Throughout this chapter, we have emphasized the distinction between communica-tion and language. In this final seccommunica-tion, we will compare human linguistic commu-nication with what we have learned about systems of animal commucommu-nication.
7.1 The Features
Differences and similarities between human language and natural animal communi-cation systems can be highlighted by comparing essential characteristics of the sys-tems. These characteristics are called design features, and are set up (perhaps unfairly) with reference to human language. Since this book emphasizes the essentially mental nature of linguistic ability, the design features that follow do not include the tradi-tional reference to vocal-auditory transmission. What is emphasized is the nature of the semantic and organizational structuring of each system. These design features rep-resent an adaptation of work by Charles Hockett and W.H. Thorpe.
1. Interchangeability All members of the species can both send and receive messages.
This is obviously true of human language. It is not the case with bee dancing (performed only by foragers) or birdsong (performed only by males). Nonhuman primate vocalizations appear to be largely interchangeable.
2. Feedback Users of the system are aware of what they are transmitting.
Humans monitor their linguistic output and correct it. It is debatable whether bees do so when they dance, or whether birds monitor their calls. It is not known if birds monitor their song; it is likely that they do.
3. Specialization The communication system serves no other function but to communicate.
Human language represents reality—both external (real world) and internal (states, beliefs)—symbolically in the mind. Manifested as speech, language serves uniquely as a communicative system. Bee dancing and birdsong also appear to be specialized communicative activity. Alarm calls of any species may be symptomatic but at the same time are specialized for different types of predators. Symptomatic tokens, on the other hand, are unspecialized. Crying is a symptomatic sign that may be interpreted by someone else and thus func-tion communicatively, but its primary purpose is physiological (the clearing of foreign matter from the eye, the release of emotional tension). If animal communication is primarily symptomatic—a claim that is hotly disputed by specialists in animal communication—then it would not qualify as a special-ized communicative system.
4. Semanticity The system conveys meaning through a set of fixed relationships among signifiers, referents, and meanings.
Human language conveys meaning through arbitrary symbols. Bee dancing con-veys meaning, but within a very limited range, as do bird calls and song. The range of meaning is broader and more subtle in nonhuman primate vocalizations.
Although we cannot claim to know the minds of such near relatives as chim-panzees and gorillas, it appears that the range of meanings suggested by their behavior in the wild does not approach the vastness of human semanticity (see feature 8).
5. Arbitrariness There is no natural or inherent connection between a token and its referent.
This is true of human language, with the possible exception of a few ono-matopoeic terms. Bee dancing shows arbitrariness in that there may be no con-nection between the form of the dance and the distance from the hive.
Expressions of food source quality and direction are not arbitrary, however.
Many bird calls are highly suited for their purpose, such as danger calls which are difficult to locate, and in this sense are not arbitrary. Most nonhuman pri-mate vocalization appears to be equally adaptive, though arbitrariness has been claimed for vervet monkey alarm calls.
6. Discreteness The communication system consists of isolatable, repeatable units.
Human language shows distinctive features, phonemes, syllables, morphemes, words, and still larger combinations. There are two (three, in some dialects) discrete types of bee dances, but these dances are not combined in various ways to produce novel messages. There is some evidence for subunits in birdsong. They are also pres-ent in primate call systems.
7. Displacement Users of the system are able to refer to events remote in space and time.
Bee dancing shows displacement. No evidence for displacement is found in bird calls or songs. Baboons occasionally produce threat and fight vocalizations long after an aggressive encounter, but there is no evidence that this is reflecting displacement;
it probably reflects a slow winding down of the animal’s emotional state. Among apes, it is not yet clear whether some degree of displacement is a feature of either their communication in the wild or the systems they have learned from humans.
Nonhuman primates do not appear to communicate about imaginary pasts or futures, which humans are able to do with language.
8. Productivity New messages on any topic can be produced at any time.
This is obviously true of human language. Bees show limited productivity. Bird calls show none. Birdsong shows evidence of recombination (the songs of laugh-ing gulls are well documented in this respect), but it is doubtful whether these recombinations transmit novel messages. This is also true of recombination in the calls of certain monkeys, such as macaques.
9. Duality of patterning Meaningless units (phonemes) are combined to form arbitrary signs. These signs in turn can be recombined to form new, meaningful larger units.
