Conceptualizing and operationalizing maternalism

Broadly speaking, maternalism refers to the practice of identifying women as mothers first and foremost. Given the wide range of meanings this general definition of maternalism encompasses, it is unsurprising that historical research on maternalism has applied the term to denote multiple phenomena. In a single 1993 edition of the Journal of Women’s History, for instance, contributors used the term variously to describe (1) the ideas of mid- nineteenth-century American women who sought to reclaim motherhood from male- dominated obstetric and pediatric medicine24_{; (2) the use of women’s maternal role by}

German feminists as grounds for women’s participation in the public sphere25_{; (3)}

conflation of women with mothers and policies based on the assumption that “all women are potential mothers capable of nurturing children for whom they hold primary

responsibility”26_{; (4) an ideology that presented motherhood as a service to the state and a}

rationale for male wages high enough to support the dependent family27_{; (5) the rise of}

charities to support maternal and child welfare in tsarist Russia28_{; and (6) a “belief in}

motherhood as an idea validating policies or public actions” in turn-of-20th-century Japan.29 _{These definitions represent a small sample of the range of meanings that have}

been associated with maternalism across time and space.

In the more specific context of social policy too, understandings of maternalism vary. In this context, “maternalist” is used to describe policies that “recognize and

24

Weiner, “Maternalism as a Paradigm: Defining the Issues,” 97.

25 _{Allen, “Maternalism in German Feminist Movements,” 99-100.} 26

Boris, “What About the Working of the Working Mother?” 104.

27

Ladd-Taylor, “Toward Defining Maternalism in US History,”110.

28 _{Lindenmeyr, “Maternalism and Child Welfare in Late Imperial Russia,” 118.} 29 _{Uno, “Maternalism in Modern Japan,” 127.}

reward care as a female responsibility,”30 _{address the welfare needs of mothers and}

children,31 _{or provide support to mothers to enable them to care for children at home,}32

among others. One definition that captures this range of meanings concisely comes from Sainsbury (1996). Although Sainsbury rarely uses the term “maternalism,” she

distinguishes models of welfare provision on various dimensions, one of which is the basis on which entitlements are provided. Sainsbury finds that in Western welfare states women’s entitlement has often “derived from their status as mothers and wives.”33

This provides a useful way to conceptualize not only maternalist social policy but also the larger universe of gendered social policy. Drawing from this framework, I define maternalist social policy and programs as those under which women’s status as current or potential mothers is the basis for the benefits women receive. Let us unpack this

definition briefly. First, the use of “policy and programs” above suggests that both general state policy and particular social programs may be classified as maternalist. Second, “current or potential mothers” indicates that programs for women who are not yet mothers qualify as maternalist if they assume future motherhood and direct benefits on this basis. Examples include programs for pregnant women. Finally, “basis for the benefits women receive” suggests that only benefits for which women qualify due to their (current or potential) motherhood can be characterized as maternalist.

30 _{Blofield and Franzoni, “Maternalism, Co-Responsibility, and Social Equity: A Typology of Work-Family}

Policies,” 47.

31

Koven and Michel, “Womanly Duties: Maternalist Politics and the Origins of Welfare States in France, Germany, Great Britain, and the United States, 1880-1920,” 1079.

32 _{Orloff, “Gender and the Social Rights of Citizenship: The Comparative Analysis of Gender Relations}

and Welfare States,” 321.

It is also worth considering here whether programs for family planning and contraceptive services qualify as maternalist under this definition. In the usual usage of the term, maternalism is associated with a pro-birth or pro-child stance, as the paragraphs above and below document. On the surface, then, this association would seem to

disqualify policies and programs designed to control, delay, or prevent birth from being identified as maternalist. Yet, in practice this distinction dissolves quickly. Two examples will clarify the point. First, in some countries (such as India), the programs that provide antenatal and postnatal care to women often also provide family planning services. While the former type of benefits may be considered pro-birth or pro-child, the latter would help prevent or delay birth. Yet the two converge in the same programs, calling a sharp practical distinction between birth-promoting and birth-preventing into question. Second, at least some measures that normally prevent or delay birth, such as spacing methods, might be considered pro-child if framed as measures that keep mothers in better health, lower health risk to babies from future pregnancies, and allow mothers to provide the best possible care to an existing child without being distracted by another pregnancy or a younger child.34 _{Both these examples blur the line between pro-birth/pro-child and}

birth-preventing. Given this blurred distinction, in this study family planning programs are considered maternalist if they meet the above definition of maternalist programs, regardless of whether they appear to be birth-promoting or birth-preventing at first glance.

