Community-based targeting

Samson et al. (2006:68) define community-based targeting as “a state policy of contracting with community groups or intermediary agents to have them carry out one or more of the following activities: identify recipients for cash or in-kind benefits, monitor the delivery of those benefits, and/or engage in some part of the delivery process.” Targeting decisions that is, judgements on which households are in extreme poverty, made by community members usually working through an elected or appointed committee of respected citizens. Like other targeting methods, community-based targeting could be the sole test of eligibility or as part of multiple stages in a targeting system.

The cornerstone of community-based targeting is the active involvement of members of the community. The key objective is the incorporation of local knowledge into the cash transfer’s decision-making processes. Participation of communities is expected to lead to better targeted benefits and more equitably distributed benefits with less corruption and other rent-seeking practices (Mansuri and Rao 2004).

132 Community-based targeting falls under the umbrella term, community-based development. The latter refers to “projects that actively include beneficiaries [and non-beneficiaries] in their design and management…” (ibid.).

Community-based targeting relies on communities to use their social capital to organise themselves and participate in the development process.

There is debate about community involvement in defining and applying criteria to identify programme beneficiaries. Proponents of community-based targeting base their support on the point that community members are better placed than agencies and people external to the community to identify the poor and vulnerable households in need of assistance (Regional Hunger and Vulnerability Programme 2007:2). Dissenters argue in favour of universal assistance or provision of support to all eligible beneficiaries. The dissenters argue that community-based targeting is labour intensive, divisive and can perpetuate local patronage structures and gender biases (ibid.).

Garcia and Moore (2012:86); Botes (1999:41-49); and Sharp 1997; Coady et al. 2002; and WFP 1998 (as cited in Mayanga (2008:36) assert that community-based targeting has the following advantages:

▪ Community based targeting is relatively inexpensive as it avoids the costs and complexities of collecting and analysing objective data.

▪ Local actors have more information available to them or at lower costs than would officials from a welfare agency.

▪ Utilises the communities’ deeper understanding of the interacting causes of need and vulnerability and which individuals or households are at greater risk and in need of assistance. Communities are familiar with any recent idiosyncratic or covariate shocks that community members or households may have faced and therefore which individuals and households should be assisted.

▪ Those in the immediate community are likely to know whether or not households will use cash transfers in ways intended by a programme’s goal and objectives. This is informed by their local knowledge of recipients’ behaviours.

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▪ Community-based targeting facilitates empowerment and capacity building of communities. Communities gain mastery over their affairs and find own solutions to their development challenges. Community groups or committees involved in the targeting system have their administrative, leadership and decision-making competencies enhanced.

▪ Community participation in targeting increases access of disadvantaged households to project benefits; enhances motivation of communities; and increases ownership and community responsibility of projects.

▪ Community-based targeting is about involvement and participation of communities in the targeting process. In this regard, communities become active recipients rather than mere targets of development benefits, something which could result in what Merton (as cited in Botes 1999:43) calls a development “anomie” that is, “a state in which people are prevented from attaining socially desirable ends by socially acceptable means.”

▪ Community-based targeting can foster social integration and de-monopolises power within communities by strengthening interpersonal relationships, and reducing feelings of powerlessness and alienation, all factors being important forms of social capital – bonding, bridging and linking dimensions.

Chambers; Ostrom, Lam and Lee; Uphoff; and Narayan cited in Mansuri and Rao (2004) argue that community involvement in the selecting beneficiaries of poverty alleviation programs “can improve targeting, lower the informational costs of delivering anti-poverty programmes and ensure high-quality monitoring of programme implementation.”

The underlying criticisms of community-based targeting cited by the following authors: Samson et al. (2006), Sharp (1997) and Coady et al. 2002) as cited in Mayanga (2008:36-37); and Garcia and Moore (2012:87); and Hanlon et al.

2010:113) are as follows:

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▪ Local elites may distribute resources in ways that deviate from targeting guidelines. For example, the danger of nepotism or other kinds of favouritism leading to inclusion and exclusion errors.

▪ When eligibility criteria are ambiguous and leave room for interpretation, inconsistent application of targeting rules and procedures may arise leading to errors.

▪ Even when community members objectively target households, community-based targeting can still be perceived as unfair or highly subjective and can result in social tensions and resentment thereby undermining community social capital.

▪ Since it decentralises important policy elements of targeting, it may lead to varying benefit levels for the same groups in different regions with the result that horizontal equity is undermined.

▪ It faces difficulties in standardising or comparing targeting between different communities, high inputs of time, training and monitoring may be needed to develop the community institutions and ensure fairness.

