share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them. When passed, it would be readily see that such provision mandates that (1) the LGUs shall have a “just share” in the national taxes; and (2) “just share” shall be determined by law; (3) that “just share” shall be automatically released to the LGUs. PROVINCE OF
BATANGAS VS. ROMULO, 429 SCRA 736, May 27, 2004.
- The legislative is barred from withholding the release of the IRA. (ACORD vs. Zamora, June 8, 2005)
- AO No. 372 of President Ramos, Section 4 which provides that “pending the
assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation, the amount equivalent to 10% of the internal revenue allotment to local government units shall be withheld” is declared in contravention of Section 286 of the LG Code and Section 6 of Art X of the constitution (Pimentel vs. Aguirre, July 19, 2000).
- LOCAL TAXATION Constitution itself promotes the principles of local autonomy
as embodied in the Local Government Code. The State is mandated to ensure the autonomy of local governments, and local governments are empowered to levy taxes, fees and charges that accrue exclusively to them, subject to congressional guidelines and limitations. The principle of local autonomy is no mere passing dalliance but a constitutionally enshrined precept that deserves respect and appropriate enforcement by this Court. The GSIS’s tax- exempt status, in sum, was withdrawn in 1992 by the Local Government Code but restored by the Government Service Insurance System Act of 1997, the operative provision of which is Section 39. The subject real property taxes for the years 1992 to 1994 were assessed against GSIS while the Local Government Code provisions prevailed and, thus, may be collected by the City of Davao. (City of Davao vs. RTC, Br. 12, August 18, 2005). - G.R. No. 165827, National Power Corporation vs. Province of Isabela,
represented by Hon. Benjamin G. Dy, Provincial Governor, June 16, 2006)- the
NAPOCOR is not exempt from paying franchise tax. Though its charter exempted it from the tax, the enactment of the Local Government Code (LGC) has withdraw such exemption, the Court said, citing its previous ruling in National Power Corporation vs. City of
Cabanatuan.
- MCCIA vs. Marcos, September 11, 1996- The power to tax is primarily vested in
the Congress; however, in our jurisdiction, it may be exercised by local legislative bodies, no longer merely by virtue of a valid delegation as before, but pursuant to direct authority
conferred by Section 5, Article X of the Constitution. An “agency” of the Government refers to “any of the various units of the Government, including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit therein;”while an “instrumentality” refers to “any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned
and controlled corporations.” It had already become, even if it be conceded to be an
“agency” or “instrumentality” of the Government, a taxable person for such purpose in view of the withdrawal in the last paragraph of Section 234 of exemptions from the payment of real property taxes, which, as earlier adverted to, applies to MCIAA.
- PPA vs. Iloilo City, November 11, 2004- The bare fact that the port and its facilities
and appurtenances are accessible to the general public does not exempt it from the payment of real property taxes. It must be stressed that the said port facilities and appurtenances are the petitioner’s corporate patrimonial properties, not for public use, and that the operation of the port and its facilities and the administration of its buildings are in the nature of ordinary business.
- MIAA vs. CA, et al., July 20, 2006- MIAA’s Airport Lands and Buildings are
exempt from real estate tax imposed by local governments. MIAA is not a government- owned or controlled corporation but an instrumentality of the National Government and thus exempt from localh taxation. Second, the real properties of MIAA are owned by the
Republic of the Philippines and thus exempt from real estate tax. The Airport Lands and
Buildings of MIAA are property of public dominion and therefore owned by the State or
the Republic of the Philippines. The Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public
use because they are used by the public for international and domestic travel and
transportation. The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are devoted to public use and
thus are properties of public dominion. As properties of public dominion, the Airport
Lands and Buildings are outside the commerce of man. Real Property Owned by the
Republic is Not Taxable.
- When local governments invoke the power to tax on national government instrumentalities, such power is construed strictly against local governments. The rule is that a tax is never presumed and there must be clear language in the law imposing the tax.
Any doubt whether a person, article or activity is taxable is resolved against taxation.
This rule applies with greater force when local governments seek to tax national government instrumentalities.
- Another rule is that a tax exemption is strictly construed against the taxpayer claiming the exemption. However, when Congress grants an exemption to a national
government instrumentality from local taxation, such exemption is construed liberally in favor of the national government instrumentality.
- PRESIDENT’S SUPERVISION- National Liga vs. Paredes, September 27,
2004- Like the local government units, the Liga ng mga Barangay is not subject to control
by the Chief Executive or his alter ego.
- The President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a local government unit if he or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to law. This is the scope of the President’s supervisory powers over local government units. Hence, the President or any of
his or her alter egos cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned local government unit acts within the parameters of the law and the Constitution. Any directive therefore by the President or any of his or her alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-conforming judgment on local affairs of a local government unit is a patent nullity because it violates the principle of local autonomy and separation of powers of the executive and legislative departments in governing municipal corporations. (Dadole vs. COA, December 3, 2002).
