4. DISCUSSION
4.6. CONCLUSIONS
The present thesis has examined paranormal and religious beliefs considering the role of cognitive biases, cognitive miserliness, and belief inflexibility. Most previous studies have not considered multiple profiles for believers and sceptics but have treated them as homogenous groups. This thesis, instead, suggests that among be- lievers and sceptics there are subgroups for which some underlying factors contribute more than other. It is concluded, that dual-process theory offers several pathways leading to similar worldviews.
Unexpectedly, the tendency to default to type 1 responses (cognitive miserliness) was less common among believers than often thought. Many believers seem to be capable of overcoming their incorrect intuitions, which conflicts the view that that believing reflects a weak inhibitory control (e.g. Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012; Pen- nycook et al., 2012). Also, a large number of cognitive misers end up having a scep- tic worldview. Taken these results together, it is possible that analytic thinking just co-occur with the sceptic worldview without much contributing it.
It is a bit surprising that cognitive biases, namely ontological confusions and teleolo- gy towards natural objects and life events, were found to be rather common among analytical believers. This may reflect the prolonged exposure to paranormal beliefs, which has prevented these childhood intuitions from being replaced by scientific ideas. Why do not intuitive sceptics, whose core ontological knowledge gets mixed up, believe in paranormal phenomena as well? The answer remains unclear. One possibility is that they have grown up in a sceptical and secular environment which
has acted as a buffer against their innate tendencies. Alternatively, loose ontological boundaries affect only intuitive thoughts, but have no direct impact on one’s reflec- tive belief system. Therefore, the person can hold a rational view of world despite biased intuitions (Subbotsky, 2000).
Before the researchers define the causal factors for paranormal and religious think- ing, it is also crucial to separate the conditions for when the beliefs are originally acquired (usually in childhood) and when they are being studied in laboratory. Dif- ferent factors can have a different role in a certain age. For example, epistemological regulation may be truly possible only from mid-childhood, implying that very young children are vulnerable to both cognitive miserliness and parasitic representations. Only later on analytic thinking can be used to resists cognitive miserliness, but over- learned false knowledge presumably requires metacognitive skills.
For some people paranormal beliefs can reflect their natural way to process infor- mation. They see signs in random things and associations between fundamental qual- ities. Just as it is important to isolate factors that contribute to childhood belief acqui- sition, it is necessary to pinpoint aspects that strengthen the adulthood believing. A role of religion must not be ignored. Religion gives paranormal beliefs a firm ground for growth. While superstitious beliefs can be more like a habit, or – like Irwin puts it – “a tuxedo that is taken out of the closet only when the occasion arises” (2009, p. 111), religion can be a fundamental way of life, where tradition, holy concepts, and identity are tightly intertwined around a paranormal-laden ideology.
Paranormal, superstitious, magical, and supernatural beliefs are not to vanish from the world even though scientific education improves. The full understating requires psychological, sociological, evolutionary, and anthropological approaches. From the cognitive psychology point of view, the dual-process theories offer a framework about how intuitive biases make us vulnerable to many paranormal beliefs, and how reflective thinking may either protect from them or strengthen them (Morgan, 2014). Parasitic nature of some representations helps to acknowledge the causal role of cul- tural information when explaining superstition and religion. By taking different as- pects of the paranormal belief into account we are better able to understand the caus- al factors behind them.
All in all, most of us are quite rational in the majority domains of life. When we are not, we probably will not even notice it. It is up to science to correct our erroneous beliefs. And even though we might never reach full rationality, we may grow to ap- preciate the limitations of our mind and learn to behave accordingly.
References
Aarnio, K. (2007). Paranormal, superstitious, magical, and religious beliefs (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved 27th November, 2015, from
http://hdl.handle.net/10138/19774
Aarnio, K., & Lindeman, M. (2005). Paranormal beliefs, education, and thinking styles. Personality and Individual Differences, 39, 1227–1236.
Aarnio, K., & Lindeman, M. (2007). Religious people and paranormal believers: Alike or different? Journal of Individual Differences, 28, 1–9.
Atran, S. (2002). In gods we trust: The evolutionary landscape of religion. New York: Oxford University Press.
