Christopher Clary The Road So Far
6) Command and Control under Stress: How will either state’s command and control system function under stress? In the Cold War, the United States resorted to predelegating authority to
military commanders in certain situations because it had no confidence in the robustness of the command and control network in the face of nuclear attack.10 In the South Asian contexts, the stressors are likely conventional and electronic rather than nuclear, but the always-never dilemmas are still present. If either country’s command and control network—engineered no
9 See Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), Ch. 20. 10
For an introduction to the problem of predelegation with Cold War examples, see Paul Bracken, “Delegation of Nuclear Command Authority,” in Managing Nuclear Operations, eds. Ashton Carter, John D. Steinbruner, and Charles A. Zraket (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987), ch. 10.
doubt with redundancies and resiliencies—does substantially collapse during a war, what authority, if any, or physical ability, if any, will strategic force commanders have to launch? What authority, if any, will local commanders have over nuclear weapons in a situation of all-out war? Will Indian or Pakistani decision-makers, compared to their U.S. counterparts, be more willing to accept systems that fail safe, which perhaps in the process encourages counter-control or counter-force attacks?
7) Graduated Responses: When the Pakistani military announced the test of the short-range, nuclear-capable Nasr, the press release quoted Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Khalid Kidwai, the director-general of the Strategic Plans Division, as saying that the test was an “important milestone in consolidating Pakistan’s strategic deterrence capability at all levels of the threat spectrum.” Furthermore, he said that in the “hierarchy of military operations, the NASR Weapon System now provides Pakistan with [a] short range missile capability in addition to the already available medium and long range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles in its inventory.”11 Conceptualizing any sort of hierarchy of nuclear operations or levels of strategic deterrence threat, rather than envisioning a dichotomous “use/non-use” decision, implies several things. First, it suggests that the Pakistani command and control system might have to operate under nuclear in addition to conventional stressors. Second, it suggests the content of the message to nuclear units is not simply a “go/no-go” for all units, but rather a unit-specific message with distinct targeting options. The most difficult options to attempt to calibrate involve tactical nuclear weapons. India is understandably wedded to public statements that any nuclear first strike would generate massive retaliation.12 One wonders whether the Indian system gives policymakers multiple nuclear choices to enhance the credibility of deterrence in the face of limited Pakistani (or Chinese) use, or conforms to India’s stated position. In any event, the possibility of graduated options along multiple nuclear pathways likely complicates the task of nuclear management in peacetime, crisis, and war in ways that are not easily foreseeable, given extant public knowledge. 8) Naval Command and Control: Both countries have expressed interest in pursuing naval legs for future nuclear triads. India’s effort has been more visible, with tests of both surface- and submarine-launched ballistic missiles and trials of a nuclear-powered submarine. Pakistan’s effort will likely be more cruise missile centered, and it is not yet clear whether surface vessels or submarines might be involved in a naval Pakistani triad. Developing naval legs of the triad, particularly if they are viewed as more survivable than aircraft- or missile-born weapons, is accompanied by unique command and control challenges. Submarine-launched missiles cannot be mated with nuclear warheads underway, meaning that custody must be transferred to the military at some point. This can occur during peacetime, during crisis, or during war. Crisis or wartime transfer of authority creates incentives for an adversary to launch nuclear or conventional strikes prior to the transfer and loading of nuclear weapons. This is by definition
11 Emphasis added. Inter-Services Public Relations, Joint Staff Headquarters, Pakistan, Press Release No.
PR94/2011-ISPR, April 19, 2011, available at http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&id=1721.
12
Press Information Bureau, Government of India, “Cabinet Committee on Security Reviews Progress in Operationalizing India’s Nuclear Program,” Prime Minister’s Office Press Release, January 4, 2003, available at http://pib.nic.in/archieve/lreleng/lyr2003/rjan2003/04012003/r040120033.html.
crisis unstable. Concerns about military custody can be mitigated through technological and procedural fixes, most notably PALs. To the extent these PALs cannot be overridden while underway, this places stress on the command and control system to still be able to broadcast authorizing launch codes even after a possible nuclear strike, or this would create incentives for counter-control strikes.13
To conclude, both India and Pakistan have significant choices to make. There is no reason to expect the present configuration of nuclear capabilities and doctrinal choices to be more stable than that configuration which existed in May 1998. One hopes that both civilian and military leaders consider the political and military ramifications of all options so that they can make deliberate decisions. Poor outcomes become more likely when technological capabilities are pursued by drift or at scientific or program manager direction only. Capabilities acquired absentmindedly can still be quite threatening to adversaries and can generate countervailing responses. What seems clear from the past decade is that neither India nor Pakistan was content with staying with a “recessed deterrent” posture or a “force-in-being” arsenal. Developments over the next decade do not suggest a natural stopping point for future technological and doctrinal developments. So far, India and Pakistan have been content to walk or jog in their nuclear developments. Perhaps an outright race is next. It is worth remembering the famous “Red Queen’s Race” from Alice in Wonderland. It is possible to have a race where both parties must run very fast to stay in the same place.
13
A good introduction to the problem of vulnerability for naval nuclear forces is Ashton Carter, “Assessing Command System Vulnerability,” in Managing Nuclear Operations, Carter, Steinbruner, and Zrakat, eds., particularly 574-8.