Completion through marriage 92 any decisive effort on the part of the Government” (9 November 1848); within eight

months, the public mood had changed from initial approval to considerable condemnation. When the Prussian King decided to refuse the Imperial Crown of Germany, the Times finally concluded that the upheaval ended in “the phantom of the Germanic Empire” (7 April 1849), thus signaling its disapproval of any further revolutionary agitation. This changing opinion of the Times was mirrored by the official attitude of the British Foreign Office, which shifted from initial acceptance to a clear rejection, a disposition which was reflected in Britain’s neutral approach towards these continental problems.

Apart from the fact that the Prussian King was more than reluctant to let Prince Albert direct the policy of Prussia, another reason why Albert failed to implement his political beliefs in the restructuring process of Germany was Palmerston’s refusal to co-operate with the Prince in this question. Chamberlain’s argument that Palmerston “showed very little either understanding of, or interest in events in Germany in 1848”^^ is certainly misleading; on the contrary, Palmerston was constantly informed about the latest political development on the Continent, but it is important to understand that he always had to consider the international situation before defining the British position. Besides, the Foreign Office was anything but opposed to the possibility of forming a closer association between Britain and the German Confederation, but Palmerston vehemently objected to the constant interference of the royal couple regarding this subject. The pre-revolutionary concept of a possible Anglo-Prussian alliance was based on the shared religion, the non- aggressive approach of German foreign policy, and a predominantly conservative outlook of both countries. Whereas the German Zollverein was the main obstacle to such an alliance before 1848, the revolutionary development of that year threatened to change the European balance of power in such a grave way that the Foreign Office revised its predisposition to consider a closer Anglo-German association.

Fischer-Aue’s assumption that the development of the German political affairs of 1848 were regarded as a private matter of Prince Albert in Britain is in fact

M.E.Chamberlain, British foreign policv in the age of Palmerston (London, 1981), p.62. See: G.J.Billy, Palmerston’s foreign policv: 1848 (New York, 1993), p.113; K.Boume, The foreign policv of Victorian England. 1830-1902 (Oxford, 1970), p.65; and R.J.Sontag, Germany and England: Background of conflict 1848-1894 (New York, London, 1938), pp.31-2. As a consequence, Halevy’s suggestion regarding Palmerston’s “hostility to Prussia” must be refiited. In: E.Halevy, Victorian years. 1841-1895 (London, 1951), p.308.

wrong/^ Palmerston left no doubt that “he, as Foreign Minister, was responsible for the relations of England with other countries,”*^ which created an immense potential for a conflict with the monarch. The official position of the British Foreign Office was alert if cautious, since the outcome of the revolutionary upheavals was anything but certain. Once the threat to existing governments became evident, the Foreign Office decided to uphold a neutral approach, which included the acceptance of any political refugees, but which excluded any closer commitment to any continental nation.

Queen Victoria and Albert, on the other hand, did indeed maintain close contacts with the royal family of Prussia, an approach that was not welcomed by Palmerston. He tried to balance the Court’s biased view by “submitting only select dispatches for royal view,”*^ which before long was discovered by Victoria and Albert. They in turn decided to show Palmerston only Victoria’s (rather unpolitical) correspondence with the Prussian Court, but excluded Albert’s (certainly political) share in the communication. The relationship between the British Court and the Foreign Office was therefore not a pleasant one, and the possibilities for a closer co­ operation were rather restricted during these years. However, this did not restrain the process of policy formation, since the official British position of neutrality was ultimately not disputed by the royal couple.

This has to be kept in mind when considering the remark of the insider Greville, who observed in 1850 that although Victoria and Albert “were quite powerless in such matters as the Greek or the Sicilian questions, they could do a great deal of mischief in Germany, for being in constant communication with their relations and connexions [sic] there.”*^ Greville was certainly right in pointing out the unique interest which the royal couple had in the political development of Germany, but by this time. Prince Albert had already decided to end his political correspondence with the Prussian King. The Queen’s husband had evidently realized that “the responsibility for giving advice from a distance is too great.”*^ As observed earlier, any co­ operation between the royalty of Great Britain and Prussia depended in fact on the ^ See: Fischer-Aue, Die Deutschlandpolitik des Prinzgemahls Albert von England, p.28.

Benson, Queen Victoria, p. 159.

Billy. Palmerston’s foreign policv: 1848. p.21.

26 November 1850 Extract from the journal of Greville. In: Strachey/Fulford (edd.). The Greville memoirs, vol.6, pp.261-2.

10 November 1850 Prince Albert to Duke Ernest II. In: Jagow (ed.), Prinzgemahl Albert. p.220. Translation by the author

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