Comparison of the three adverbials

From a macro-perspective, the three ADVs underwent similar changes. Each functioned as a clause-internal adverbial at Stage I, as an epistemic sentential adverbial at Stage II, and as a DM at Stage III. Each had its origins in a clause- internal adverbial (RA or MA). Each developed an EA polysemy with wide scope

Adv Type indeed actually in fact

RA 1300 1425 1670

EA 1450 1750 1680

DM 1600 1815 1815

Figure 4.2. Approximate dates of development of indeed, actually, in fact.

serving a polyphonic adversative function; and each further developed a DM func- tion indicating that q is argumentatively related to p as an elaboration or clarification. The approximate dates of development are shown in figure 4.2. But at the same time, each construction has its own history at the micro-level, and the coexistence of the forms with each other (and other ADVs like really, in truth, etc.) ensures that some differences persist, on an assumption that no two Ls mean exactly the same thing (Haiman 1980: 516).

The two PPs are most obviously similar in their histories, having the same syntax. The chief differences between them are that:

(i) The original lexical deed is now largely restricted to such phrases as

deeds of valor, whereas no such restriction applies to fact. Strengthened

versions such as as a point of deed are therefore not available, though they are for in fact, as in I don’t think that in point of fact there is a

distinction.

(ii) The original bare PP in deed is now restricted to formulae like in deed

and word (or in word and deed ), whereas in fact1is not.

(iii) Indeed can signal agreement (despite counterexpectation) to a prior

utterance or implicature, which in fact cannot.

(iv) In fact cannot be used in the sense of Yes, whereas indeed can, as

exemplified in (19).

(v) Being confirmatory, indeed2invites the inference that though the infor-

mation may be new to AD/R, nevertheless SP/W had it in mind before. By contrast, in fact2presents material in q as new information: What in fact is going on/What is in fact going on? is a good question, but not

*What indeed is going on/What is indeed going on?

This distinction is made particularly clear by (38), which is the beginning of a newspaper article titled “Murder Suspect Competent for Trial”:

(38) A Superior Court judge has ruled that a man accused in the 1996 murder of a prostitute is indeed mentally competent to stand trial.

In a 10-minute hearing Wednesday at the Hall of Justice, Judge Lenard Louie ruled that Chung Chiu, 41, understands the charges against him and can rationally assist his defense attorneys. . .

The ruling stems from a competency hearing last December in which two of the three court-appointed psychiatrists testified that Chiu suffered some mental illnesses, but was not legally incompetent.

(1999 Jan. 21, San Francisco Chronicle) In this example indeed2invokes the question “Is Chiu mentally competent to stand

trial?,” and answers in the affirmative. That a question of this type had been posed earlier and had been answered affirmatively is shown by the later paragraph that summarizes the prior ruling (this later paragraph interestingly requires indeed to be reinterpreted not only as affirmation but also as confirmation). Had in fact2been used

here, a different prior discourse would have been invoked, for example, “This man is not mentally competent to stand trial,” and in fact would have contradicted that proposition (as a result the paragraph on the ruling would then have been incoherent). Consider another example, this time one in which both ADVs are used. Here President Clinton for the first time acknowledged publically a liaison that he had formerly denied:

(39) As you know, in a deposition in January, I was asked questions about my relationship with M. L. While my answers were legally accurate, I did not volunteer information.

Indeed, I did have a relationship with M. L. that was not appropriate. In fact, it was wrong.

(1998 Aug. 18, TV speech)

Indeed here is indeed2, referring back to I was asked questions about my relation- ship, and confirming the validity of the questioners’ assumptions that there was a

relationship. In fact is in fact3, strengthening (and confirming) it was not appropri- ate, and signaling that this is new information.

But if the two adverbs are switched as in (40) the effect is rhetorically quite different:

(40) As you know, in a deposition in January, I was asked questions about my relationship with M. L. While my answers were legally accurate, I did not volunteer information.

In fact, I did have a relationship with M. L. that was not appropriate. Indeed

it was wrong.

In fact would be possible here, but rather than inviting inferences of agreement with

the questioners, it suggests opposition to I did not volunteer information. Indeed

it was wrong would not signal new information, but rather some agreement with

unspecified critics. Therefore this sentence is only a weak addition to what preceded, not a “confession.” In other words, indeed and in fact are on a scale of strength, with in fact the stronger member of the pair.

Actually is similar to in fact. Like in fact:

(i) Actually cannot be used in the sense of Yes.

(ii) Actually2invites the inference that the information in q is new: What actually is going on/What is actually going on? is a good question.