Banerjee, K., & Bloom, P. (2013). Would Tarzan believe in God? Conditions for the emergence of religious belief. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 17, 7–8.
Banerjee, K., & Bloom, P. (2014). Why did this happen to me? Religious believers’ and non-believers’ teleological reasoning about life events. Cognition, 133, 277–303.
Banerjee, K., & Bloom, P. (2015). “Everything happens for a reason”: Children’s beliefs about purpose in life events. Child Development, 86, 503–518.
Barber, J. (2014). Believing in a purpose of events: Cross-cultural evidence of confu- sions in core knowledge. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 28, 432–437. Baron, J. (1993). Why teach thinking? An essay. Applied Psychology, 42, 191–214. Barrett, J. L. (2000). Exploring the natural foundations of religion. Trends in Cogni-
Barrett, J. L. (2004). Why would anyone believe in God? Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMi- ra.
Baumard, N., & Boyer, P. (2013). Religious beliefs as reflective elaborations on intu- itions: a modified dual-process model. Current Directions in Psychological
Science, 22, 295–300.
Bering, J. M. (2011). The belief instinct: The psychology of souls, destiny, and the
meaning of life. New York, NY: Norton.
Berkman, M. B., & Plutzer, E. (2011). Defeating creationism in the courtroom, but not in the classroom. Science, 331, 404–405.
Blackmore, S. (2000). The meme machine. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bloom, P. (2007). Religion is natural. Developmental Science, 10, 147–151.
Boyer, P. (1994). The naturalness of religious ideas: A cognitive theory of religion. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Boyer, P. (2001). Religion explained: The evolutionary origins of religious thought. New York: Basic Books.
Boyer, P. (2003). Religious thought and behaviour as by-products of brain function.
Trends in cognitive sciences, 7, 119–124.
Browne, M., Pennycook, G., Goodwin, B., & McHenry, M. (2014). Reflective minds and open hearts: Cognitive style and personality predict religiosity and spir- itual thinking in a community sample. European Journal of Social Psycholo-
gy, 44, 736–742.
Chinn, C. A., & Brewer, W. F. (2000). Knowledge change in response to data in sci- ence, religion, and magic. In K. Rosengren, C. Johnson, & P. Harris (Eds.),
Imagining the impossible: Magical, scientific, and religious thinking in chil- dren, (pp. 334–371). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Denes-Raj, V., & Epstein, S. (1994). Conflict between intuitive and rational pro- cessing: When people behave against their better judgment. Journal of Per-
sonality and Social Psychology, 66, 819–829.
De Neys, W. (2006). Dual processing in reasoning two systems but one reasoner.
Psychological Science, 17, 428–433.
De Neys, W., & Bonnefon, J.-F. (2013). The “whys” and “whens” of individual dif- ferences in thinking biases. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 17, 172–178. Ecklund, E. H., & Park, J. Z. (2009). Conflict between religion and science among
academic scientists? Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 48, 276–292. Epstein, S., Pacini, R., Denes-Raj, V., & Heier, H. (1996). Individual differences in
intuitive-experiential and analytical-rational thinking styles. Journal of Per-
sonality and Social Psychology, 71, 390–405.
Evans, J. S. B. T. (1989). Bias in human reasoning: Causes and consequences. Hove: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2008). Dual-processing accounts of reasoning, judgment, and so- cial cognition. Annual Review of Psychology, 59, 255–278.
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2009). How many dual-process theories do we need? One, two, or many? In J. St. B. T. Evans & K. Frankish (Eds.), In two minds: Dual pro-
cesses and beyond (pp. 31–54). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2010). Thinking twice: Two minds in one brain. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Evans, J. S. B. T., & Over, D. E. (1996). Rationality and reasoning. Hove: Psycholo- gy Press.
Eve, R. A., & Dunn, D. (1990). Psychic powers, astrology & creationism in the classroom? Evidence of pseudoscientific beliefs among high school biology & life science teachers. The American Biology Teacher, 10–21.
Everitt, B. S., Landau, S., Leese, M., & Stahl, D. (2011). Cluster analysis (5th ed.). West Sussex: Wiley.
Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (1991). Social cognition . (2nd ed.). New York: McGraw Hill.
