substantial empirical evidence for an important influence of norm-based preferences as well as theoretical arguments that people must be influenced by such preferences if they are to achieve stable cooperation, it is also obvious that norm-based preferences are not the whole story in explaining cooperative behavior. Even in cases in which there are clear norms applying to some interaction, people may vary considerably in the degree to which they adhere to them, with some being more willing than others to violate norms, particularly (but not only) in order to satisfy self-interested preferences. Both casual observation and more systematic investigation support the conclusion that people are sensitive to the costs to themselves and perhaps to others incurred in conforming to norms and are more willing to violate norms as the benefits of doing so increase30.
Adherence to norms (and motivation by social preferences more generally) also becomes attenuated as anonymity increases and is strengthened under arrangements that make information about behavior more public. And of course, there are many situations in which there are no clear norms governing behavior at all, so that unless subjects import norms from other situations that they judge to be similar or create norms to govern the new situation, their behavior will not be norm-governed.
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