- Leynes vs. COA, 418 SCRA 180- By upholding the power of LGUs to grant
allowances to judges and leaving to their discretion the amount of allowances they may want to grant, depending on the availability of local funds, the genuine and meaningful local autonomy is ensured.
- Batangas CATV Inc. vs. CA, 439 SCRA 326- In the absence of constitutional or
legislative authorization, municipalities have no power to grant franchises.
ARTICLE XI
(ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS)
- IMPEACHMENT- Estrada vs. Desierto, April 3, 2001Section 3(7) of Article XI
provides for the limit and the consequence of an impeachment judgment. Conviction in the
impeachment proceeding is not required before the public officer subject of impeachment may be prosecuted, tried and punished for criminal offenses committed.
- READ: Francisco, et al. vs. House of Representatives, November 10, 2003-
definition of “TO INITIATE IMPEACHMENT”- proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice.
- Gutierrez vs. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, GR No.
193459, February 15, 2011- The proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified
complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.
- A vote of 1/3 of all the members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a
favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee or override its contrary resolution, De Castro vs. Committee on Justice, Batasan Pambansa, September 3, 1995.
- Resignation by an impeachable official does not place him beyond the reach of
impeachment proceedings; he can still be impeached.
- Salumbides vs. Ombudsman, GR No. 180917, April 23, 2010- The doctrine of
condonation cannot be extended to reappointed coterminous employees like petitioners as in their case, there is neither subversion of the sovereign will nor disenfranchisement of the electorate. The unwarranted expansion of the Pascual doctrine would set a dangerous precedent as it would, as respondents posit, provide civil servants, particularly local government, with blanket immunity from administrative liability that would spawn and breed abuse of bureaucracy.
- The 1987 Constitution, the deliberations thereon, and the opinions of constitutional
law experts all indicate that the Deputy Ombudsman is not an impeachable officer.
(Office of the Ombudsman vs. Court of Appeals and former Deputy Ombudsman Arturo C. Mojica, March 4, 2005).
- Marquez vs. Desierto, June 27, 2001- there must be a pending case before a court
of competent jurisdiction before inspection of bank accounts by Ombudsman may be allowed.
- OMB’S POWER TO PROSECUTE, Uy vs. Sandiganbayan, March 20, 2001- The
power to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. The law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts.
- Gonzales III vs. Office of the President, GR No. 196231, September 4, 2012
January 28, 2014- Sec. 8(2) of RA 6770 providing that the President may remove a
deputy ombudsman is unconstitutional because it would violate the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. It is the Ombudsman who exercises administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over her deputies.
- Sulit vs. Ochoa, GR No. 196232, January 28, 2014- By clear constitutional
design, the Tanodbayan or the Office of the Special Prosecutor is separate from the Office of the Ombudsman. The inclusion of the Office of the Special Prosecutor with the Office of the Ombudsman does not ipso facto mean that it must be afforded the same levels of constitutional independence as that of the Ombudsman and the Deputy Ombudsman.
- Ombudsman vs. Valera, September 30, 2005- The Court has consistently held that
the Office of the Special Prosecutor is merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman. xxx However, with respect to the grant of the power to preventively suspend, Section 24 of R.A. No 6770 makes no mention of the Special Prosecutor. The obvious
import of this exclusion is to withhold from the Special Prosecutor the power to preventively suspend.
- Honasan II vs. Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of DOJ, April 13, 2004- The
power of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or employees is not exclusive but is concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the government such as the provincial, city and state prosecutors. DOJ Panel is not
precluded from conducting any investigation of cases against public officers involving violations of penal laws but if the cases fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, then respondent Ombudsman may, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction take over at any stage.
- Pichay vs. IAD-ODESLA- Contrary to petitioner's contention, the IAD-ODESLA did
not encroach upon the Ombudsman's primary jurisdiction when it took cognizance of the complaint affidavit filed against him notwithstanding the earlier filing of criminal and administrative cases involving the same charges and allegations before the Office of the Ombudsman. The primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute
cases refers to criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and not to administrative cases. It is only in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction that the
Ombudsman may, at any time, take over the investigation being conducted by another investigatory agency. xxx While the Ombudsman's function goes into the determination of
the existence of probable cause and the adjudication of the merits of a criminal accusation, the investigative authority of the IAD- ODESLA is limited to that of a fact-finding investigator whose determinations and recommendations remain so until acted upon by the President. As such, it commits no usurpation of the Ombudsman's constitutional duties.
- Ledesma vs. CA, July 29, 2005 - Ombudsman has the authority to determine
the administrative liability of a public official or employee at fault, and direct and com the head of the office or agency concerned to implement the penalty imposed. In other
words, it merely concerns the procedural aspect of the Ombudsman’s functions and not its
jurisdiction.
