2. Theoretical background
2.5. Common property and open access ….…
A further concept which contributes to the analysis of transnational water governance system are the theories of open access and common property resources. Even if there are several overlapping points between the two concepts both have significant differences, particularly in respect of use and access.12 It is important to state that open access or common property are not inherent characteristics of resources, but rather describe the way how a resource is or is not managed.
2.5.1. Open access or the problem of overuse
An open access resources is
“… a depletable, fugitive resource characterized by rivalry in exploitation; it is subject to use by any person who has the capability and desire to enter into harvest or extraction of it; and its extraction results in symmetric and asymmetric negative externalities.”
(Stevenson 1991, p. 8)
12 This chapter does not deal with the full depth of these theories but only to the extent which seems necessary for the analysis of water governance systems.
30
Open access can be split up in two subcategories: on the one hand, there are those which have limited users and therefore can only accessed by members, on the other hand, there are those resources which have an unlimited number of users and are open to anyone. Both subcategories share the point of unlimited extraction of the resource. (ibid, p.58)
The overuse of a resource means that the exploitation has reached a critical level which exceeds its carrying capacity or maximum sustainable yield (ibid, p.10). Hardin (1968) exactly discusses this problem in his article “The tragedy of commons”. He argues that several issues exclude a technical solution but have to be conceived as problems of morality and attitude. Hardin contests the idea that the best outcome for society can be reached if each individual acts in a way which ensures its own benefit. On the contrary, unlimited individual freedom causes serious problems for the survival of mankind, because the activities of subjects acting in the logic of individual benefit lead to a tragedy. It is the tragedy of the commons. Unlimited freedom enables everyone to increase his individual benefit at the costs of the commons.13 Resources like water or air cannot be fenced. Therefore, these kinds of resources have to be protected by laws and regulations. Moreover, Hardin emphasizes the role of overpopulation as key source of other problems. (Hardin 1968, pp.1243-1245)
2.5.2. Common property: a solution for the tragedy of the commons?
Stevenson suggests seven elements characterizing common property.
Firstly, “the resource unit has bounds that are well defined by physical, biological and social parameters.” (Stevenson 1991, p.40) This aims to clarify which resource is meant. Secondly, the group possessing the right to use a particular resource is well defined and clearly indicates those who are excluded. Thirdly, more than two people use the resources. Otherwise it would be private property. Fourthly, a system of rules exists fixing rights and duties which regulate the behavior of the users and resource extraction. This control mechanism over the extraction of the resource constitutes a major difference between open access and common property resources. Furthermore, a common property foresees that “users share joint, nonexclusive entitlement to the in situ or fugitive resource prior to its capture.” (ibid, p. 40) This means owners jointly claim the use of a resource a priori to its capture. Moreover, those who use the resource compete for it. In doing so, they cause negative externalities on the other users.
13 Hardin illustrates it with the example of herdsmen who share common grassland.
31
However, the limited number of users and sets of rules help to keep the negative externalities at an appropriate level. Finally, a clearly defined group of rights holders can be identified; this group does not have to be identical with the group of resource users. (ibid, pp. 40-45)
In a nutshell, Stevenson summarizes his characteristics by defining a common property as
“…a form of resource management in which a well-delineated group of competing users participates in extraction or use of a jointly held, fugitive resource according to explicitly or implicitly understood rules about who may take how much of the resource.”
(ibid, p. 46) Historically, commons have always been regulated in one way or the other and have not shown elements of open access. Moreover, open access resources imply the absence of property because there are neither rights nor duties ex ante to the capture. In comparison to open access, common property postulates rights and duties which exist before resource use.
Open access resources are open to everyone and therefore have no owners who would have the right to exclude another person. Common property, on the contrary, has a well defined group of authorized users holding the right to deny others the access to a certain resource.
(ibid, S. 48-52)
Figure 4: Property institutions
Source: Stevenson (1991), p. 58 Private Property
Common
Property Open Access
Limited User Unlimited User
Group limitation One person Members only Members only Open to anyone
Extraction
Limitation Extraction limited Extraction limited Extraction Extraction
by individual decision by rules unlimited unlimited
32
Additionally, even if there is a limited number of users it does not fulfill the condition of a common property if these users are allowed to extract as much of the resource as they want because they tend to overuse. Consequently, rules between users defining the way and amount of extraction are necessary to prevent exceeding of the carrying capacity.
A decisive difference between common property and public goods lies in their nature.
Public goods are goods or services whereas common property is a kind management a particular resource. In addition, public goods cause rivalry and are not exclusive because the exclusion of certain groups is hardly possible, due to costs. In general, public goods are produced artificially and the principal question is how much of them should be provided.
(ibid, pp. 52-58)
Furthermore, the consumption of public goods does not have influence on its quantity.
Consequently, they are in some way ‘immune’ against depletion. However, whereas public goods cannot be depleted, common property resources can easily be depleted. Therefore, several resources are wrongly characterized as public goods although they show clear elements of common property resources. (McKean 1996, p. 226)
33