Competition as an Indirect Diffusion Source for State and Institution Building

The inclusion of the relative military parent strength variable (relparentstrength) in the state and institution building models measures the influence of patron-parent state competition on the state and institution building potential of de facto states. The models thereby capture competition as one of the potential indirect diffusion influences of patrons on the state and institution building processes of de facto states. Overall, the results highlight that the stronger the parent state in terms of military capabilities, the likelier it is for de facto states to attain coherent governance

150 structures (high degrees of state building) all other variable held equal at a 99 per cent confidence interval. The likelihood of attaining basic civilian governance (moderate degrees of state building) is not influenced significantly by a relatively stronger parent state. The number of governance institutions, meanwhile, significantly decreases the stronger the parent is compared to the patron state all other variables held equal at a 95 per cent confidence interval. These results are also applicable to de facto states that do not have a patron state as it captures the military strength of parent states in general.

The impact of the parent state’s relative economic strength in form of GDP per capita (relparentgdppc) on state and institution building in de facto states is also mixed (see appendix V). Economically stronger parent states increase the number of governance institutions and the likelihood of high degrees of state building, but decrease the likelihood of moderate degrees of state building. While a relatively stronger parent state in terms of GDP per capita performance increases the likelihood of achieving coherent governance structures (high degrees of state building) and the number of governance institutions all other variables held equal at a 95 and 99 per cent confidence interval, the variable does not have a statistically significant effect on the likelihood of a de facto state achieving basic civilian governance (moderate degrees of state building).

The results highlight that stronger parent states in terms of military capabilities compared to patron states increase the likelihood of de facto states attaining coherent government structures (high degrees of state building), but not basic civilian governance (moderate degrees of state building) and the number of governance institutions all other variables held equal. In other words, competition as an indirect diffusion source appears to encourage particularly the development of coherent governance structures such as internal security and border management. Yet, competition appears to matter less in the early state building developments when de facto regimes go from rebel governance to basic civilian governance. Therefore, the second hypothesis of this chapter can only be partially confirmed depending on the degree of state building development.

Even though the relative parent strength variable overemphasises the role of parent states when a de facto state does not have a patron, the results, nonetheless,

151 support the argument put forward by Kolstø and Blakkisrud (2008) that a strong parent state incentivises state building in de facto states at least for high degrees of state building. The regression results also reiterate the results of chapter 2 that the absolute capabilities of a patron state matter less than the patron’s relative capabilities vis-à-vis the parent state. In practical terms, the results of both relative military and economic capabilities may be explained with a tendency among de facto states with a patron to use the patron’s economic and military capabilities to outweigh or match the real or perceived threat and capabilities from the parent state. Specifically great or regional powers can shift the power balance of the dyadic relation between de facto states and their parents significantly. Therefore, the regression results can be interpreted in a way that if the patron’s military capabilities are high and outweigh the parent’s military capabilities, this may disincentivise domestic state and institution building in de facto states due to a reliance or even dependence on patron support to protect the de facto states from potential parent state threats. The opportunity structures of de facto states with a patron that enable these entities to rely on their patron’s military protection may disincentive domestic state and institution building despite a wider range of financial resources. De facto states without a patron meanwhile are likelier to be incentivised to increase their public service provision and state capacity including border security and domestic security in light of a real or perceived parent state threat. This form of dependence on military support from the patron state can be identified in a number of de facto states. Abkhazia and South Ossetia, for instance, would have been unlikely to withstand the Georgian offensives without Russia’s military support (Caspersen 2015: 6).

These findings speak to the theoretical framework in so far that they highlight the presence of indirect diffusion sources such as competition on the state building development of de facto states. Indeed, the diffusion literature would explain the higher likelihood of state building and the lower number of governance institutions with the role of indirect diffusion channels such as geopolitical competition in facilitating institution or policy diffusion. Thereby, this chapter has not only shown that patrons have both a direct and indirect diffusion impact on the degrees of state building and the number of governance institution, but also that patron involvement

152 appears to increase if competition with the parent state is higher. Geopolitical competition with the parent state may incentivise de facto governments to pursue institutional or policy transformations, whereas the presence of patron states may reduce the competitive diffusion influences of the parent state on de facto states. The reduction in the number of governance institutions when a parent state is stronger, for instance, may indicate that patrons take over governance institutions from de facto states when pressures from the parent state are higher and that it can be more difficult to establish governance institutions under heightened external pressures (see section 6.3.3 for further details on the role of competitive diffusion in Abkhazia’s state building development).