- Office of the Ombudsman vs. CA, et al.,GR No. 160675, June 16, 2006- the
Court similarly upholds the Office of the Ombudsman’s power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at fault, in the exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority. The exercise of such power is well founded in the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770. xxx The legislative history of Republic Act No. 6770 thus bears out the conclusion that the
Office of the Ombudsman was intended to possess full administrative disciplinary authority, including the power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at fault. The lawmakers envisioned the Office of the Ombudsman to be “an activist
watchman,” not merely a passive one.
- Facura vs. CA, et al., GR No. 166495, February 16, 2011- Appeals from the
decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases do not stay the execution of the penalty imposed.
- CONDONATION:
- Olais vs. Almirante, GR No. 181195, June 10, 2013- where the respondent is
absolved of the charge or in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, or suspension for the period not more than one month or a fie equivalent to one month’s salary, the Ombudsman Decision shall be final, executor and unappelable, subject to judicial review.
- Ombudsman vs. CA, G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015- Rule 65 petitions
for certiorari against unappelable issuances of the Ombudsman should be filed before the CA, and not directly before the Supreme Court. In Office of the Ombudsman v. Capulong
(March 12, 2014), wherein a preventive suspension order issued by the Office of the
Ombudsman was - similar to this case - assailed through a Rule 65 petition for certiorari filed by the public officer before the CA, the Court held that "[t]here being a finding of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman, it was certainly imperative for the CA to grant incidental reliefs, as sanctioned by Section 1 of Rule 65."
- The concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of accountability to the people at all times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an elective local official's administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second term of office, or even another elective post. Election is not a mode of
condoning an administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a different term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense done
during a prior term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising from administrative offenses may
be condoned bv the President in light of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which was interpreted in Llamas v. Orbos to apply to administrative offenses.
- Ombudsman vs. CA, et al., GR No. 1772224, January 26, 2011- The decision of
the Ombudsman in administrative cases may be executed pending appeal. This is pursuant to the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman which explicitly states that an appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. Also, the power of the
Ombudsman to implement the penalty is not merely recommendatory but mandatory.
- Masing, et al. vs. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 165584, January 22, 2008
– Supreme Court reiterated this ruling in Office of the Ombudsman v. Laja, where we
emphasized that “the Ombudsman’s order to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee is not merely advisory or recommendatory but is actually
mandatory.” Implementation of the order imposing the penalty is, however, to be coursed
through the proper officer.
- Section 23(1) of the same law provides that administrative investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman shall be in accordance with its rules of procedure and consistent with due process. It is erroneous, therefore, for respondents to contend that R.A. No. 4670 confers an exclusive disciplinary authority on the DECS over public school teachers and prescribes an exclusive procedure in administrative investigations involving them. R.A. No. 4670 was approved on June 18, 1966. On the other hand, the 1987 Constitution was ratified by the people in a plebiscite in 1987 while R.A. No. 6770 was enacted on November 17, 1989. It is basic that the 1987 Constitution should not be restricted in its meaning by a law of earlier enactment. The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 were quite explicit in conferring authority on the Ombudsman to act on complaints against all public officials and employees, with the exception of officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over members of Congress and the Judiciary.
- QUIMPO vs. TANODBAYAN- It is not material that a GOCC is originally
created by charter or not. What is decisive is that it has been acquired by the government to perform functions related to government programs and policies.
- JURISDICTION OVER GOCC- Macalino vs. Sandiganbayan, 376 SCRA 452-
Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution and Section 15 of RA 6770 granted the Ombudsman the power to direct any officer or employee of government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters to perform any act or duty required by law
or to stop any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties.
- PRESCRIPTION- Presidential Ad-hoc Fact-finding Committee on Behest Loans
vs. Desierto , 317 SCRA 272- Section 15 of Article XI applies only to civil actions for
recovery of ill-gotten wealth and not to criminal cases.
ARTICLE XII
(NATIONAL ECONOMY & PATRIMONY)
0
- ANCESTRAL DOMAIN- Alcantara vs. DENR, GR No. 161881, July 31, 2008- It
must be emphasized that FLGLA No. 542 is a mere license or privilege granted by the State to petitioner for the use or exploitation of natural resources and public lands over which the State has
sovereign ownership under the Regalian Doctrine. Like timber or mining licenses, a forest land grazing lease agreement is a mere permit which, by executive action, can be revoked, rescinded, cancelled, amended or modified, whenever public welfare or public interest so requires. The determination of what is in the public interest is necessarily vested in the State as owner of the country's natural resources. Thus, a privilege or license is not in the nature of a contract that enjoys protection under the due process and non-impairment clauses of the Constitution. In cases in which the license or privilege is in conflict with the people's welfare, the license or privilege must yield to the supremacy of the latter, as well as to the police power of the State. Such a privilege or license
is not even a property or property right, nor does it create a vested right; as such, no