Command and Control, and Unified Command

It is strongly recommended that a venue incident response plan involve coordination and communication with public safety and public health officials, as well as the local JTTF (Joint Terrorism Task Force) and fusion centers where possible. It is strongly recommended that decisions on the roles and authority of involved agencies and individuals be made during security planning sessions, and not during an incident.

The National Incident Management System (NIMS), especially the Incident Command System (ICS), is used as a tool to assist many venues in planning for managing incidents. A key component of the ICS system is the unified command structure. Unified command unites the incident commanders of entities involved in incident response. In the unified command framework, commanders of responding organizations make response decisions together according to ICS guidelines. Once these broad decisions have been made, the incident commanders retain control over the first responders that report to them and the responsibilities assigned to their units. At a venue, unified command is likely to include stadium security and management along with local law enforcement and fire services at a

minimum. It is strongly recommended that venues follow a model similar to the unified command model. However, individuals can be trained to take command and make

decisions themselves in the event that communications within a unified incident command are cut off.

Of particular note regarding transferring from normal operations to incident management are instances where the decisions to do so are not entirely clear. This is most common with weather conditions, but it is also plausible with terrorist threats such as a suspicious bag or a bomb threat. It is therefore strongly recommended that communication with outside groups remain open even during normal operating procedures.

It is strongly recommended that a venue identify a centralized location as an operations center. It is strongly recommended that this command center be staffed by members of supporting and stakeholder agencies to efficiently communicate with security team members. The physical location and security of the command center is important to consider. It can be a security issue if the command center is compromised and this greatly inhibits the incident response capabilities of a venue. It is recommended that a venue consider how insulated their on-site security center is. If possible, it is recommended that the venue try to keep the public from accessing the location of the command center and other areas crucial to the implementation of the security plan and the response to any security incidents. A few metrics to measure the security of the command center itself are listed below.

If an event is especially large or identified as particularly at risk for a terrorist attack, it is

recommended that a secondary, remote command center be set up. When doing so, a venue

and participating stake-holders should be careful not to develop two parallel, but non-

communicating command centers. A serious flaw in stadium security plans can be the lack of communication between the venue security command center and the law enforcement/outside agency command center.

To test how well a plan has been coordinated with outside agencies, tabletop exercises can be run with these agencies present. It has been noted that turnover in leadership and point of contact positions within these outside agencies can be relatively high. Thus, in order to

ensure good communication and understanding of role, it is recommended that venues consider how frequently they reiterate and review unified command structure and planning, and how often they run joint tabletop exercises. It is also recommended that a structure be in place to identify and brief newly appointed individuals on their role in incident command operations whenever turnover internally or in outside agencies does take place.

It is possible that lines of communication will not be available during an emergency. Assuring that this does not happen is a goal that is discussed later in the communication chapter. Even so, it is recommended that venues design contingency plans in case it does. A venue may estimate its performance during an emergency with the added complication of isolated communication structures via tabletop exercises in which groups of individuals are isolated from one another. In these exercises, as would happen in a real emergency, the groups must independently make decisions given the, most likely different, information they have available. Chapter 5 includes a more extensive discussion of tabletop exercises.

Time is of the essence in emergency situations. The speed with which decisions are made and then implemented is one important metric, although some decisions may be made hastily under pressure before sufficient information is available. It is recommended that a test of the strength of a unified command system, to be it through tabletop exercises or some other method, include measuring both the speed with which decisions are made as well as the validity of the decisions.

There are potential opportunities to collaborate with other sports venues or similar facilities. Equipment and personnel can be shared between venues in order to defray costs. Management can also tour nearby venues to learn from their procedures and to offer up advice to these venues on anything they see. It is suggested that venues contact nearby locations to determine if any such partnerships could be mutually beneficial. For smaller venues or smaller leagues, it is recommended that they seek out a larger, more established venue to observe their security procedures and develop a point of contact to consult with on security issues.

Are tabletop exercises done in coordination with local law

enforcement, public health and other relevant agencies? How many times per year are tabletop exercises done?

Y/N, Freq.

How many times per year are incident response plans reviewed with relevant outside agencies?

Freq.

Are measurements in place for both the speed and validity of the decision making process in a unified command situation?

Y/N

Are procedures in place to identify and brief new points of contact and leadership elements both internally and in outside agencies?

Y/N

Has the security of the command center been studied? Y/N How close to the command center are patron accessible areas? # Is there a secondary, remote command center for some events? Y/N How many individuals (employees) have access to the command

center?

#

Have nearby venues been contacted to explore possible collaborative partnerships?

Y/N