Conclusion

In this chapter I have reviewed the intense debate surrounding large dams, which India has not escaped. The previous experience o f large dams in India has not been a happy one on many counts. They have often not delivered the expected benefits, but have instead incurred huge costs, which are not acknowledged in the cost-benefit analysis on which they are based. The costs have instead been shouldered by vulnerable sections o f Indian society. It is argued that much o f the literature on SSP has been plagued by a tendency to invoke failures o f the past in assessing this present-day project, but this tendency is not unreasonable unless proponents o f the scheme can demonstrate convincingly that they no longer apply.

Thus with pro- and anti-dam activists both writing profusely in order to prove their respective points that resettlement on this scale can or cannot work (simultaneously contributing to discussions about appropriate development) an assessment o f resettlement by the oustees can become dis-placed from the debate or submerged like their place o f origin. The next chapter introduces an approach I have chosen to listen to the voices o f the oustees and their assessment o f resettlement and rehabilitation.

Notes for Chapter 2

' Large Dams, as defined by the Intemational Commission on Large Dams (INCOLD) are those having a dam wall above 15m in height from the lowest general foundation to the crest. Dams between 10-15 m may also qualify as large if they satisfy a number of another criteria (see Rangachari et al. 2000).

^ See section 2.3.1 on India.

^ Although there are some beneficial impacts to the ecosystem such as the creation of a reservoir providing a suitable habitat for wetland species, the evidence overwhelmingly shows negative impacts (Rangachari et al. 2000).

Estimates of displacement vary widely. The root cause is the lack of systematic recording of displacement figures by the authorities of some top large-dam building nations. Missing or incomplete data challenges others to make their own calculations, using their own methodologies, which are in themselves debatable. For example, to arrive at his estimate of world-wide displacement, McCully gathers data on 120 completed dams for which data is available, in countries excluding China and India (a fraction of the total number built but includes most of those with the largest number of evictions). He finds that these dams displace a total of 2.1 million people. For Indian displacement figures McCully cites the Indian Social Institute estimate of 14 million evictees. For China, he rejects the official figure of 10.2 million, choosing instead an unspecified figure from a range suggested by Dia Qing (a fierce opponent of the Three Gorges dam) who believes that between 40 to 60 million people have been displaced. Choosing - for an unknown reason - a figure from the lower end of Qing’s range, McCully concludes that a realistic estimate of world-wide dam evictees would be around 60 million. This figure lies within the range suggested by the World Commission on Dams. The Indian Government does not accept the displacement statistics featuring in the WCD report, alleging that they make no sense in comparison to the figures quoted for Indian dam displacement. The India statistics are discussed more fully in Section 2.4.3.

^ Decommissioning as explained by McCully (1996) includes anything from merely closing down electricity generation to the costly and challenging exercise of completely removing a dam and restoring the river to it’s former state.

^ Rangachari et al. (2000) state that from fewer than 300 large dams existing at the time of Independence, the number of dams constructed and under construction has to risen to about 4291. Their figures are based on the National Register of Large Dams compiled by the Government of India.

^ Perhaps one of the underlying reasons for wanting to create a centralist and state-orientated nation was the fear of division, particularly the creation of an East and West Pakistan.

* The issue of contested development has just as much relevance in India today as it did at the time of Nehru and Gandhi. Many more recent critiques of India’s development ideology can be described as ‘Ecological Marxism’ (Baviskar 1997).

® Lipton first wrote about urban bias in relation to Indian development and felt that whilst planning under urban bias had ‘achieved a great deal in rural India’ (Lipton 1968:147), on the whole development had been retarded by this phenomenon - even more so in other developing countries as he was to find later. In the first instance the agricultural sector is squeezed (farming is left alone, few resources are provided and it is heavily taxed) and its outputs (food and raw materials) are obtained cheaply for the cities to finance industrial development (Lipton 1989). Subsequent policies arising out the deficiencies of the original approach, he argues, are seldom free of urban bias, reflecting the city based orientation of city based planners.

The emphasis on canal irrigation and large dams for agriculture can be placed in a longer historical context. For example, as far back as the fourteenth century Firoz Shah created the original version of the celebrated Western Yumuna Canal. After falling into disrepair it was later renovated or remodelled under various Mughal rulers and by the British. Habib (1999)

presents evidence of other large canals that were dug during the Mughal period, especially in Northern India. In 1817 the British commenced their canal-building activity in India, initially modifying indigenous works and then embarking on their own projects beginning in 1836 with the Ganges Canal (Stone 1984). According to Singh (1997) the British replaced diverse traditional irrigation systems by a standardised response based on civil engineering. Rather than developing water management techniques, the British concentrated on canals and technological expertise. Whilst this may be an overly simplistic interpretation of irrigation development under British rule, critics like Whitcombe (1972) regard the basic approach to have been generally unhelpful to peasant communities. The large dam technology of the 1930s provided the final break between traditional irrigation science and this ‘scientific’ approach.

“ Government agricultural development or welfare schemes are currently based around the following classifications: big farmers are those with more than two hectares, smaller farmers with between one and two hectares and marginal farmers with less than one hectare, irrespective of the land being irrigated or not.

Rangachari et al. (2000) also observe that even lower standards (whereby benefits could be the same as the costs) were considered acceptable for projects in drought-prone areas.