Substituting actually for indeed in (38) is incoherent in the context of the larger discourse, just as it would be in He is in fact mentally

competent. But it seems less incoherent than in fact. This is presumably

in part because actually is weaker on the epistemic scale, as evidenced by the order actually, in fact, not *in fact, actually, and by substituting

actually for in fact in (40).

Another way in which in fact and actually are similar is that both may be used in spoken language to serve as hedges or softeners, though as one might expect from the fact that actually is the weaker of the two, it is more likely to be used this way. Basing her data on the London–Lund and Lancaster–Oslo–Bergen corpora, Aijmer (1986) studied PDE uses of actually. She says that a characteristic use in spoken language is to “create contact with the listener” or “rapport,” e.g. “I am telling you this in confidence” (Aijmer 1986: 128); in this meaning it often occurs clause-finally. Examples include:

(41) a. No, I don’t think I was. No, I was determined to get married actually. (Aijmer 1986: 126) b. Trump himself seemed exhilarated by the marathon negotiations that

preceded the bridge loan agreement.

“I enjoyed it, actually,” said Trump, author of “The Art of the Deal.” (1990 June 27, United Press Intl.) D. Robert Ladd (p.c.) provided a striking example of the hedged use of actually for politeness in Scottish English. On one occasion in a post office he had put a package on the scale to be weighed oriented in a direction which made the mailing address hard for the clerk to see. The clerk said: “Where’s it actually going?” If actually here were actually2, it would be the sender of the packet who might be questioning

(somewhat rudely) the ability of the post office to deliver mail correctly. Spoken by the post office clerk, however, Ladd interpreted it as “clearly an apology” for not being able to see the packaging label.

In her article on actually, Aijmer in passing also points out that in fact can be used in this way too in spoken discourse, also usually in clause-final position:

(42) Funny. We really quite enjoyed it in fact.

4.4 Subjectification and intersubjectification

The development of the EA meanings of indeed, in fact, and actually is in each case an example of subjectification. SP/W uses the adverbials to make explicit his or her commitment to the truth of the utterance. The further development of the DM meanings is a case of increased subjectification since SP/W is now making the rhetorical strategy explicit. This new DM meaning has nothing to do with literal deeds or acts, and cannot be directly derived from the RA or MA uses.

This is borne out by examples in Japanese. For example, in her discussion of the development in Japanese of wake, a post-VP “extended predicate” marker meaning “it is (the reason/case/situation) that,” Suzuki (1998) claims that at the latest stage “the speaker seems to invite the hearer (or impose on the hearer) to accept that there is a logical relationship between the wake clause and its preceding discourse” (Suzuki 1998: 80) and suggests the translation “you see” (ibid. p. 68). In its earliest uses, wake derived from the verb waku meaning “divide.” This verb gave rise to two nouns which were represented by different Chinese characters, one “division,” “left over food,” etc., the other epistemic and concerned with “distinguishing and understanding differences,” “logical consequence” (Suzuki 1998: 80, fn. 3, referring to NKD). In the 1830s the noun wake meant “reason”; in the late nineteenth century it developed a polysemy as a pragmatic particle with DM function, linking p and q, and signaling that SP/W regards q is related to p as an alternative (or better) formulation, roughly equivalent to “in other words, that means. . .” (ibid. p. 74). This meaning can be seen in instances in which a logical relationship between the

wake clause and preceding discourse (or other aspects of the speech act situation)

is not evident, but in which SP/W wants AD/R to assume or construe that one exists. The intersubjective meaning is not only more recent than the epistemic one, but could presumably not have developed had the epistemic one not already been available.

As we have seen, actually and in fact in some of their uses are intersubjective in the sense that they mark not only connectivity between p and q (a subjective rhetorical device with the intersubjective purpose of conveying to the addressee what sort of textual connectivity is implied) but also function as a “DM hedge” to soften or mitigate what is said with the purpose of acknowledging the addressee’s actual or possible objections (see 1.2.4). The question is whether these hedged meanings derive from the textual DM actually3, in fact3, or from actually2, in fact2. It would

appear that the immediate source is the adversative, actually2 and in fact2, since

the hedge implies a kind of concessive, e.g. “I am confiding in you, even though you might not believe what I just said/even though you might not approve.” The typical position for concessives like anyway is clause-internal, or even-final, as in Aijmer’s examples (41a) and (42). Furthermore, hedged meanings, which include I

think, I guess, you know, you see, are often associated with expressions of epistemic

attitude.