▪ Community-based targeting may perpetuate local power structures, that is, the multiple interests of the community actors may imply that even if they have excellent information on who is needy they may not use that information in the way that the central welfare agency funding the programme might prefer

▪ The notion of community is problematic as the idea of community-based targeting is easiest to apply in small communities where it is clear who is and is not a member.

The research evidence of community-based targeting’s performance is mixed.

The method yields successful outcomes in some cases yet in other cases performance is poor.

The unconditional social cash transfer pilot scheme implemented in Zambia’s Kalomo district in 2004 targeted households meeting two key criteria: (1) extremely poor and suffering from chronic hunger, malnutrition and at risk of starvation (Schubert 2010:215). These households were described as food-poor and in most low-income countries, food poverty is viewed as a good

135 indicator of chronic and persistent poverty (ibid.). (2) Households have high dependency ratios, have no able-bodied persons of working age or the breadwinners are sick or have died (ibid.). The selection and approval process was completely community-based with the Public Welfare Assistance Scheme (PWAS) structures leading the process (ibid., 217). At the village level are Community Welfare Assistance Committees (CWACs) each covering 200 to 400 households and these committees are elected by the communities.

Area Coordinating Committees are responsible for coordinating between five and ten CWACs (ibid.). The District Welfare Assistance Committees (DWACs) oversaw the work of ACCs. A manual of operations setting out the procedures of the entire targeting, approval, registration and payment process was in place to guide the CWACs in identifying the 10 percent of households that are extremely poor and labour-constrained (ibid). In his analysis of the effectiveness of targeting and programme delivery, Schubert (2010:219) found that the CWACs were effective in selecting those households that fulfil the criteria of ‘food-poor’ and ‘labour-constrained’. However not all food poor and labour-constrained households were included in the project. Schubert makes the point that the CWACs were not responsible for this outcome but that the 10 percent ceiling applied to each village meant that there would be exclusion errors from the onset (ibid.). The Kalomo unconditional cash transfer project showed that it is possible to rely on community structures to carry out community-based targeting in cash transfer programmes.

Results from several pilot grants using community-based methods to target the 10 percent ultra-poor and labour-constrained in Malawi showed that in 2007 in the Mchinji district the exclusion error was high at 37 percent. The inclusion error rate was 24 percent explained as recipients not meeting the labour-constrained criterion (Millier, Tsoka and Reichert 2008 as cited in Hanlon et al. 2010:113). Miller, Tsoka and Reichert 2010 (as cited in Garcia &

Moore 2012:87) point to concerns of unfairness and favouritism in community-based targeting in cash transfer programmes in Malawi and Zambia. “Village heads were sometimes able to inappropriately influence community members involved in selecting beneficiaries for Malawi’s SCT [social cash transfer]

programme perhaps because community members were not able or confident

136 enough to navigate local political dynamics” (ibid.) In Zambia research evidence from Chipata and Kazungula districts revealed significant issues with community-based targeting. In the former case, the inclusion error was high at 50 percent and 30 percent of the district’s population “believes that powerful households had preferential access [to benefits in the programme].”

In the latter case, the poverty profiles of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries were not different (Hanlon et al. 2010:114).

Mansuri and Rao (2004) make the point that in communities where people have multiple and conflicting identities, community-based targeting may be fraught with challenges because of competing incentives

The negative social effects arising from community-based targeting in cash transfer programmes can have implications on a community’s forms of social capital similar to some of the negative effects highlighted under the proxy means test method. Perceptions of unfairness, bias, nepotism, lack of transparency, manipulation of targeting processes, political interference often leads to social fragmentation, weakening of social relations and social conflicts in communities. A detailed discussion of these social effects of CTs is provided in section 3.4.

Garcia and Moore (2012:87) note that some countries in Sub-Saharan Africa continue to refine and improve the implementation and use of their community-based targeting methods. Malawi has taken steps to reduce targeting errors in community-based targeting. Miller, Tsoka and Reichert (as cited in Garcia & Moore 2012:87) make the point that Malawi’s SCT programme bars village heads to sit on community social protection committees. This is meant to prevent undue influence of local traditional leaders on community processes. The programme added a community verification stage to its targeting system. Community verification is done by extension workers who are external to the communities and local family systems. This brings impartiality and independence into the targeting process.

Hamonga cited in Garcia and Moore (2012:87) asserts that Zambia while allowing local community leaders to participate in community-based targeting introduced a “confidential appeals process” thus allowing community

137 members to raise grievances and complaints on anything related to the selection, approval, registration and payment processes. Community capacity development training activities are part of some cash transfer programmes and they aim to strengthen the technical competencies, administrative capabilities, and management and leadership skills of community members to carry out the targeting process.