Our definition of maternalist also indicates that not all programs that place women in the home automatically qualify as maternalist: to be characterized as

maternalist, they must target women as mothers. What of programs that target women as wives, however? Borrowing from Skocpol (1992), I distinguish maternalist policy from paternalist policy, which directs benefits not to mothers for their care work but to

breadwinning fathers/husbands as maintenance for their families (including their children and wives) or directly to wives in recognition of their dependent status (see Figure 2.1). The difference between paternalist and maternalist policy thus amounts to differences in the identity of the direct recipient of benefits (mother v. wife) and the purpose for which, or the principle based on which, benefits are distributed (principle of care v. principle of maintenance).35 _{While paternalist policies might comprise, for instance, a “family wage,”}

couples’ or family pensions, or other social insurance benefits for men who are then assumed to provide maintenance to their wives and children, maternalist policies channel benefits to mothers to enable them to provide care for their children.36

The distinction between paternalist and maternalist measures is not always made clear in the gender and welfare literature, where authors have often used the terms interchangeably or characterized both maternalist and paternalist initiatives using a common label: the male breadwinner model. Yet, others have argued that paternalist and maternalist measures are based on different assumptions about women’s roles in society and have different consequences for women.37 _{Persuaded by the latter argument,}

in this project I distinguish between the two to the extent possible. I further distinguish the paternalist and maternalist policy types from a third type, which we might call the “parentalist” model. Under this type, benefits are channeled neither to the

35

See Sainsbury, Gender, Equality and Welfare States, 44-45.

36 _Skocpol,

Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States, 10.

husband/father nor to the wife/mother but to one or both parents, regardless of gender, for care of dependent children.38

Despite their differences, however, all three types of social programs discussed above – maternalist, paternalist, and parentalist – do derive from the same general model of social policy: one in which entitlements are based on family relationships (mother, wife, father, husband, parent) rather than on individual citizenship.39 _{Here I use the term}

“familialist” to characterize social policies in which familial relationships serve as bases of entitlement. The opposite type of policy, in which benefits are channeled to recipients as individuals rather than as members of families, may be described as “individualist.”

The label “individualist” is borrowed from Karen Offen, who uses it to describe the feminist tradition that invoked “abstract concepts of individual human rights and celebrated the quest for personal independence (or autonomy) in all aspects of life, while downplaying, deprecating, or dismissing as insignificant all socially defined roles and minimizing discussion of sex-linked qualities or contributions, including childbearing and its attendant responsibilities.”40 _{Offen distinguishes this feminist tradition from what she}

calls “relationalism” (and what I have called familialism): a set of ideas that grounds claims for women’s rights not in women’s individuality and humanity but in their childbearing and nurturing capacities.41 _{Individualist social policy consist of programs}

that address recipients in their roles outside the family, typically as workers, and can be broken down further into policies and programs that provide socioeconomic benefits on

38

Pedersen, Family, Dependence, and the Origins of the Welfare State: Britain and France, 1914-1945, 17-18.

39

Sainsbury, “Gender and Social Democratic Welfare States,” 78.

40 _{Offen, “Defining Feminism: A Comparative Historical Approach,” 136.} 41 _{Offen, 136.}

the one hand and those that target beneficiaries as civic and political actors on the other. Although civic and political programs are not usually examined in the welfare literature on the grounds that they are not negative or protective measures that the term “welfare” implies and instead constitute positive or promotional programs, I include them in the scope of the study here because the focus here is broader social policy rather than more

restricted world of “welfare.”42

The distinction between familialist and individualist approximates the popular distinction proposed by Molyneux (1985) between “practical gender interests” and “strategic gender interests.” The former are “a response to an immediate perceived need [of women], and they do not generally entail a strategic goal such as women’s

emancipation or gender equality.”43 _{An example may be access to clean water, since}

women are traditionally responsible for the cooking and cleaning tasks that require a large supply of water. The latter derive “from the analysis of women’s subordination and from the formulation of an alternative, more satisfactory set of arrangements to those which exist.”44 _{Examples include elimination of institutionalized gender-based}

discrimination, freedom from male violence and control, and political equality.45 _{In our}

formulation, familialist policies would orrespond to practical gender interests since they work within the framework of the sexual division of labor and individualist policies may be considered linked to strategic gender interests because they represent a challenge to

42

For distinction between protective, promotional, and other linked categories, see Devereux and Sabates- Wheeler, “Transformative Social Protection,” 10-11.

