

O

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A

4-23. Operational environment awareness provides an accurate picture of friendly and enemy operations within an area of interest and is the key enabler of the TOC/BDOC’s ability to command operations in real time. It also provides the capability to view and monitor threats and potential targets giving TOC/BDOC C²

personnel the ability to direct and/or redirect strike, intercept, and ISR assets during and prior to execution.

Key data and information links (at a minimum) will include local, in-theater, and national level sensors, tactical data links, and messaging to provide relevant information required for timely and accurate execution. Operational environment awareness combines information from air, surface, ground, near space and space assets to provide a four-dimensional view of the operational environment. Sensor and data fusion displayed within the C² picture plays an important role in validating targets and eliminating ambiguous information. The information provided under the umbrella of operational environment awareness must be shared throughout the TOC/BDOC and other supporting organizations.

4-24. By developing and distributing a common view of the operational environment, TOC/BDOC C² personnel are able to monitor enemy actions and reactions, identify potential threats, determine potential impact on friendly forces/operations, and rapidly inform/warn base personnel of impending/on-going enemy actions.

4-25. During execution, each TOC/BDOC C² functional area continuously monitors changes in the operational environment, thus enabling them to assemble the information needed to command and control the fight, and to answer the commander’s question, ―What is the enemy doing and what options/capabilities do we have to counter his actions?‖ Parallel coordination among TOC/BDOC functional areas and between external organizations is essential for timely proactive execution. As unexpected or time-critical events unfold which affect installation/base personnel and/or operations, C² personnel assess impacts on their own functional area, level of reporting required, and then develop options for the decision maker. Options must be derived rapidly and communicated horizontally and vertically. Continuous review and assessment of operational environment awareness data often reveals a ―trigger event,‖ which can be used to preempt possible enemy actions.

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4-26. The C-RAM unit follows standard convoy procedures to and from its location. For detailed guidance on conducting convoy operations, see the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Handbooks 03-6 and 04-5, and FM 4-01.45.

4-27. Once convoy procedures are completed, C-RAM begins the emplacement and integration process.

The C-RAM section integrates with the BDOC to provide the base commander and staff local airspace and RAM information. The C-RAM section should be linked to the BDOC. The airspace control authority establishes and publishes air routes, air tasking orders, special instructions, and flight times for friendly protect and SA. This links all the airspace users for immediate airspace management and synchronization.

4-28. The FAAD will be linked into the WAVES system providing EW to the OA through confirmation or correlation of available RAM sensors. The AMDWS and FAAD systems display the local air picture in the BDOC.

4-29. The employment of the C-RAM unit is based on the commander’s defended asset list, METT-TC, the intercept timeline, threat TTPs, and C-RAM capabilities. Placement of the weapon systems must maximize coverage and limit potential collateral damage of surrounding areas when possible.

4-30. The C-RAM section ensures connectivity to all sensors and command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C⁴I) assets available. These include the following systems: WAVES, RAID, TASS, HALO, UTAMS, AFATDS, and UAS common ground station when available.

S

W

E

C

4-31. Numerous sensors can collect both actionable information (for immediate response) and gather intelligence for analysis and future use. The family of Firefinder radars (Q36, Q37, and Q46) and the LCMR (Q-48) are the primary indirect fire sensors. These systems can provide reactive targeting data

(locations) for attack by a variety of responders (counter-fire, maneuver forces [ground or air], Air Force or other attack aircraft, et cetera).

4-32. Acoustic sensors can complement the counter-fire radars. Numerous other sensor platforms or attack platforms, to include UASs, Army helicopters, Air Force or Marine fixed-wing aircraft, and other systems such as Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), provide actionable information.

Ground-based sensor systems—such as RAIDs/Man-Portable Surveillance and Target Acquisition Radar System (MSTARS)/wide-area surveillance thermal imager (WSTI)/long-range thermal imaging (LRTI), et cetera—provide actionable information for use against threat IDF. This includes aerostat-mounted systems.

4-33. The goal of C-RAM is to use every available sensor and attack platforms to assist in the defeat of threat IDF capabilities.

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4-34. Ideally, the LCMR should be emplaced on a hill, rooftop, or flat plain. Performance is degraded when placed near obstructions such as buildings, trees, or vehicles. The important thing to remember is if you cannot see through it, neither can the radar (see Figure 4-1).

Figure 4-1. LCMR site location

4-35. When LCMRs are emplaced, all sectors facing other radars should be turned off to avoid interference. The radars should be emplaced no closer than 1,000 meters apart, and operating frequencies should be separated as much as possible (see Figure 4-2).

Figure 4-2. Multiple LCMR emplacement

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4-36. The Sentinel radar should be emplaced according to guidelines established in FMs 01.11 and 3-01.48.