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Conclusion and Personal Analysis

The Iranian nuclear program has remained a major concern for both Iran and the international community. The nuclear plan that had begun in collaboration with the West transformed into a serious danger for the same Western countries years later. Since then, Iran has faced a serious of problems with the international community, and specifically the United States, regarding its nuclear program. The United Nations ordered Iran to suspend its nuclear program for not complying with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), but Iran refused, insisting its program was peaceful; the international community did not believe that. The United States’ major objective was to stop Iran from producing a nuclear bomb or any nuclear weapons. As a result, the United Nations, the United States and Europe imposed harsh sanctions and isolated Iran economically and politically. Despite international pressures and isolation, Iran did not collapse under the pressure imposed on the country since 2006, under the United Nation Security Council’s resolution 1696. The Iranians asserted that no pressure can stop them from developing their “peaceful” nuclear program that is the right for the country and directly related to Iran’s sovereignty. Nevertheless, after the 2013 presidential elections in Iran, the US began a series of secret talks with Iran regarding a nuclear agreement that would reconnect Iran with the international community and relieve sanctions that have choked the country’s economy.

There is no doubt that both sides entered in negotiations to serve their own interests in addition to finding a peaceful solution; however, the power and interest cannot verify

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why Tehran and Washington have not been able to unite through a process of broad significant discussion in the past decades for, at least, minimal collaboration.

During the talks there were periods of hot and cold politics due to the huge pressure imposed on

Iran. The Iranian regime believed the world powers were prohibiting Tehran from acquiring its

natural right of enriching uranium; moreover, the Iranians have focused on their pride as a

priority to their rights. This was clear in Zarif’s statement, when he said: “the Iranian people

demand respect for their rights but demand respect for their dignity [too]…and I hope this

process can do that” (Shabani, 2015). Discussion went back and forth until the 2013 presidential

elections in Iran and the election of a moderate president and government, the polar opposite of

the hardliner, President Ahmadinejad, who occupied the position from 2009-2013. The Geneva

talks, a door of negotiation with the Iranian regime, in an attempt to find a mutual point of

interest to start from.

Since the beginning, Iran’s had little desire to strike a deal, despite all the pressure the country was under. Iran considers itself a sovereign and independent nation and any deal made comes with possibility of foreign intervention in its affairs.

Therefore, why has Iran suddenly shifted?

Throughout this paper I have discussed the general shift in the Islamic Republic of Iran’s foreign policy, choosing the optimal time for a deal to serve regime interest. Regardless of the changes that have occurred on the political level and the stunning results of the recent elections that reflected the Iranian peoples’ desires, we cannot shed enough light on the role of the Iranian people who struggled under the embargos and overcome all the challenges imposed on the country. The Iranians did not want to topple their regime; moreover, not even to destroy their country. Their patience has shocked the West, who

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had bet that the sanctions would trigger an uprising and call for foreign intervention, especially since many of Iran’s neighboring countries are undergoing revolutions, mainly due to economic failures. The bet on a contagious effect was very strong, but not stronger than the will of the Iranian people who believed that their strength is directly related to their national unity that is directly related to their pride; in addition, it is reasonable to believe that most of Iran’s 80 million citizens do not care for a more luxurious life than anyone in the world. But ahead of the elevated principles of “equal footing” and “mutual respect” (Shabani, 2015), dignity for the Iranians can be measured through other useful terms. According to Shabani, “for most Iranians, the state of their dignity can be measured through the value of two crucial pieces of paper: their national currency and their passports” (Shabani, 2015).

Concerning the regime, pragmatism in foreign policy to serve domestic interests was the winning bet that has reflected positively on Iran, while maintaining domestic principles that is considered a priority to the Iranian people under which they struggled and suffered for so long. The smartest move on the regime’s part was altering their foreign policy practices after the 2013 presidential elections to meet their needs. The Iranian people demanded a moderate regime that would put an end to the embargo and open Iran to the West, while enhancing the economy. This has reduced the risk for any domestic uprisings; moreover, it prevents the spread of uprisings from outside the borders. Striking the nuclear deal with the West and mainly the United States has strengthened Iran’s position and tilted the balance of power in the region in its favor, causing fears to rise among some of the US’ allies in the region. The easing tensions throughout this deal

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will be reflected in the security of the region and the better economic development that will take place post-deal.

In conclusion, the Iranian regime has overcomed a huge domestic issue protecting its position. This wise move in the country’s foreign policy has blocked the road for any movement or revolution aiming to topple the regime. The Iranian’s firm resistance throughout the embargo years has put the Iranian government in a better position to negotiate with the West and strike a deal because such a deal could have not been made as powerful if there were any signs of civil dissent.

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