Frankish, K., & Evans, J. S. B. T. (2009). The duality of mind: An historical perspec- tive. In two minds: Dual processes and beyond (pp. 1–29). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Frazer, J. G. (1922). The golden bough a study in magic and religion. New York: Macmillan.
Frederick, S. (2005). Cognitive reflection and decision making. Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 19, 25–42.
Genovese, J. E. (2005). Paranormal beliefs, schizotypy, and thinking styles among teachers and future teachers. Personality and Individual Differences, 39, 93– 102.
Gervais, W. M. (2013). Religious Cognition. In V. Saroglou (Ed.), Religion, person-
Gervais, W. M., & Henrich, J. (2010). The Zeus problem: Why representational con- tent biases cannot explain faith in gods. Journal of Cognition and Culture, 10, 383–389.
Gervais, W. M., & Norenzayan, A. (2012). Analytic thinking promotes religious dis- belief. Science, 336, 493–496.
Gervais, W. M., Willard, A. K., Norenzayan, A., & Henrich, J. (2011). Thecultural transmission of faith: Why innate intuitions are necessary, but insufficient, to explain religious belief. Religion, 41, 389–410.
Gilovich, T., & Griffin, D. (2002). Introduction - Heuristics and biases: Then and now. In T. Gilovich, D. Griffin, & D. Kahneman (Eds.), Heuristics and Bias-
es: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment (pp. 1-18). Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Glöckner, A., & Witteman, C. (2010). Beyond dual-process models: A categorisation of processes underlying intuitive judgement and decision making. Thinking &
Reasoning, 16, 1–25.
Gore, J., & Sadler-Smith, E. (2011). Unpacking intuition: A process and outcome framework. Review of General Psychology, 15, 304.
Hair, J. F. (2006). Multivariate data analysis (6th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall.
Heywood, B. T., & Bering, J. M. (2013). “Meant to be”: How religious beliefs and cultural religiosity affect the implicit bias to think teleologically. Religion,
Hood, B. M. (2009). Supersense: From superstition to religion - The brain science of
belief. London: Constable and Robinson.
Irwin, H. J. (2009). The psychology of paranormal belief: A researcher’s handbook. Hatfield: University of Hertfordshire Press.
James, W. (1902). The varieties of religious experience. New York: The Modern Library.
Jong, J., Bluemke, M., & Halberstadt, J. (2013). Fear of death and supernatural be- liefs: developing a new Supernatural Belief Scale to test the relationship. Eu-
ropean Journal of Personality, 27, 495–506.
Kahneman, D. (2003). A perspective on judgment and choice: Mapping bounded rationality. American Psychologist, 58, 697–720.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1972). Subjective probability: A judgment of repre- sentativeness. Cognitive Psychology, 3, 430–454.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1973). On the psychology of prediction. Psychologi-
cal Review, 80, 237–251.
Kalkman, D. P. (2013). Three cognitive routes to atheism: a dual-process account.
Religion, 44, 72–83.
Kelemen, D. (1999a). Function, goals and intention: Children’s teleological reason- ing about objects. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 3, 461–468.
Kelemen, D. (1999b). The scope of teleological thinking in preschool children. Cog-
Kelemen, D. (1999c). Why are rocks pointy? Children’s preference for teleological explanations of the natural world. Developmental Psychology, 35, 1440– 1452.
Kelemen, D. (2004). Are children “intuitive theists”? Reasoning about purpose and design in nature. Psychological Science, 15, 295–301.
Kelemen, D., & DiYanni, C. (2005). Intuitions about origins: Purpose and intelligent design in children’s reasoning about nature. Journal of Cognition and Devel-
opment, 6, 3–31.
Kelemen, D., & Rosset, E. (2009). The human function compunction: Teleological explanation in adults. Cognition, 111, 138–143.
Kelemen, D., Rottman, J., & Seston, R. (2012). Professional physical scientists dis- play tenacious teleological tendencies: Purpose-based reasoning as a cogni- tive default. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 142, 1072–1083. Kiljunen, P. (2013). Tiedebarometri 2013. Porvoo: Tieteen tiedotus Ry.
King, L. A., Burton, C. M., Hicks, J. A., & Drigotas, S. M. (2007). Ghosts, UFOs, and magic: Positive affect and the experiential system. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 92, 905–919.
