Throughout this paper I have examined the ways in which Brazilian and Mexican Conditional Cash Transfer programs have differed from one another in how they try to prevent corruption within the program. In many ways, these programs follow a similar model in trying to prevent corruption, however, several small but important differences between them demonstrate ways in which the program can be run to minimize overall corruption.
The centralization of the program seems to be the most important factor in preventing systemic corruption within the program. Examination within the program has demonstrated that the majority of corruption found within these programs occurs on a local rather than federal level when politicians attempt to use the program to influence voters. Comparisons between Bolsa Familia and Oportunidades showed that while many aspects of both programs were centralized, Bolsa Familia's method of data collection was fairly decentralized and very reliant on municipal governments. This has allowed for local officials to have both more credibility when telling voters that they can manipulate the program and have a greater ability actually to get themselves and others on the program. Thus, it appears that greater centralization of these programs leads to less corruption within these programs.
This research raises interesting implications about the centralization of CCT programs. Some national governments and organizations have been wary about encouraging developing countries with more corrupt and less stable governments to have greater control over their social programs due to the potential struggles they could have in enforcing these programs However, this research indicates that giving the central government greater control over these social programs actually lowers the degree of corruption in them by making it more difficult for it to occur. This raises further questions about encouraging central governments to take on greater
responsibilities for programs within their countries. I would encourage more research into the topics of both whether maintaining control over more programs is linked to better governance and whether this effect is seen in other agencies other than ones that run social programs.
Both of these programs also had extensive measures in place to try and encourage transparency within the program. Both had external organizations frequently audit the program, although the Mexican government has had a worse track record with releasing and sourcing several of the audits if they contain data that could be unfavorable to the program. Prospera also does not release personal information about its beneficiaries, which makes it harder for
individual citizens groups to track data on beneficiaries. While both of these are worrying signs and could lead to greater problems later on, I could not find significant links to show that this slightly lower level of transparency actually impacted corruption within the program.
While the programs that I examined did not have many significant differences with respect to transparency, the fact that they had significant transparency measures already in place indicates a degree of commitment within the government to monitor these programs and prevent corruption. Based on other research in the field, it is unlikely that transparency measures have no effect on the level of corruption within governments and social programs. However, the fact that Mexico’s slightly lower level of transparency did not seem to impact the program in any
significant measure indicates that the effectiveness of these measures may decrease the greater the measures there are in place. Thus, when designing future CCT programs, it may be
reasonable to prioritize additional transparency measures behind other factors such as coverage and efficiency provided that some measures are already in place.
Finally, I examined the methods that both programs use to determine which beneficiaries qualify for the program. Although the proxy-means test makes it harder for individuals to lie
about their overall wealth and become program beneficiaries, I could not find many results to show that this actually prevented government officials from manipulating program results to select particular beneficiaries. This was particularly true since these officials would have more access to information about how program beneficiaries are determined. So, all in all, having more complicated criteria for beneficiaries does not necessarily make the program less
susceptible to corruption. Clearly, more research needs to be done in this area in order to better clarify the impacts that differing evaluations of wealth and assets have on corruption within the program. A long term study on the amount of incorrect assessments of benefits within the
program after standards were put into place would be particularly useful here. For now, however, whether or not these evaluations use a strictly- or proxy-means tested evaluation does not seem to affect significantly the degree of corruption within the program.
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