Projects qualify for approval if the promoters can demonstrate a cost-to-benefit ratio equal to or higher than 1:1.5 i.e. every rupee worth of costs requires a return of 1.5 rupees. Thus, benefits to the economy (for example, the increased income generated from higher yields, value of the fishing industry that develops in the dam reservoir etc.) must be one and half times the costs (for example, capital costs of the project, loss of revenue from land outlined for submergence etc.). Rangachari et al (2000:56) find that in their own evaluation of some 11 command area development projects, 6 failed to reach the qualifying ratio of 1.5, thus confirming their view that projects usually have higher actual costs than what is stated on paper.

Roy (1999: 58) notes ‘there has not been an official audit, a comprehensive, post-project evaluation, of a single Indian Big Dam to see whether or not it has achieved what it set out to achieve’.

No mention is made of the size of external funding in the 1990s.

See Rangachari et al. (2000) for a full account of the procedure for inclusion of projects into the National Plan and the way in which the playing field for large irrigation projects and ‘alternatives’ are far from even.

Walter Femandes is the head of the Programme for tribal studies at the Indian Social Institute, New Delhi. Many others have contributed to this highly politically charged debate (see Bhalla 1999, Kak 1999).

Some critics, however, argue that it is not appropriate to talk of non-tribals benefiting at the expense of tribal people for this sharp distinction is not appropriate in the Indian context (Joshi 1997). If there is a difference it is just a question of how far a cultural group is along the tribe-caste continuum.

Those affected by development projects were often in the Indian context referred to as oustees. Dhagamwar (1992) notes a shift in nomenclature to ‘project affected people’ to reflect the array of people impacted by such projects not just those uprooted from their houses. The shortened version pap is commonly used although some critics object to such dehumanising terminology and it is best avoided.

Cemea’s conclusion is made in relation to case studies of Indian resettlement complied by Dr Parasuraman (1999)

The estimated cost of the Sardar Sarovar in 1983 prices was Rs. 42 billion. The actual cost by 1994 was Rs. 342 billion (McCully 1996: 299). See Turton (2002: 60) and Shah (1997: 355) for more details about cost of the Sardar Sarovar Project.

The Govemment of Gujarat refute the suggestion that a reduction in dam height will have minimum impact on the dam’s performance, stating that ‘there would be a loss of 230 to 350 MKwh per year in the beneficial use of water for power generation and power will be only seasonal’ and in terms of water availability the loss ‘works out to 1.52 Million Acre Feet

(MAF) i.e. about 16% of total share of Gujarat and Rajasthan States’ (GOG undated: 4). The Supreme Court in its judgement on 18th October 2000 endorsed the Gujarat Government’s view, ordering that construction continue as per the parameters set out in the award of the Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal (1979).

Baviskar (1997) describes how the crops grown by adivasi do not require them to follow a rigid agricultural schedule, unlike in the plains where cash crops are grown. She notes that this flexibility allows people to organise 'laabs' whereby, when an agricultural task exceeds the capacity of an individual household, others in the village are called upon to help out. In return the host family provides a feast and will be able to help others when needed. This applies to house construction as well. The web of favours that develops is based on the recognition of mutual dependence.

Communal work, group dancing, story-telling, worship of the natural and supernatural world and attending markets and fairs together all serve to foster a community spirit. This is heightened by adivasis ’ relative independence from mainstream society (Baviskar 1997).

Morse and Berger (1992: 70) define encroachers as, ‘the people, who as a result of successive political and economic pressures over a long colonial history, find themselves to be illegal uses of what they have believed to be their own lands’. Adivasis in the Narmada Valley became ‘encroachers’ overnight with the British govemment of India classified forests with reserved status.

At the time the Gujarat resettlement policy was the least satisfactory as the state govemment tried to capitalise on the fact that the Tribunal’s directions on the resettlement package did not explicitly refer to these as applicable to Gujarat govemment. The govemment argued that the only condition placed on them by the Tribunal was that they were to resettle any Madhya Pradesh and Maharastra oustees wishing to relocate to Gujarat to be in the command area of the project. If oustees chose to resettle within their home states the cost of their relocation would be bome by the Gujarat govemment since it has the most to gain from the project.

The Maharastra and Madhya Pradesh NGOs, with the support of the World Bank, Prof Scudder and others, had criticized the Ministry for not honouring the World Bank loan agreement by refusing to release forest land for oustees. In June 1990 the Ministry announced they would consent to the resettlement of tribals on the Taloda forest land. However, in the interim the Madhya Pradesh and Maharastra NGOs had declared their objection to the SSP. Consequently when the announcement was made the NBA supplied a memorandum to the Maharashtra govemment, claiming to represent the views of tribal people in the thirty-three Maharashtra submergence villages, stating that they no longer wanted the land (as they were totally opposed to displacement and resettlement). Only later, when the tribals came to know that such a decision had been taken on their behalf by the anti-dam activists, did some come forward to say that they did in fact want the forest land as per their original demands.

The document presented by the NBA is civil writ petition No. 319, 1994.

This latest directive has been widely critised. Downing (2002) argues that it weakens existing World Bank policy on resettlement and rehabilitation.

Other key elements of the World Bank policy include a commitment to minimising/avoiding displacement, allocating resources and sharing benefits, moving people in groups, promoting participation, rebuilding communities, considering hosts’ needs, protecting indigenous people (Cemea 1997).