Kokis, J. V., Macpherson, R., Toplak, M. E., West, R. F., & Stanovich, K. E. (2002). Heuristic and analytic processing: Age trends and associations with cognitive ability and cognitive styles. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 83, 26–52.
Levin, I. P., Gaeth, G. J., Schreiber, J., & Lauriola, M. (2002). A new look at framing effects: Distribution of effect sizes, individual differences, and independence
of types of effects. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes,
88, 411–429.
Lévy-Bruhl, L. (1935). Primitives and the supernatural (1st ed.). New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., inc.
Lindeman, M., & Aarnio, K. (2006). Paranormal beliefs: Their dimensionality and correlates. European Journal of Personality, 20, 585–602.
Lindeman, M., & Aarnio, K. (2007). Superstitious, magical, and paranormal beliefs: An integrative model. Journal of Research in Personality, 41, 731–744. Lindeman, M., Cederström, S., Simola, P., Simula, A., Ollikainen, S., & Riekki, T.
(2008). Sentences with core knowledge violations increase the size of N400 among paranormal believers. Cortex, 44, 1307–1315.
Lindeman, M., & Saher, M. (2007). Vitalism, purpose and superstition. British Jour-
nal of Psychology, 98, 33–44.
Lindeman, M., & Svedholm, A. M. (2012). What’s in a term? Paranormal, supersti- tious, magical and supernatural beliefs by any other name would mean the same. Review of General Psychology, 16, 241.
Lindeman, M., Svedholm, A. M., Takada, M., Lönnqvist, J.-E., & Verkasalo, M. (2011). Core knowledge confusions among university students. Science &
Education, 20, 439–451.
Lindeman, M., Svedholm-Häkkinen, A. M., & Lipsanen, J. (2015). Ontological con- fusions but not mentalizing abilities predict religious belief, paranormal be- lief, and belief in supernatural purpose. Cognition, 134, 63–76.
Lombrozo, T., Kelemen, D., & Zaitchik, D. (2007). Inferring design: Evidence of a preference for teleological explanations in patients with Alzheimer’s disease.
Psychological Science, 18, 999–1006.
Macpherson, R., & Stanovich, K. E. (2007). Cognitive ability, thinking dispositions, and instructional set as predictors of critical thinking. Learning and Individu-
al Differences, 17, 115–127.
Malinowski, B. (1948). Magic, science and religion, and other Essays. New York, NY: Free Press.
McCauley, R. N., & Cohen, E. (2010). Cognitive science and the naturalness of reli- gion. Philosophy Compass, 5, 779–792.
Morgan, J. (2014). Religion and dual-process cognition: a continuum of styles or distinct types? Religion, Brain & Behavior, Advance online publication. doi.org/10.1080/2153599X.2014.966315
Nemeroff, C., & Rozin, P. (2000). The makings of the magical mind: The nature and function of sympathetic magical thinking. In K. Rosengren, C. Johnson, & P. Harris (Eds.), Imagining the impossible: Magical, scientific, and religious
thinking in children, (pp. 1–34). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Newport, F. (2011). More than 9 in 10 Americans continue to believe in God. Re- trieved November 27th, 2015 from
http://www.gallup.com/poll/147887/americans-continue-believe-god.aspx Newstead, S. E., Handley, S. J., Harley, C., Wright, H., & Farrelly, D. (2004). Indi-
vidual differences in deductive reasoning. Quarterly Journal of Experimental
Norris, P., & Epstein, S. (2011). An experiential thinking style: Its facets and rela- tions with objective and subjective criterion measures. Journal of Personality,
79, 1043–1080.
Pacini, R., & Epstein, S. (1999). The relation of rational and experiential information processing styles to personality, basic beliefs, and the ratio-bias phenomenon.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76, 972–987.
Pennycook, G., Cheyne, J. A., Barr, N., Koehler, D. J., & Fugelsang, J. A. (2014). Cognitive style and religiosity: The role of conflict detection. Memory &
Cognition, 42, 1–10.
Pennycook, G., Cheyne, J. A., Koehler, D. J., & Fugelsang, J. A. (2013). Belief bias during reasoning among religious believers and skeptics. Psychonomic Bulle-
tin and Review, 20, 806–811.