43

Molyneux, “Mobilization without Emancipation? Women’s Interests, the State, and Revolution in Nicaragua,” 233.

44 _{Molyneux, 232.} 45 _{Molyneux, 233.}

the sexual division of labor that is at the core of women’s subordinate status in most societies.

The above discussion suggests categories of social programs that can be used to

classify programs for either or both sexes. Narrowing them to women-specific social programs, which are the focus of this study, leads to the typology below (see Figure 2.1). The parentalist type is omitted from the figure because, by default, it comprises of programs that assist either or both parents, not mothers specifically, and therefore cannot be included among women-specific programs.

Figure 2.1: Typology of women-specific programs

What would some examples of each ideal type look like? Examples of women- specific paternalist social programs would be programs that channel benefits to women based on their status as current or former wives: old-age pensions for dependent wives, old-age pensions for divorced women, and pensions for widows without dependent children, among others. Maternalist programs are programs that provide benefits to

mothers: family allowances to mothers, maternal and infant health benefits,46 _maternity

grants, social assistance to poor mothers, pension credits to mothers for childrearing, and others. Examples of women-specific individualist programs of the socioeconomic type include benefits for working women, such as jobs or entrepreneurship programs for women, and for female students, such as women’s scholarships or vocational training programs, among others. Civic and political individualist programs include initiatives designed to promote women’s political participation and community leadership.

The above categories are ideal types. In reality, not all women-specific social programs fall neatly in one category or another. Some programs, for instance, fall at the intersection of one or more categories: maternity leave programs that assist employed women during their pregnancies may be considered part-maternalist and part-

individualist since they address women both as mothers and workers. Benefits for lone mothers, which target women both as mothers and in relation to an absent male partner, might be considered part-maternalist and part-paternalist. These examples suggest that, although not every women-specific program can be sorted easily into a single category, the fact that these programs can still be described well by reference to the intersection at which they fall suggests that the overall typology is useful in understanding the universe of women-specific programs.

How should familialism and individualism in social policy – or social policy effort for women as members of families and women in roles outside the home – be measured, however? Policy “effort” is sometimes used interchangeably with policy “attention” and

46

Although, as per our definition, only maternal health benefits and not infant health benefits should qualify as maternalist, the literature on maternalism characterizes infant health programs as maternalist as well, possibly because many programs provide the two types of benefits jointly.

policy “action.” A common way to operationalize “policy attention” to a given a topic in political science literature is by counting the number of legislative hearings on the topic.47

There are two problems with this approach. First, it measures “what is being discussed in various forums – rather than what the government is actually doing” (emphases added).48

Second, it directs attention to discussion in the legislature rather than action by the executive, which for our purposes means that it directs attention away from the branch of government responsible for social policymaking in India. Since records of deliberations in Government of India’s executive branch are not centrally stored and not open to the public, counting references to women-as-mothers or women-as-workers (and so forth) in executive deliberations is also not an option. Other possible indicators of policy

attention/action applicable to India – such as the number of parliamentary questions on a given topic, laws, bills, court decisions, and speeches49 _{– suffer from one or both of these}

drawbacks as well.

This leaves us with one way in which policy effort for women as mothers, workers, etc., can be operationalized: by using social spending as proxy. At the outset, it should be noted that the relationship between social spending and policy effort is not always

straightforward: budgetary provisions often lag shifts in policy priorities, policy effort can occur without causing a visible change in budget outlays, and total spending figures do not signify the character of other components of policy effort, such as the extent of coverage and degree of generosity of given programs.

47

Lowery, Gray, and Baumgartner, “Policy Attention in State and Nation: Is Anyone Listening to the Laboratories of Democracy?” 292-293.

48 _{Dowding, Hindmoor, and Martin, “The Comparative Policy Agendas Project: Theory, Measurement}

and Findings,” 5.

Despite these limitations, this project uses social spending to operationalize policy effort on women in specific roles because (1) there is ample precedence, especially in welfare research, for using social spending to measure levels of policy action or policy effort50_{; (2) in India the executive branch both allocates budgetary funding and makes}

social policy, so focusing on budgets allows us to train our attention on the very part of the government that leads social policymaking; (3) the expenditure of funds not only denotes issue salience but also suggests existence of policy effort since the money has to be spent on some action relating to the issue at hand; (4) unlike legislative hearings or

political speeches, whose differences in length or intensity can render a simple count of their number a misleading estimate of policy effort, money is a uniform unit of account, which makes comparisons across programs and over time easier; and (5) data on

budgetary allocations by the Government of India exist and could be accessed for all relevant social programs throughout the timeframe of this study.