Self and Subjectivity: A Middle Way Approach
GEORGES DREYFUS
6. Conclusion: Are We Still Allowed to Talk About Experience?
Throughout this essay, I have used quite liberally the concept of experience to discuss the topic of consciousness, in defiance of the suspicion that has surrounded this concept within the humanities. This rejection of the notion of experience is all the more unfortunate in that it comes at a time when there is a willingness in some quarters to include the subjective aspects of mental processes within the purview of the mind sciences. Within Buddhist studies, the foremost proponent of this critique of experience has been Robert Sharf, who has brilliantly and provocatively argued against the use of this notion. Reacting to the previous exaggerated emphasis on experience as providing a metaphysical basis for the justification and explanation of Buddhism, Sharf has taken to task those who use the notion of experience as part of a crypto- theological project to create a realm of privacy in which religion can escape the suspicion that has undermined its credibility within the more educated public. As Sharf rightly argues, it is simply not credible to claim that the meaning of texts, rituals, and institutions is to elicit in the mind of the practitioners some inner experience, for this ignores most of what is going on in a religious tradition in order to focus on and distort a few rarefied expressions.
But his provocative and welcome critique of experience goes much further and impugns the very use of this notion, which for Sharf is hopelessly mired in Cartesian metaphysics. Quoting Dennett with approval, Sharf states his case in this way:
51This is the description given by Ju Mipham, trans. Doctor (2004: 355). Readers who know this author
may notice that my approach to the Yogācāra views of the mind bears a certain similarity to those of Ṡāntarakṡita's views as interpreted by Mipham. It should also be clear, however, that my discussion here is simplified to the point of caricature. In particular I am glossing over a number of extremely complex issues concerning the relation between ordinary and enlightened states of mind. For Mipham's views on this topic, see Hopkins (2006).
[T]here is a certain tendency to think of experience as a subjective ‘mental event’ or ‘inner process’ that eludes public scrutiny. In thinking about experience along these lines, it is difficult to avoid the image of mind as an immaterial substrate or psychic field, a sort of inner space in which the outer material world is reflected or re-presented. Scholars leave the category of experience unexamined precisely because the meaning of experience, like the stuff of experience, would seem to be utterly transparent. Experience is simply given to us in the immediacy of each moment of perception. This picture of the mind has its roots in Descartes and his notion of mind as an ‘immaterial substance’ (although few would subscribe to Descartes' substance ontology). And following the Cartesian perspective, we assume that insofar as experience is immediately present, experience per se is indubitable and irrefutable. (Sharf 1998: 94–116)
I cannot address here all the points made by Sharf, but it should be clear that there is a fundamental difference between the target of his Dennettian critique and the phenomenological views that have informed this essay. Sharf assumes in his critique of experience that its use necessarily implies a view of consciousness as being private, transparent, and immune to mistake. I believe that this essay shows that this is simply not the case. It is true that the notion of experience entails a view of the mind as having a subjective side, a side that is often difficult to pin down, but this hardly entails that the mind is enclosed in a private realm, immune to external scrutiny. In fact, phenomenologists such as Husserl, Heidegger, Scheler, and Merleau-Ponty have taken great pains to show that the concern with human experience in no way implies the sealing off of the mind in a realm of transparent absolute privacy. On the contrary, these thinkers have emphasized the opacity of subjectivity and its limitations, and argued that a convincing account of experience cannot isolate what is going on in one's mind, but must consider its inter-subjective dimensions. These dimensions are multiple and complex, ranging from the ways in which bodies interact to the role of empathy and the place of symbolically mediated social interactions.52 But all these thinkers concur in
the same conclusion, that it is only by taking into considerations these dimensions that we can hope to have an adequate sense of what is entailed by the concept of experience.
52 (52) For a brief summary of various views on intersubjectivity, see Zahavi (2005), 147–177. For a
Hence, it should be clear that although the use of the term ‘experience’ does signal the importance of subjectivity for a Buddhist account of the person, it does not entail the kind of Cartesian position caricatured by Sharf. I believe that it is time to rehabilitate the notion of experience, and to avoid assuming that its use necessarily leads to a crypto-theological project mired in hopeless metaphysics.53 I also believe that this rehabilitation is of some importance for the study of Buddhism and its philosophy, importance that goes well beyond the present essay. It will allow the inclusion of the traditions whose views rely more specifically on notions derived from meditative experiences within the purview of Buddhist philosophy. This is perhaps the case of the Yogācāra tradition, whose views are often derived from meditative experiences (hence its name), but remain surrounded by some suspicion within Buddhist studies, despite the considerable resources that they offer for the elaboration of Buddhist views of the mind as shown here. This is also true of the tantric tradition, which is often considered as merely practical without much philosophical importance. The neglect of its philosophical content is due to a number of factors that cannot be analyzed here but has had the unfortunate result of removing tantric material from the purview of those who are interested in understanding Buddhist views of consciousness and its relation to the person. Considerable attention has been devoted to the textual material of the tantric tradition, its historical evolution, and its relation to vernacular cultures. Those are all important topics worthy of consideration, but they leave out important areas of inquiry such as the bearing of tantric ideas on our understanding of the person, consciousness, embodiment, etc. To include these views within the purview of Buddhist philosophy, we will need to accept notions that make sense within the context of yogic practices, and hence be open to include within the purview of our conversations the experiential aspects of the tradition. Only then can scholars of Buddhist studies hope to do justice to the full range of Buddhist views of consciousness and the person and, perhaps, be in a position to make significant contributions to our understanding of consciousness.
53
(53) For a response to Sharf and a defense of the place of experience within Tibetan Buddhism, see Gyatso (1999).
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