Pennycook, G., Cheyne, J. A., Koehler, D. J., & Fugelsang, J. A. (2015). Is the cog- nitive reflection test a measure of both reflection and intuition? Behavior Re-
search Methods, Advance online publication. doi.org/10.3758/s13428-015-
0576-1
Pennycook, G., Cheyne, J. A., Seli, P., Koehler, D. J., & Fugelsang, J. A. (2012). Analytic cognitive style predicts religious and paranormal belief. Cognition,
123, 335–346.
Pettersson, M. (2014, August 15). Avaruustutkija ja mormoni uskoo ihmeisiin, mutta ei evoluutioon. Helsingin Sanomat. Retrieved November 27, 2015, from http://www.hs.fi/elama/a1407925584672
Petty, R. E., Briñol, P., Loersch, C., McCaslin, M. J., Leary, M. R., & Hoyle, R. H. (2009). The need for cognition. In M.R. Leary & R.H. Hoyle (Eds.), Hand-
book of individual differences in social behavior (pp. 318–329). New York:
Guilford Press.
Piaget, J. (1929). The child’s conception of the world. Savage, MD : Littlefield Ad- ams quality Paperbacks.
Pyysiäinen, I. (2004). Magic, miracles, and religion: A scientist’s perspective. Wal- nut Creek, CA: Altamira Press.
Rakison, D. H., & Poulin-Dubois, D. (2001). Developmental origin of the animate– inanimate distinction. Psychological Bulletin, 127, 209.
Riekki, T., Lindeman, M., & Raij, T. T. (2014). Supernatural believers attribute more intentions to random movement than skeptics: An fMRI study. Social Neuro-
science, 9, 400–411.
Risen, J. (2015). Believing what we do not believe: Acquiescence to superstitious beliefs and other powerful intuitions. Psychological Review, Advance online publication. doi.org/10.1037/rev0000017
Rosengren, K. S., & Hickling, A. K. (2000). Metamorphosis and magic: The devel- opment of children’s thinking about possible events and plausible mecha- nisms. In K. Rosengren, C. Johnson, & P. Harris (Eds.), Imagining the impos-
sible: Magical, scientific, and religious thinking in children, (pp. 75–98).
New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Rottman, J., & Kelemen, D. (2012). Is there such a thing as a Christian child? Evi- dence of religious beliefs in early childhood. In P. McNamara & W. Wildman
(Eds.), Science and the world’s religions: Origins and destinies (pp. 205– 238). Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger.
Sadler-Smith, E. (2011). The intuitive style: Relationships with local/global and ver- bal/visual styles, gender, and superstitious reasoning. Learning and Individu-
al Differences, 21, 263–270.
Sarason, I. G., Johnson, J. H., & Siegel, J. M. (1978). Assessing the impact of life changes: Development of the life experiences survey. Journal of Consulting
and Clinical Psychology, 46, 932–946.
Sá, W. C., West, R. F., & Stanovich, K. E. (1999). The domain specificity and gener- ality of belief bias: Searching for a generalizable critical thinking skill. Jour-
nal of Educational Psychology, 91, 497–510.
Shafir, E., & LeBoeuf, R. A. (2002). Rationality. Annual Review of Psychology, 54, 491–517.
Shenhav, A., Rand, D. G., & Greene, J. D. (2012). Divine intuition: Cognitive style influences belief in God. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 141, 423–428.
Shiloh, S., Salton, E., & Sharabi, D. (2002). Individual differences in rational and intuitive thinking styles as predictors of heuristic responses and framing ef- fects. Personality and Individual Differences, 32, 415–429.
Sloman, S. A. (1996). The empirical case for two systems of reasoning. Psychologi-
cal Bulletin, 119, 3–22.
Spelke, E. S., Breinlinger, K., Macomber, J., & Jacobson, K. (1992). Origins of knowledge. Psychological Review, 99, 605–632.
Spelke, E. S., & Kinzler, K. D. (2007). Core knowledge. Developmental Science, 10, 89–96.