In human language, phonemes can be combined in various ways to create dif-ferent symbolic tokens: spot, tops, opts, and pots. These tokens in turn can be combined in meaningful ways: Spot the tops of the pots. There is no evidence of this type of patterning in any known animal communication system.
10. Tradition At least certain aspects of the system must be transmitted from an experienced user to a learner.
This is obviously a factor in the acquisition of human language. It is possibly present in a very limited way in bee communication, and it is definitely present in the acquisition of birdsong for some species. There is also some recent evi-dence for a degree of tradition among chimpanzees.
11. Prevarication The system enables the users to talk nonsense or to lie.
Undoubtedly, this property is found in human language. There are specialized mimics among birds, fishes, and even insects. A few examples of animal deception have been noted among the arctic fox and among vervets, but it is not clear whether this is normal species-specific behavior or the acts of a few isolated indi-viduals. The question of intentionality is crucial here. Current work with birds sug-gests that some species learn as many songs as possible and use this repertoire to maintain territorial advantage by “impersonating” other species. This may well be purely genetically determined behavior, but, in any event, it is highly complex.
12. Learnability A user of the system can learn other variants.
Humans can learn different languages. Bees are limited to their own genetically specified dialect. Bird calls are apparently limited in this same way. As noted previously, some birds learn the songs of other species, but this may well be simply mimicry. Nonhuman primates seem restricted to their own systems in the wild.
13. Reflexiveness The ability to use the communication system to discuss the sys-tem itself.
No evidence exists that any other species writes grammars or linguistics textbooks.
Tables 18.3 and 18.4 summarize this survey of design features.
Design feature Bees Birds
1. Interchangeability no; foragers only no; only males sing
2. Feedback ? ?
3. Specialization yes yes
4. Semanticity yes, very limited yes, limited 5. Arbitrariness yes, for expressing yes, though highly
distance adaptive
6. Discreteness in a limited way yes, in song
7. Displacement yes no
8. Productivity yes, very limited possibly
9. Duality of patterning no no
10. Tradition possibly, but highly yes, limited limited
11. Prevarication no possibly
12. Learnability no possibly
13. Reflexiveness no no
Table 18.3 Summary of design features for bees and birds
Summing Up
This brief overview of animal communication systems emphasizes that human lan-guage is one communication system among the many that life forms on this planet employ.
Communication can be described with reference to the sign, which is composed of two components, a signifier and that which is signified. Tokens may be iconic, symbolic, or indexical (the latter including the symptomatic token), and struc-tured as graded or discrete types. Most animal communication has traditionally been viewed as symptomatic, though studies of communication among birds and bees suggests symbolic signs are used. A significant innate component may interact with some exposure to the communication system, especially among birds.
Nonhuman primate communication consists of graded series of vocalizations and appears to show little arbitrariness, though some has been reported for the alarm calls of several monkeys.
Experiments with nonhuman primates have created controversy over whether chimpanzees and gorillas have shown symbolic behavior and a capacity for linguistic behavior. Many researchers have dismissed the work as an example of dressage or the Clever Hans phenomenon.
Human language and systems of animal communication share certain design features. Humans, however, lack many communicative skills that animals possess.
We are hopelessly inadequate at following scent trails; we cannot change color for communicative purposes with the facility of an octopus; and we are not as gifted as horses and many other mammals at assessing and interpreting subtle body gestures.
Humans do possess an ability to symbolize that far exceeds that of chimpanzees and gorillas (our nearest genetic relatives), even allowing for the most generous
Design feature Nonhuman primates Humans
1. Interchangeability yes yes
2. Feedback probably yes
3. Specialization in part yes
4. Semanticity yes yes
5. Arbitrariness limited confirmation; yes
selectively adaptive
6. Discreteness in call systems yes
7. Displacement no yes
8. Productivity possibly yes
9. Duality of patterning no yes
10. Tradition possibly yes
11. Prevarication possibly yes
12. Learnability no yes
13. Reflexiveness no current evidence yes
Table 18.4 Summary of design features for nonhuman primates and humans
interpretation possible of recent experiments. Human language is also more flexible and productive in manipulating these symbols than any known animal communi-cation system. Language is as natural a part of human life patterns as the commu-nication systems of our fellow creatures are for their modes of existence.