The comparison of practice-based and cognitive theories of

The practice-based theorising on knowledge, including the situated learning theory, emerged as an alternative to cognitive theories of learning. These two approaches differ on a number of epistemological and ontological assumptions. So far I have discussed the epistemological assumptions of the situated learning theory and only hinted at the differences between practice-based and cognitive theories of learning. For the purpose of clarity, this section discusses the differences between the assumptions of these two theoretical paradigms in greater detail.

These two approaches are clearly distinguished in the literature (e.g. Sfard, 1998). As already mentioned above, Cook and Brown (1999) note that an “epistemology of possession” underpins the cognitive theories whereas practice-based theories are based on the “epistemology of practice”. Gherardi (2000: 11) differentiates between “a mentalistic vision of knowledge” and “practice-based theorising” while Scarbrough (1998) refers to the ‘content’ theory of knowledge and the ‘relational’ view of knowledge. The key differences in the epistemological and ontological assumptions of these two approaches are summarised in Table ‎3.1.

Table ‎3.1 Differences in ontological and epistemological assumptions of cognitive and practice-based theories of learning

Cognitive theories of learning Practice-based theories of learning Selected authors (Anderson, 1983; Bruner et al.,

Development of identities (ways of being) and modes of action (ways of doing) are the outcomes of learning Knowledge is an disembodied asset possessed

by individuals

Knowing and doing are inseparable Knowing is a process

Knowing is embodied in people

Knowledge is static Knowledge is emergent, dynamic

Knowledge is objective - mental structures and language are mirror-like representations of external, independent phenomena

(representationalist approach)

Knowledge is subjective (value laden),

embedded (situated, context dependent), socially constructed, negotiated, indeterminate, contestable Knowledge acquisition is based on intellectual

processes, such as reasoning, intuition and perception, and leads to the creation of new

Understanding of social phenomena emerges from a mutually constitutive process in which the individual interacts with the environment.

Learning is individualistic Learning is social

Context is a static, container-like backdrop Context is enacted - its elements simultaneously have an influence on, are the medium for and result from social activity

Source: Constructed by the author on the basis of Hislop (2005) and Marshall (2008)

The cognitive approach has been criticized for a static, functionalist, passive and ultimately individualistic portrayal of learning and for assuming objectivity and representational nature of knowledge (Fox, 2006; Lave and Wenger, 1991). These limitations have been addressed by scholars subscribing to the practice-based view of knowledge and learning, which, nonetheless, also suffers from some shortcomings. The practice-based learning theory has been criticised in particular for being silent on (1) the cognitive content of what is learned by individuals in social interactions (Yakhlef, 2010), (2) what it is that people know in order to become active agents in the reproduction and potential transformation of practice (Marshall, 2008; Fox, 2000), and

5 Piaget, 2001 is a translation of 1977 classic Piaget's work in French

(3) what it is that people know in order to sustain social practice over time (Marshall, 2008). Moreover, the role of individuals in the process of learning and in making changes to practice is rarely addressed explicitly in practice-based theorising (Yakhlef, 2010; Felin and Hesterly, 2007).

Cognitive and practice-based approaches are often portrayed as incommensurable but some scholars have recently argued that the incompatibility of the two approaches has been overstated and that these two ‘camps’ could learn from each other (Yakhlef, 2010;

Marshall, 2008). While a bridge between the two approaches could potentially help to address some of their theoretical shortcomings, it could also lead to inconsistencies in ontological and epistemological assumptions. Any attempt at integration needs to address this challenge in an explicit manner. Marshall (2008) suggests to take an interpretative perspective on cognition but maintains that learning takes place through mental processes of forming and reforming mental schemata (i.e. in effect he maintains the cognitive epistemology). Yakhlef, on the other hand, combines the assumptions of both perspectives and proposes that learning is both cognitive and social. He acknowledges individual agency and the ability of individuals to reflect on their practices but at the same time recognises “(1) their interdependency on one another for their learning, and (2) the centrality of the social, interaction-based learning context”

(Yakhlef, 2010: 44). This thesis takes yet another stand. The conceptual framework adopted in this thesis remains committed to the “epistemology of practice” but addresses some shortcomings of practice-based theorising. Specifically, the role of individual agency in the process of learning and change is recognised.

This section elucidated the epistemological and ontological assumptions of situated learning theory. The next section discusses in detail the concept of practice, a crucial building block of the situated learning theory.

3.1.3 The concept of practice

In the previous two sections I explained how individuals learn and create new knowledge through participation in social practices. What do they learn this way? The answer is: they learn their practice. Wenger (1998: 95) illustrates this point saying that:

“Their practice is not merely a context for learning something else. Engagement in practice – in its unfolding, multidimensional complexity – is both the stage and the object, the road and the destination”. The purpose of this section is to define the concept

of practice. I draw on studies of communities of practice and other practice-based studies of learning and knowledge creation.

Although the term ‘practice’ has been used extensively, its meaning is not always clear. Wenger (1998: 47) has pointed out that “the concept of practice connotes doing, but not just doing in and of itself. It is doing in a historical and social context.” Practice is always a social phenomenon since it “exists because people are engaged in actions whose meaning they negotiate with one another” (Wenger, 1998: 73). People negotiate what is the right way of doing things, what is acceptable, and what needs adjustments.

