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Conclusions on the tackling of displacement in the framework of the

Chapter 5- The Parameters of a Transitional Justice Approach to Addressing Israel’s

5.1 Displacement within the Framework of the Current “Peace Process”

5.1.4 Conclusions on the tackling of displacement in the framework of the

The focus of the framework followed in Camp David and the subsequent peace agreements with the PLO and Jordan has, thus far, failed to address the injustices inflicted upon the refugees who were forcibly displaced during the wars of 1948 and 1967, as well as those who were displaced through residency revocation throughout the years of the occupation. Despite the clear theoretical distinction between the 1948 refugees, the 1967 refugees (or as the framework refers to them the “displaced persons”) and those whose status had been revoked (referred to as “those who lost their ID cards”), the peace process has not given remedies to most of these victims until now.50

46

Ibid.

47 Israel and Palestine Liberation Organization, “Declaration Of Principles On Interim Self-

Government Arrangements,” Article 3(b).

48

Ibid., Annex 1(1); Israel and Palestine Liberation Organization, “Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,” Article II (3).

49 Israel and Palestine Liberation Organization, “Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West

Bank and the Gaza Strip,” Article XVII (1)(a).

50

A number of Palestinians (almost 150,000) actually returned to the OPT within the Oslo framework as part of the returning PLO officials. Nonetheless, the overwhelming majoirty of the refugees and dispalced persons has not been allowed to return yet. Tamari, Palestinian Refugees, Displaced Persons, and the Negotiating Strategy, 2.

190 In fact, as explained in Chapter 3, displacement became much more active in some of its forms after the peace process started. For example, in Jerusalem more than 13,000 Jerusalem residencies have been revoked between 1967 and 2011, 11,000 of which were actually revoked after the peace process started.51 Similarly, the laws regulating child registration and family unification in Jerusalem, and the whole policy of “freezing the population registry” came with the peace process. It was noted by several observers and analysts that Israel’s policy towards the peace process was to use it to buy time, not to actually reach peace.52 Former Israeli Member of Knesset (parliament), Minister of Education and Minister of Environment Yossi Sarid ironically commented on this pattern:

Each one loves to take but hates to give, becomes addicted to talks on condition that there won't be any results, plants the trees of life yet loathes the fruit of knowledge. This is how it goes. We set a table with the Palestinian side - Palestine first - because the Palestinian problem is "the heart of the conflict," as we all know. On the path to an agreement, we turn over every stone. This too is common knowledge.53

Also, Israeli sociologist Jessica Nevo more critically commenting on the role of the peace process wrote:

A more critical approach might argue that hidden real agenda of all peace agreements between Israel and the Palestinians, from the Oslo agreements of the 1990s to the 2003 Road Map, is to set up an apartheid system in the West Bank based on the creation of territorial Bantustans, the relocation of the Palestinian population, land confiscation and a segregated economy.54

Indeed, Nevo’s observation is accurate. The accelerated Israeli colonization of the Occupied Territory combined with further innovation in displacement methods show that Israel is using the Palestinian “self-government” as a method to concentrate the Palestinian population and colonize the rest of the land.

51 B’Tselem, “Statistics on Revocation of Residency in East Jerusalem,” B’Tselem, December 3, 2012,

http://www.btselem.org/jerusalem/revocation_statistics.

52

Yossi Sarid, “They’ve All Been Yitzhak Shamir,” Haaretz.com, November 28, 2008,

http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/opinion/they-ve-all-been-yitzhak-shamir-1.258428; Daniel Levy, “What Netanyahu Learned from Shamir (and Others Didn’t),” Foreign Policy Blogs, July 9, 2012,

http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/07/06/what_netanyahu_learned_from_shamir.

53

Sarid, “They’ve All Been Yitzhak Shamir.”

54 Jessica Nevo, “Transitional Justice and Its Application to the Zionist/ Palestinian Conflict and the

Palestinian Refugee Issue,” in Rights in Principle- Rights in Practice: Revisiting the Role of Internationa Law in Crafting Durable Solutions for Palestinian Refugees, ed. Terry Rempel (Beithlehem: Badil, 2009), 330.

191 While this was the practical implication of the process, it is important to stress that there is a serious problem even within the theoretical aspects of the peace process framework. First, it did not make any reference to many other types of victims of displacement. For example, no mention of those who were internally displaced in Israel, the West Bank or Gaza strip throughout the conflict can be found, creating a high level of frustration among the victims of these displacements.55 Secondly, even with the types of displacement that the peace process tackled (i.e. 1967 refugees and West Bank and Gaza status revocation victims), there is no mention of a comprehensive remedy program that can redress the injustice that those displaced endured for many years. The use of neutral terms like the “admission” of “displaced persons” and the “reissuance of ID cards” for those who “lost” them is consistent with Israel´s general policy of denial. Finally, in relation to the Nakba of 1948, the peace process seems to be leading to a denial of the most important remedy that has become part of the identity of the refugees: the right to return. In addition, no special representation of the refugees has been appointed to advance their cause in the negotiations, leaving their rights and interests even more vulnerable.56 Furthermore, within the peace process framework, issues like truth, accountability of the perpetrators of gross human rights violations, and reparations for the victims have not been addressed.

The Palestinians’ frustration with the “peace process” is well known and is well reported.57 It was expressed with anger by the Palestinian hip-hop band DAM in their song “Who is the terrorist” where they chant:

You have taken everything I own in my land,

55

Arafet Boujemaa and Palestinian Return Centre, Internally Displaced Palestinians: “The Present Absentees” (London: Palestinian Return Centre, 2010), 70–1.

56 Susan M. Akram, “Palestinian Refugees and Their Legal Status: Rights, Politics, and Implications

for a Just Solution,” Journal of Palestine Studies 31, no. 3 (2002): 46.

57

Oxford University organized a good documentation regarding the opinions/ feelings of

Palestinian refugees in the diaspora regarding several issues linked with their plight or the general political representation of the Palestinian people. Reading through the statements made by the refugees who participated in the study one can see how the issue of the right to return is still a steady demand. Moreover, a general frustration from the peace process, and a fear from what it could result in can be clearly sensed. See, Karma Nabulsi, Palestinians Register: Laying Foundations and Setting Directions: Report of the Civitas Project (Oxford: Nuffield College, University of Oxford, 2006), 47–9.

192 Why am I a terrorist? Because I'm not indifferent?

I'm hot-headed because I walk with my head up high Trying to defend my land? They killed my loved ones Now I'm alone, my family was dispersed

But I'll keep on crying out loud

I'm not against peace, peace is against me

It wants to eliminate me, to erase my heritage.58

DAM’s feeling that peace is against the Palestinians stems from the consequences of the peace process that creates a fear that “peace” is going to eliminate Palestinians and erase their heritage. Not only has the peace process failed to redress the victims of the past violations, but Israel has used it to accelerate displacement and create new injustices. Against this background, a reassessment of the appropriate remedies that should be combined with the transition to peace is needed. While this chapter is designed to conduct this assessment in accordance with the transitional justice framework, it is essential to explain first the general international legal framework for providing remedies