Sperber, D. (1996). Explaining culture: A naturalistic approach. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Sperber, D. (1997). Intuitive and reflective beliefs. Mind & Language, 12, 67–83. Stanovich, K. E. (1999). Who is rational? Studies of individual differences in reason-
ing. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Stanovich, K. E. (2005). The robot’s rebellion: Finding meaning in the age of Dar-
win. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Stanovich, K. E. (2009). Distinguishing the reflective, algorithmic, and autonomous minds: Is it time for a tri-process theory? In J. St. B. T. Evans & K. Frankish (Eds.), In two minds: Dual processes and beyond (pp. 55–88). Oxford: Ox- ford University Press.
Stanovich, K. E. (2011). Rationality and the reflective mind. Oxford University Press.
Stanovich, K. E., & Toplak, M. E. (2012). Defining features versus incidental corre- lates of Type 1 and Type 2 processing. Mind & Society, 11, 3–13.
Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (1997). Reasoning independently of prior belief and individual differences in actively open-minded thinking. Journal of Educa-
tional Psychology, 89, 342–357.
Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (1998). Individual differences in rational thought.
Stanovich, K. E., West, R. F., & Toplak, M. E. (2011). The complexity of develop- mental predictions from dual process models. Developmental Review, 31, 103–118.
Sternberg, R. J. (2008). Why Smart People Can Be So Stupid. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Subbotsky, E. (2000). Phenomenalistic Perception and Rational Understanding in the Mind of an Individual. In K. Rosengren, C. Johnson, & P. Harris (Eds.), Im-
agining the Impossible: Magical, Scientific, and Religious Thinking in Chil- dren, (pp. 35–74). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Subbotsky, E. (2004). Magical thinking in judgments of causation: Can anomalous phenomena affect ontological causal beliefs in children and adults? British
Journal of Developmental Psychology, 22, 123–152.
Svedholm, A. M. (2013). The cognitive basis of paranormal, superstitious, magical
and supernatural beliefs : The roles of core knowledge, intuitive and reflec- tive thinking, and cognitive inhibition (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved 27th
November, 2015, from http://hdl.handle.net/10138/38201
Svedholm, A. M., & Lindeman, M. (2013a). Healing, mental energy in the physics classroom: Energy conceptions and trust in complementary and alternative medicine in grade 10–12 students. Science & Education, 22, 677–694.
Svedholm, A. M., & Lindeman, M. (2013b). The separate roles of the reflective mind and involuntary inhibitory control in gatekeeping paranormal beliefs and the underlying intuitive confusions. British Journal of Psychology, 104, 303–319.
Svedholm, A. M., Lindeman, M., & Lipsanen, J. (2010). Believing in the purpose of events - Why does it occur, and is it supernatural? Applied Cognitive Psy-
chology, 24, 252–265.
Symons, D. (1992). On the use and misuse of Darwinism in the study of human be- havior. In J. H. Barkow, L. Cosmides, & J. Tooby (Eds.), The adapted mind:
Evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture, (pp. 137-162). New
York: Oxford University Press.
Tobacyk, J. (2004). A revised paranormal belief scale. The International Journal of
Transpersonal Studies, 23, 94–98.
Tomasello, M., & Rakoczy, H. (2003). What makes human cognition unique? From individual to shared to collective intentionality. Mind & Language, 18, 121– 147.
Toplak, M. E., Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (2011). Intelligence and rationality. In R. J. Sternberg and S. B. Kaufman (Eds.), Cambridge handbook of intelli-
gence (3rd Ed.) (pp.784–826). Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press.
Toplak, M. E., West, R. F., & Stanovich, K. E. (2011). The Cognitive Reflection Test as a predictor of performance on heuristics-and-biases tasks. Memory
and Cognition, 39, 1275–1289.
Toplak, M. E., West, R. F., & Stanovich, K. E. (2013). Rational thinking and cogni- tive sophistication: Development, cognitive abilities, and thinking disposi- tions. Developmental psychology, 50, 1037–1048.
Toplak, M. E., West, R. F., & Stanovich, K. E. (2014). Assessing miserly infor- mation processing: An expansion of the Cognitive Reflection Test. Thinking
& Reasoning, 20, 147–168.
Torgler, B. (2007). Determinants of superstition. The Journal of Socio-Economics,
36, 713–733.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1973). Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability. Cognitive Psychology, 5, 207–232.
Tylor, E. B. (1871). Primitive culture: researches into the development of mythology,