Conclusion

Existing research on EU soft law in general and the ES in particular has focused mainly on how and why it was adopted and is implemented at the EU level (Bekker 2014; Crespy and Menz 2015; Schäfer 2004; Terpan 2015; Zeitlin and Vanhercke 2014; 2018). However, only few studies have engaged with the conditions under which corresponding policies are adopted and implemented at the national level (Eihmanis 2018; Van Wolleghem 2017). This constitutes a major shortcoming, given that EU soft law in general and ES CSRs in particular are similar to directives in relying crucially on national-level implementation (Saurugger and Terpan 2016). Because policy coordination through CSRs follows the same basic structure as EU policy-making through

directives – policy formulation at the EU level and policy adoption and implementation at and through the national level – variation in implementation performance, suggesting patterns of both compliance and noncompliance, seems likely to – and indeed does – also emerge in this area (Darvas and Leandro 2015; Saurugger and Terpan 2016). However, very little is known about how well the explanations applied to directive compliance ‘travel’ to other types of instruments such as soft-law coordination. In drawing on the substantive and qualitative assessment of CSR implementation by the European Commission, this study aims to advance the understanding of drivers of substantive compliance beyond the specific case of directives.

The results for variables associated with the enforcement approach, while frequently challenging conventional wisdom, offer some interesting insights about compliance and the European Semester. First and foremost, while governments’ economic ideologies have an impact on CSR compliance, the effect does not seem to be driven by simple ideological affinity to CSR objectives. The positive effect of government ideology further to the ‘economic right’ is largest for CSRs focusing on social objectives, although conventional wisdom has it that these objectives are more important for the ‘economic left’. Possible explanations for this paradoxical result might be found in salience theory (Budge 2001), in that governments are less likely to heed EU advice in their main areas of (perceived) competence, and insider-outsider politics (Rueda 2005). Furthermore, insofar critics are correct in asserting that the CSRs lack a fair balance between economic and social objectives, it might be reassuring to note that more socially oriented CSRs face marginally better compliance prospects. Second, contrary to theoretical reasoning, (the possibility of) enforcement through the EU does not appear to improve compliance prospects. Reading this as an indication that EU socioeconomic coordination is not working would, of course, be a misinterpretation. Rather, it could be interpreted as a sign that the asymmetry in instruments (Seikel 2016) does not lead to an asymmetry in implementation. Third, transfer benefits of EU membership increase CSR compliance (whereas trade benefits almost certainly do not). This is a striking result, which –

though in line with theory – contrasts with existing empirical findings of the literature on directive compliance (König and Luetgert 2009; Perkins and Neumayer 2007).

While standard variables used by the management approach to capture domestic constraints and capabilities are associated with overall more uncertain and ambiguous effects, another interesting finding is that corporatism appears to improve compliance prospects. Although this is in line with the arguments provided by the compliance literature, it might be counterintuitive from a domestic constraints perspective, given that strong trade unions in corporatist systems could also be viewed as potential veto players (Lampinen and Uusikylä 1998: 249). This result might indicate that despite sharp criticism raised against the ES for a lack of social balance, greater organizational capacities may give strong trade unions a more constructive role in the implementation of CSRs, which may also facilitate their transmission into domestic policy discourse.

Summing up, as is the case for directives, both the willingness and ability of governments to adopt recommended measures shapes CSR compliance, but they do so in sometimes unexpected ways. Overall, the varying ‘progress’ made across countries and policy fields suggests that the implementation of CSRs, as of EU inputs more generally, remains a contested and open-ended process. The pervasiveness of patterns of compliance and noncompliance invites further research on its causes, but it does not necessarily imply a failure of the ever-evolving and -changing system of EU socioeconomic coordination. Resistance to EU soft law is not only ‘normal’ but also legally admissible, given its non-binding nature (Saurugger and Terpan 2016). CSRs cover a wide variety of policy fields and (potentially conflicting) policy objectives, they are formulated and adopted by fallible political actors with limited time horizons and information and the broader political, institutional and economic contexts in which these are implemented (or not) remain highly diverse. Therefore, the coexistence of compliance and noncompliance should be considered as a defining feature of EU (economic) governance and one that is – justifiably – there to stay even as it is further institutionalized. With this further institutionalization of EU soft law as one key governing

mechanism of EU policy-making, there is substantial potential for future research to understand not only why and how it applied at the EU level, but also why and how member states implement it domestically. A better understanding of the latter can thus contribute to the processes of ‘experimentation’ and ‘reflexive learning’, which are often considered as major sources of policy innovation in this field (Zeitlin 2016). Thus, it might ultimately also help improving both the effectiveness and legitimacy of overall coordination.