Communicative action

Through communicative action Habermas (1984) proposes it is possible to minimise the influence of the system‟s instrumental action on the lifeworld. As he explains it, the lifeworld is where actions (social goals) can be discussed reflectively and critically; he suggests that the tool of language can liberate modern societies from the effects of the instrumental action. He proposes that language is fundamentally universal to all humans and that the ability to communicate rationally (in a sensible or logical manner) is a perfect human ability. He attempts to outline freedom in society through his concept of communicative rationality, which evolved over time through his expression of the critical theory of communicative action (Habermas, 1984).

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Habermas (1987) suggests that the human impulse to communicate is a fundamental universal reasoning underpinning all human interaction. He notes that communicative rationality may not instantly discard prejudice or achieve rational consensus but that negative communicative aspects can be weakened over time through reasoning. However, Susen (2011) criticises this concept of reasoning, querying whether a rational consensus can, in fact, be achieved by any society. The key reason for communicative rationality is to enhance equality.

Habermas and Outhwaite (1996) argue that human linguistic reason can form a bridge between societal integration and cultural and individual identity formation. Habermas, however, does not propose rehabilitating system thoughts, as they serve an important social function and provide a foundation for knowledge (see Figure 4.3, which represents and describes the intersubjective relationship between the lifeworld and the system world). They are connected by culture, social life, beliefs and values, opinions, planning, and performance. Habermas emphasises the importance of developing a universal intersubjective relationship between the objective system and personal lifeworld thoughts, and the legitimisation of authority in modern society.

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Figure 4.3: The intersubjective relationship between the lifeworld and the system world

Habermas (1984, 1987) emphasises the power of communicative action in policy formation, maintaining that communication, open discourse, and debate in the public sphere will empower people or groups to confront state authority for the purpose of political action. This may happen when individuals‟ or groups‟ moral, cultural values, and practices (lifeworld aspects) have experienced prejudice from or have not been incorporated into the dominant world‟s political state and economy (the system world). This results in an equal presentation of needs and experience by the community, which have been incorporated into the system - as, for example, in health policy formation.

The principal point of Habermas‟s (1984, 1987) theory of communicative action is to develop a shared understanding between the communicators: the person who is listening (the hearer) and the speaker. “Shared” here is not about sharing the same view or being similarly influenced by instrumentalism - both listener and speaker, rather, share the presupposition of equality. Instrumentalism is a practical philosophical approach which involves an activity

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(e.g. science, law, or education) primarily as an instrument or tool for some practical purpose. Habermas (1979) proposed a validity claim model to assess levels of equality between communicators; this model tests the communication‟s sincerity, trustworthiness, and suitability to the circumstances, and whether one communicator can understand what has been expressed by the other i.e. whether it is intelligible.

Cohen (1995) and Flyvberg (1998) regard Habermas‟s theory of communicative action as insufficient, their argument focusing on what would happen if the validity claim between communicators is faulty – especially in a society dominated by politics and economic growth, which increase the opportunity for opposing discourse. Cohen (1995) emphasises the subconscious influence of power, proposing that during the discourse a communicator may feel less powerful and hence less vocal in comparison with the other communicator. Conversely, he states that the communicator with power, who is more vocal, will direct and steer the direction of the discourse. Extending the argument, Fraser (1992) states that the various manners of speech and methods of influence create an action which promotes the marginalisation of particular groups through factors such as race, gender, and ethnicity. Fraser uses Tannen‟s (1992) research to illustrate the marginalisation of women by men in group conversation: men may dominate the discourse by talking extensively and to a greater degree. Critics of Habermas‟s theory ask whether it is possible to realise an environment which is free from domination.

In response, Habermas (1996) asserted the need to institutionalise discourse ethics, proposing that the criteria for discourse should require a shared public space where information can be shared inclusive of all, everyone having the same opportunity to take part, and that a conscious effort should be made to ensure that no-one is excluded. Central to the institutional discourse criteria is that there should be no external influence, as everyone is bound only to the principle of what is rational, and that all must have a fair chance to introduce their issues,

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be heard, and make suggestions. This will then free the discourse from internal coercion (Habermas, 1987) and allow unity among participants when reaching a decision or mutual understanding of needs. Thus, the interests of the community at large will be served, free from the bureaucracy of power and money.

Fleming (2002) supports Habermas‟s idea that discourse promotes freedom, equal opportunity, and care, to establish a democratic society. However, Fleming also states that the process of arriving at an agreement requires that participants disclose their ideology, any internal or external influence (coercive), and any non-democratic constructs which may affect the process of developing democracy. Collins (1991) argues that this suggests that discourse is rational, free of restraint, and power, stating that freedom from all of these is required to reach an agreement.

The principle behind Habermas‟s concept of civil society and democracy is that both are dedicated to establishing a learning community to enable disparate groups live together. In this community, efforts would be made to establish an agreement about societal problems or difficult issues through open, honest discourse, liberated from the dominant influence of the system world (Fleming, 2002). Habermas (1984) acknowledges that higher education (in this context, “higher education” denotes “research”) as a public sphere allows discourse to occur through the learning community, enabling a critical reflection of the lifeworld while continuing to support the functions of money and power.

This section introduced Habermas‟s theory of communicative action, his lifeworld/system world concept, and how colonisation of the lifeworld by the system world occurs. It examined Habermas‟s resulting theory of communicative action as a saviour of modernity. Modernity involves both a historical period and the combination of specific socio-cultural practices, norms, and attitudes which emerged in post-medieval Europe, to advance in many

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forms and in various periods around the world (Bos et al., 2013), and involves a wide range of interrelated historical processes and cultural phenomena. To understand how communicative action can inform and maintain stigmatising characteristics and attributes, the next section considers Erving Goffman‟s theory of stigma as an attribute of communicative action.