Thus, practice is social.

Brown and Duguid (2001: 203) argue that the concept’s ambiguity stems from the fact that “it signifies both work itself (the practice of a medical practitioner, for example), and rote tasks or exercises designed to help learn to work (as in piano practice)”. They suggest limiting the meaning of the term ‘work’ by asserting that “by practice we mean, as most theorists of practice mean, undertaking or engaging fully in a task, job, or profession” (Brown and Duguid, 2001: 203). However, Brown and Duguid’s definition fails to make a clear distinction between ‘practice’ and

‘participation in practice’ or ‘engagement in practice’. Handley et al. (2006) argue that it is important to distinguish conceptually between ‘practice’ and ‘participation in practice’ and to limit the understanding of practice to observable activity. I argue also that it is more helpful to limit the concept of ‘practice’ to signify activities performed in a certain manner (observable activity) and to use the term ‘participation’ to describe one’s engagement in negotiation of how the activities should be performed and by whom. For this reason, Brown and Duguid’s definition is not adopted in this thesis.

Some scholars define practice as a set of observable activities performed in a particular manner (e.g. Gherardi and Nicolini, 2000; Gherardi and Nicolini, 2002;

Nicolini et al., 2003b). This understanding of practice derives from Marxist theorising about practice. Gherardi (2000: 215) pointed out that “the important contribution of this [Marxist] tradition to practice-based theorising is its methodological insight that practice is a system of activities in which knowing is not separated from doing”. While this definition of practice is more operationalisable than those of Wenger (1998) and Brown and Duguid (2001), it still is not clear what activities are thought to be part of practice – in other words, how the boundaries of practice are defined.

Previous empirical studies reveal that scholars take different approaches to the definition of ‘the set of observable activities’ that constitute practice. On the one hand,

practice has been defined as a set of activities with a common purpose. This approach is exemplified by the work of Orlikowski (2002), who explores the practice of global product development in a multinational company. This practice includes a range of activities that enabled the company to deal with spatial, temporal, technical, social, cultural and political boundaries in the complex process of new product development distributed across multiple locations. A similar conceptualisation of practice can be found in the work of Gherardi and Nicolini (2000), who focused on safety work practices in building construction sites and in other work places (Swan et al., 2002).

On the other hand, practice has been defined as a set of activities performed by individuals within a particular organisational function or occupation. This approach is adopted by Carlile (2002). Carlile, like Orlikowski, studies the activities of new product development. However, he distinguishes practices along the functional divisions of the organisation. Based on a year-long ethnographic study, he identifies four practices:

sales/marketing, design engineering, manufacturing engineering, and production.

Carlile’s understanding of practice seems to be closer to that expressed by Lave and Wenger (1991) in their Situated Learning: Legitimate Peripheral Participation. In four illustrative case studies, they conceptualise practice as a set of the activities of a particular occupational community (e.g. the practices of midwifery, tailoring, nautical navigation and meat cutting).

The empirical studies discussed here illustrate that there is no shared understanding of the activities that constitute practice. Practice can be defined as a system of activities that is related to either a particular purpose or a particular organisational function/occupation. Both approaches seem legitimate and can serve different purposes.

However, if the aim is to understand the complexity of commercialisation practice in a particular organisation, for example, as in the case of the university KTO, it would be undesirable to limit oneself only to activities aimed at successful exploitation of academic research, such as securing IPR, marketing academic inventions, negotiating licensing contracts or formation of spin-out companies. This is because other activities, such as identifying academic inventions, record keeping or assessing academic inventions might also be an important part of the whole commercialisation practice, yet may be driven by different purposes. For example, the assessment of academic invention could be aimed mainly at the efficient use of organisational resources;

patenting is a costly process and, therefore, judicious assessment of which inventions should be patented would result in more efficient use of resources. Thus, Carlile’s

(2002) approach seems to be more suited to studies that try to build a holistic understanding of commercialisation practices in KTOs (the aim of this thesis) than to purpose-specific practices.

Practice is defined as a set of observable recurrent activities that are related to a particular organisational function, and in which knowing and doing are inseparable.

In the context of this thesis, I adapt Gherardi’s (2000) and Carlile’s (2002) understandings of practice to define it as a set of observable activities that are related to a particular organisational function, and in which knowing and doing are inseparable. I argue that the commercialisation of academic research is a kind of social practice. There are always a number of actors that engage with one another and negotiate how the commercialisation activities should be performed. It consists principally of such activities as: (1) identifying commercialisation opportunities; (2) assessing academic inventions; (3) protecting IP (if necessary); (4) identifying commercial partners; (5) negotiating contracts between the university and the commercial partner; (6) identifying funding sources; (7) creating spin-out companies; (8) documenting commercialisation projects. This thesis investigates the learning processes that transform these activities.

In this section I define the concept of practice. Participation in practice is the medium of learning and practice is an outcome of the learning. The thesis focuses on changes in practice that result from learning by the members of communities of practice in an organisational context. Section ‎3.1.4 introduces the notion of COP.