4. The Accursed Princes: Constantine and Maxentius before 306
4.4. Conclusions
A recurring theme of this chapter has been the ways in which Diocletian sought to control the princes and dissuade the assumption that they were to become Caesars. The sons did not receive titles that marked their imperial pedigree, and they are almost invisible within the media that survives from 285-306. Diocletian did not give Constantine an independent military command, and he and his Caesar appear to have kept the prince under surveillance. There is reason to think that Diocletian ended a betrothal between Constantine and Fausta, and the prince was ultimately denied a dynastic marriage, most likely in accordance with the senior emperor’s will. The eastern Tetrarchs may have even sought Constantine’s death through indirect means. In the case of Maxentius, his marriage to Galerius’ daughter in theory bound him to the eastern Caesar through familial pietas, and Diocletian may have located Maxentius in Rome or permitted him being sent to Rome by Maximian partly so that the prince would be far from the legions and could not enjoy a military career.
100 Leadbetter (2009) 160-164, although he does not use Eutropius and Eusebius, Maximinus’ efforts against the
Christians or numismatic disunity in support of his argument. He places emphasis on CJ 3.12.1, a rescript issued from Maximinus’ court, as evidence of the enhanced power of the Caesars, since there is no constitution that can be attributed with certainty to the Caesars of the First Tetrarchy. But on the power of the Caesars of the First Tetrarchy, see Corcoran (2000a) 271-274; Ch. 1.6. On Eus. HE 8.13.11, Oulton (1932) 2.298-299 n.5 takes it to refer to divisions over religious policy. On Constantius’ self-abnegation, Odahl (2010) 76-77 posits that he remained in Gaul as he would have a better chance at securing Constantine’s succession. Potter (2013) 109-110 attaches significance to the fact that an official previously described as agens uicem prefectorum praetorio (acting in place of the praetorian prefects) is, under Maxentius, referred to as agens uicem prefecti praetorio (acting in place of the praetorian prefect) (IRT 464). For Potter, this change suggests that the praetorian prefects now had a more defined geographical authority and were attached to specific rulers. But Maxentius was not an accepted member of the imperial college, and he presumably only acknowledged the authority of the praetorian prefect that he himself had appointed.
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The implications of these efforts may have been clear to some contemporaries. After all, the panegyrist in 296/7 alludes to the succession without reference to specific heirs. But this does not mean that there was a clearly-expressed idea that sons were, as a rule, to be excluded from the imperial college in favour of adopted heirs. It is likely that Maximian and Constantius did not share Diocletian’s vision. Whereas Maximian and Constantius probably wanted their sons to succeed, in accordance with centuries of imperial practice, Diocletian had his own unique plans. The fact that he could persuade them to agree to his unusual arrangements again attests to his exceptional auctoritas. But Diocletian himself contributed to a degree of uncertainty. Although Constantius had sent Constantine to the east as a hostage, Diocletian granted him military tribunates and allowed the prince to be seen alongside himself and Galerius. Although
Maxentius’ marriage strengthened his connection to Galerius, it was also a prestigious marriage fit for a Caesar-in-waiting. Although Maxentius was located far from the legions, his relationship with Rome lent the prince a special kind of auctoritas as well as access to a powerful but
discontented city. And even though Diocletian denied the succession of Maxentius and Constantine, one should recall that he permitted the co-option of another blood relation; Galerius’ nephew Maximinus.101
Diocletian clearly underestimated Maxentius’ ability to conjure support, but there were other reasons for his treatment of the prince. Maxentius’ residence near Rome was meant to foster the city’s loyalty to the regime, and his marriage strengthened not only his bond to Galerius, but also the relationship between the Jovians and Herculians. It is also possible that there were times when Diocletian did consider Maxentius and/or Constantine to be potential successors, but that he came to question and eventually reject these princes as candidates. But one suspects that Diocletian was unsure of how to treat these princes. While he did attempt to control them, and dissuade the assumption that they would become Caesars, the long history of hereditary succession dictated that princes were important. Diocletian may have felt obliged to retain this importance, especially to please his western colleagues. Moreover, for a time, Diocletian may not have been sufficiently transparent about the prospects of the sons. The arrangements so favoured Galerius that it seems likely that Diocletian and his Caesar initially
101 Epit. 40.1, 18; Zos. 2.8.1.
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devised the plan without input from their western colleagues. Perhaps then Victor was right when he criticized the emperor for his mistrust and lack of openness (Caes. 39.46):
Valerio parum honesta in amicos fides erat discordiarum sane metu, dum enuntiationibus posse agitari quietem consortii putat.
Through fear of disharmony, Valerius (Diocletian) certainly had too little honest faith in his friends, since he believed that the peace of the fellowship could be shaken by transparency.
Lastly, let us compare the experiences of Constantine and Maxentius. The emperors favoured Maxentius in two major respects. Maximian’s son was allowed a dynastic marriage, whereas Constantine was denied one, and whereas Constantine lived as a hostage under the direct surveillance of the eastern Tetrarchs and possibly in some danger, Maxentius was sent to Rome to foster support for the regime. Admittedly, while Constantine was enjoying a military career, Maxentius was residing far away from the legions, but overall, the emperors apparently showed Maximian’s son more favour and trust. Indeed, the Epitome claims that when Diocletian refused the invitation from Constantine and Licinius to attend the latter’s wedding, the old emperor received threatening replies in which ‘it was exclaimed that he had favoured Maxentius and was currently favouring Maximinus’ (increpabatur Maxentio fauisse ac Maximino fauere) (39.7). Regardless of the story’s veracity, the epitomator’s source found the accusation to be believable. It should not surprise that the sons had such different experiences. Constantine was probably of illegitimate birth, and the son of a Caesar, not an Augustus. Moreover, as discussed above, Diocletian’s relationship with Constantius was weaker than those that he enjoyed with Maximian and Galerius, thus the need for a hostage. Diocletian probably better trusted
Maxentius as the son of his long-time ally.
Ultimately, the image one receives of the princes is complicated and untidy; the natural result of the unusual situation in which they lived. Not only were hereditary norms being
discarded in an unprecedented manner, but there were four different rulers whose interests were not necessarily aligned with one another. Not only did Constantine and Maxentius have very different experiences from one another, but even in isolation these experiences were paradoxical. Constantine was the tribune standing at the right hand of Diocletian, but he was also a hostage, a target of surveillance, a possible target of assassination, and the husband of one Minervina, on
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whom the sources have nothing to say beyond accusations of concubinage. Maxentius was the representative of the emperors in Rome and the husband of Galerius’ daughter, but he was also kept far from the legions. As it happened, both princes were tenacious and politically astute. Constantine did not need a good marriage to take command of his father’s army, and Maxentius did not need a legion to initiate a rebellion. By 306 Diocletian was no longer in active power and thus no longer able to direct his vision. In July of that year, Constantine asserted his claim to the purple, perhaps with the support of Constantius, and by year’s end, Maxentius had done the same, helped by his own father Maximian, Diocletian’s oldest ally.
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