• No results found

complements this section with additional discussion on the various programs and the lessons that they provide.

Table 16 Scenario 3 – Affordability Profile Loan

Annex 5 complements this section with additional discussion on the various programs and the lessons that they provide.

6.1 Approaches to identifying lessons for upgrading

Over the years, a number of studies have attempted to identify the lessons learned from the design and implementation of urban upgrading programs and projects in the developing world. While donor agencies have spearheaded much of these efforts, academic institutions, government agencies, and NGOs alike have been active at documenting and analyzing their experience—particularly from designing and implementing informal settlements upgrading and sites and services development programs and projects, in order to better understand how urban poverty can be alleviated, if not totally eradicated. These studies have so far used a variety of approaches to identify such lessons. Some evaluation studies on urban upgrading have focused on a particular program or project, usually assessing whether its objectives were met or not and analyzing its impacts, if any, on the target beneficiaries. An evaluation study of the first generation of KIP projects in Indonesia mainly through minimum investments in improved footpaths and lighting, wider access to clean and safe water, and construction of drainage facilities that reduced the frequency of flooding in the affected neighbourhoods. But attempting to replicate KIP in cities beyond the metropolis of Jakarta and Surabaya highlighted the limitations of a highly centralized approach and emphasized the need to devolve the program to the local governments.24

A case study on the Philippines Tondo Foreshore Development Project, on the other hand, showed that delays associated with project start-up, higher than expected land acquisition and reclamation costs, petroleum price increases, and a lack of detailed design and engineering during appraisal caused a large increase in the actual project cost. And yet, cost recovery was the weakest element of the project, with the land and lot prices set too prematurely, years before the project was completed and way below the project’s actual cost. In the meantime, the incomes of the Tondo residents had risen threefold by project completion, dramatically increasing their capacity to pay for

24World Bank, Indonesia Impact Evaluation Report: Enhancing the Quality of Life in Urban Indonesia—The Legacy of the

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the secure tenure and access to improved basic infrastructure and services that they received under the project. Ironically, while extensive community participation which motivated Tondo residents to have an ownership stake and delays primarily due to the massive size of the project which comprised over 30,000 households.25

Other evaluation studies have taken a number of programs and projects and applied carefully predetermined criteria for “successes” to distill lessons learned and best practices for future programs and projects. A review of some 70 World Bank-supported urban projects and at least a dozen water and sanitation projects with components aimed at providing basic infrastructure services to low- income urban communities used the following criteria for “successful” projects or components:

(i) they are able to reach the poor, even if not exclusively;

(ii) they meet the “effective demand” of the target beneficiaries—that is, they are able to provide the services for which users are willing to pay;

(iii)the services they offer they can be sustained—that is, there is an agreed institutional arrangement to cover recurrent costs and to carry out the required operation and maintenance during the life of the investments; and

(iv)their approaches are capable of replication to serve a larger numbers of the target population than covered by the original projects.

The study essentially concluded that slum upgrading brought about real improvements in the immediate environment of residents and stimulated considerable private investments in housing improvements and new housing, thereby raising the quality of life and local economic activities. The review also revealed that the obstacles to wider national replication of programs and projects are not just financial in nature, relating to issues such as the affordability of basic services and housing provision to either the households or to the public budget, but political and institutional as well. Scaling-up requires policies and institutions that promote innovation and mobilize the initiatives and resources required to meet the expanding and changing needs. This entails the empowerment and increased participation of the local populations in their own governance, the strengthening of intermediaries such as NGOs and private developers, and the assignment of new powers and responsibilities to local governments.26

6.2 Evolution of policy responses and approaches to informal settlements upgrading—lessons

along the way

The thinking on informal settlements upgrading have evolved over the years as depicted by Figure 7 below. A half century of experience has demonstrated many ways to successfully upgrade informal settlement communities. With the unique conditions, needs, priorities, and potential in each community, no single model for upgrading fits all. Rather, each offers new lessons, and the thousands of upgraded communities serve as the foundation for understanding how to scale up. The key players in strategic upgrading—the communities, their NGO intermediaries, governments, and international development agencies—have influenced practice, just as each decade’s circumstances shaped outcomes. The last 50 years have generated valuable lessons on informal settlements upgrading and brought about significant evolution in policy responses to the challenge related to informal settlements. What worked and did not work in each decade has been summarized below:27

25 World Bank, Upgrading Urban Communities—A Resource Framework: Case Examples, 2001. See

http://web.mit.edu/urbanupgrading/upgrading/case examples/ce-PH-ton.html

26Christine Kessides, World Bank Experience with the Provision of Infrastructure Services for the Urban Poor: Preliminary

Identification and Review of Best Practices, January 1997

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The 1950s and 1960s: Two parallel worlds emerged – formal and informal – and clashed around the dilemma of housing. Governments bulldozed informal settlements and built expensive housing projects. The poor built for themselves and began to organize for change. In a few places like Peru, Indonesia, and Brazil, informal settlement dwellers mobilized political power to seek improvements to their communities, creating the first examples of informal settlement upgrading.

Lessons:

What did notwork and should be avoided:

 Informal settlement demolition, forced evictions, mass relocations;

 High-rise public housing blocks, public rental housing;

 Government-provided housing.

What didwork:

 Indonesia’s home-grown upgrading took root;

 Peru’s organized squatter invasions and Brazil’s favela movement gained political recognition;

 Housing theories emerged.

The 1970s: Informal settlement communities, with the support of NGOs, developed better ways of building for themselves. Some international agencies applied pressure to alter policies. The Tondo Foreshore project was financed conditioned on the government’s agreement to stop informal settlement eradication and forced resettlement.

Lessons:

 Upgrading informal settlements is a viable, low-cost, and effective way to help the urban poor solve their shelter needs;

 Land and services provision are also viable and necessary to meet demand;

 Centralized implementation is imperfect, and local agencies are weak;

 Land regularization issues are a stumbling block.

The 1980s: Indonesia’s Kampung Improvement Programme demonstrated a citywide approach, while El Salvador and Madras (Chennai, India) Sites and Services focused on informal settlement mitigation by supplying land and services. Sri Lanka launched its Million Houses Programme,