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Conclusion: Convergence but remaining differences

This chapter demonstrated that patterns and processes of the collective experience of crime and solidarity in selected European countries converged during the 1990s and 2000s, but that they nevertheless remain different. First, countries under for-mer communist rule and to some extent the forfor-mer Mediterranean dictatorships of Portugal, Greece, and Spain have shown to be unlike the rest of the sample countries in many indicator categories. The political histories of these countries differ from the majority of the other sample countries and these different historical trajectories seem to have left traces in public safety (higher homicide rates and victimisation rates), approaches to criminal justice (more police officers, less convictions, harsher sentencing, worse prison conditions), citizens’ attitudes towards state institutions (less trust and limited contact), as well as social expenditure (less government ex-penditure for social insurance programmes).

Second, the former dictatorships and post-communist countries converged with the rest of Europe in many aspects of the collective experience of crime, with con-fidence in the police as well as recording and conviction figures increasing, and homicide rates significantly declining. However, post-communist countries seem to have remained different in regards to solidarity as expenditure figures do not seem to have tilted towards Western and Southern Europe. Unfortunately there is no in-formation in regards to benefit generosity, so the question as to whether post-Soviet states converge towards the remaining sample in this regard remains unanswered.

Third, the sample countries not only converge in the sense that the countries that displayed distinct high or low values on the indicators assimilated to the remaining sample, but also that differences in the rest of Europe seem to have vanished in a lot of aspects. This overall convergence is especially apparent for welfare state activity:

social expenditure and the overall generosity of the sample countries’ benefit systems are well distinguishable by Esping-Andersen’s welfare state classification from the early 1990s, but increaslingly overlap towards the end of the observation period.

Convergence is equally evident for many indicators of the collective experience of crime, most notably concerning homicide rates, government expenditure for public order and safety, and confidence in the police and justice system.

Fourth, the sample countries show a number of similar trajectories. Confidence in the police seems to have increased among all countries in Europe. At the same time, however, confidence in the justice system has declined. Imprisonment rates

uniformly rose in the majority of sample countries, and were accompanied by the emergence of crime control as a political issue after 2000. Yet, these trends evolve slowly. Countries which underwent major changes were commonly those which stood out from the sample through either especially high or low figures.

Fifth, official objective indicators do not always reflect subjective attitudes and behaviour. The presence of many police officers does not automatically increase confidence in the police. Such confidence seems to be higher in countries that employ the fewest officers per 100,000 population within the sample. When it comes to the number of convictions this relationship is however reversed: criminal justice systems which convict the most people per 100,000 population also have the highest level of confidence among the wider public.

Sixth, objective indicators and subjective attitudes are also in accordance in many instances, most notably in regards to indicators of solidarity: throughout all welfare state types unemployment benefit programmes were the least generous compared to sick and pension benefit programmes. This commonality is shared by individual attitudes of citizens of the sample countries as they were least concerned about the living conditions of the unemployed in comparison to the sick and disabled or elderly. Furthermore, citizens do not seem to put unrealistic demands on the welfare state’s responsibilities to provide. Where the latter provides for a broad coverage of life risks, people generally see it as the individual’s responsibility to satisfy any additional needs. The welfare state hence has the ability to meet public demands.

Lastly, the chapter contributes to the discussion about declining solidarity in Europe. When measured on an aggregate level by means of welfare state statistics, solidarity generally does not seem to have shrunk as drastically as it is often con-veyed in public discourse. Neither public social expenditure, nor benefit generosity indicators suggest significant declines in institutionalised solidarity. When plotted according to the typology of welfare state regimes of Esping-Andersen (1990), only the social democratic states suffer slight cutbacks in public social expenditure and benefit generosity. Liberal states in turn do not seem to be affected by a decline in solidarity. On the contrary, these states have expanded expenditure for, and acces-sibility to, welfare programmes. The politics of austerity, hence are not evident in data prior to 2010.

6 European Differences and Convergence

6.1 Introduction

The previous chapter demonstrated that several aspects of the collective experience of crime and solidarity in Europe have changed over time. Many of these devel-opments have taken the shape of convergence. Indicators about which European countries appear to be converging include people’s individual attitudes, public pol-icy in relation to social welfare and criminal justice, as well as the prevalence of violent crime. At the same time there also appeared to be regional patterns of val-ues towards both criminal justice and solidarity. In particular the post-communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe as well as Mediterranean countries often differed from the other sample countries. However, the differences between these countries and the remaining sample decreased during the observation period. Are these observations indicative of a process of Europeanisation? Has a harmonisation of political, economic, and social dynamics of European countries occurred during the past decades?

This chapter addresses this general question with respect to indicators of the collective experience of crime and solidarity. Countries in contemporary Europe as well as their citizens find themselves in a dialectic of supranational and local influ-ences (Karstedt 2014). On the one hand countries strive to preserve their national identities and interests. On the other hand, however, membership in the European Union or the Council of Europe is dependent on concurrence on matters like rule of law, democracy, and respect for human rights, based on international agreements like the Treaty of Lisbon or the European Social Charter. Respect for human rights in particular is closely related to the idea of solidarity (respect towards all members of society), welfare state activity (granting social access for everybody), and criminal justice (dignified treatment of offenders).

Building on the findings from chapter 5, the present chapter analyses in more detail how countries in Europe are situated towards each other with regards to solidarity and the collective experience of crime in society. Four questions guide this part of the research:

1. Can indicators of solidarity and the collective experience of crime in society delineate different clusters of countries?

2. Do clusters of solidarity overlap with clusters of the collective experience of crime in society?

3. Is the structure of clusters stable over time?

4. Do countries converge within clusters, across clusters, or both?

The last question addresses whether countries which find themselves in the same cluster become even more alike over time, or whether convergence predominantly takes place across clusters, turning Europe into a more homogenous region in terms of solidarity, crime, and criminal justice.

To answer these four questions the chapter will proceed in two steps. First, two separate cluster analyses for patterns of solidarity and the collective experience of crime are calculated for the period 1995-2000 and 2005-2010 in order to answer questions 1-3. Subsequently, to address question 4, diffusion analysis is performed on indicators of solidarity and indicators of the collective experience of crime that significantly differ between clusters. The chapter begins with a brief literature review looking at European differences and similarities in regards to crime, criminal justice, and solidarity. The subsequent sections introduce the basics of cluster and diffusion analysis and present results from both analyses. Section 6.6 discusses the results in the wider context of this thesis.