Extrapolating from the classical mode! of conditioned-response theory, in which emphasis was placed on brain mechanisms, several writers have suggested that hypnosis is a "generalized conditioning."
Theories based on this concept picture the stimulus words of trance induction as a conditioned stimulus, while the response of the subject is the same as if the phenomena represented by the words were also presented- This was the central idea of Hull's theory of hypersug-gestibility (1933) as well as Welch's abstract conditioning. The concept
of abstract conditioning was experimentally approached by Corn-Becker, Welch, and Fisischelli (1959), who felt that everyone while
growing up repeatedly experienced that a person who said he was a dentist fixed teeth, that a person who said he was a mechanic was able
to repair cars, and so on. As a result of these " p r o v e n " facts of experience the subject comes to the hypnotic situation with an already
reinforced idea that what was said by an authority was usually proven to be correct by subsequent experience. He thus had a preconceived set to respond to the hypnotic state by producing the phenomena suggested, This theoretical approach has been experimentally criti-cized by Gladfelter and Hall (1962), whose findings did not support the concept of "abstract conditioning," Edmondston (1967) feels that a stimulus response offers the most parsimonious understanding of hyp-notic behavior.
There is indeed much similarity between some hypnotic phenom-ena and conditioned reflexes. Without knowing if a response had been implanted by hypnosis or by classical conditioning, it might be impos-sible to determine by observation which technique had in fact been utilized. A strongly accepted posthypnotic suggestion behaves in a manner almost identical to a conditioned response.
Alexander (1968) has succinctly outlined the major similarities:
The compelling nature of an effective posthypnotic suggestion which becomes fully incorporated in the mental life of the patient, who accepts it as an idea of his own rather than something he learned from the therapist, is inexplicable by traditional psychodynamic concepts. It is characterized by what is best de-scribed as a compulsive triad, namely: compelling powers of the suggested idea, amnesia of the source of the idea, and confabu-latory rationalization of the amnesia if challenged.
Weitzenhoffer (1972) has related the behavior modification tech-nique of Wolpe to the earlier "reconditioning" described by Wolberg (1948). It is perhaps not surprising that the realization that is part of the paradigm of Wolpe's (1961) technique of reciprocal inhibition is quite similar to a hypnotic induction, injecting a hypnoticlike trance into the very core of behavior modification techniques. In the technique of reciprocal inhibition, Wolpe relaxes the subject, then presents
gradu-ally increasing stress images (as a situation the patient fears) until the anxiety response is diminished.
The growing body of knowledge of biofeedback and autonomic conditioning is concerned with producing physiological changes similar to those than can be elicited in some good hypnotic subjects.
Suggestion
Similar to the conditioned-response theories are those of suggest-ibility. These may be considered in terms of (I) directed, goal-oriented striving, and (2) role-playing. T h e s e variations differ only in the degree of conscious of unconscious
motivation-White (1941) made the first distinct statement of the position that goal-oriented striving occurs at a more unconscious level than "role playing," thereby utilizing more of the unconscious abilities of the hypnotic subject. Sarbin and Coe (1972) have greatly expanded the suggestion and role-taking view of hypnosis. Weitzenhoffer, who speaks of a three-factor theory that emphasizes variables that facilitate hyper-suggestibility (1953), also has spoken to the question of the hypnotist's ability to recognize when the subject is in a ''trance s t a t e " (1964);
I have been particularly struck by the fact that while responsive-ness to suggestions is more often than not a good indicator of the presence of hypnosis, experienced hypnotists, among which I include myself, frequently conclude a person is hypnotized in spite of poor response to suggestions or no response at all, and
con-versely, we often decide that an individual giving definite, even good, response to suggestions is not hypnotized, or only very lightly so. There seems to be some sort of intuitive clinical
judg-ment going on which appears to be amazingly correct much of the time.
Weitzenhoffer further points out that from the observer's point of view the subject loses spontaneity and develops ''trance s t a r e " and that the subject may verbally report a lack of intrarelatedness or
intraconsistency in the events that are occurring in hypnosis. He also suggests that the "artificial somnambulism" of the older hypnosis literature may be rare in today's reports, making comparisons difficult
Other variations in the reports of the current and past literature concerning hypnosis should be noted. The older hypnotherapists prob-ably took much longer to induce trance, and there may have been subtle
psychological effects from some of the induction procedures, such as
" p a s s e s " of the hands, which are not used today- Zikmund (1964) has observed that subjects entering hypnosis lack the undulatory eyeball
movements characteristic of falling asleep.
In his usual lucid style, Orne (1971) has reviewed the problems of the simulation of hypnosis:
. . . though it has been shown that subjects are able to simulate successfully and can deceive highly trained hypnotists, this
ob-servation does not challenge the reality of subjects' experiences nor does it question the genuineness of hypnosis. Furthermore, in most contexts, simulation does not occur spontaneously and ought not to preoccupy either the therapist or the investigator . . . it [simulation of hypnosis] indicates only that observations made in the usual clinical contexts do not hold when subjects are motivated to deceive.
Evans and Orne (1971) showed that simulating subjects behaved very differently from hypnotized subjects when they felt that the experimental task was interrupted by a supposed power failure that interfered with a tape-recorded hypnotic session. When the experi-menter left the room after the 'power f a i l u r e / ' simulating subjects almost immediately ceased faking, while hypnotized subjects in the same group only slowly and with difficulty terminated hypnosis by themselves. Sheehan (I971) too has discussed differences between hypnotized and simulating subjects. Orne (1959) has found that " r e a l "
and " f a k e " hypnotic subjects differed mainly in the higher tolerance of the " r e a l " subjects for logical inconsistencies. He concluded that " i n the absence of objective indices of hypnosis the existence of trance may be considered a clinical diagnosis."