Congo from 1960 to 1996

Congo gained independence from Belgium in 1960. Congolese Paul-Albert Emoungu, who researched educational issues in Howard University in USA, has concluded that on the surface, it looked like the newly independent Congo had what it takes to become a prospering country in Africa. The country’s economy was thought to be among the most industrialized and progressive ones in the sub-Saharan region. Also the education system was seen to be on the right tracks with good literacy rates, although only twenty Congolese citizens had graduated from the Congolese universities under the Belgian rule (Emoungu 1987, 287). Congo had, and still has, abundant natural resources, rich in minerals such as cobalt, copper, tin, zinc, diamonds, gold, iron, ore, uranium and silver (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002, 28). The abundant riches and the potential in the ground never really benefited the Congolese population at large though, as Congolese political scientist Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja has pointed out. Nzongola- Ntalaja has written extensively on Congo over the decades, and is an expert of administration, conflicts, and public sector capability problems. In the Congolese context those problems are underlined in Nzongola-Ntalaja’s book The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: A People’s History. The natural wealth ended up to the hands of the political leaders and their economic compatriots (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002, 2). Thanks to its’ vast size and the natural resources, Congo has drawn outside forces to take part in deciding who is at the wheel of the political and economic power. These willing participants have included not only the neighboring countries and the cold war protagonists, but also characters like Che Guevara. The turbulent early years after the independence led to crises after another. Nzongola-Ntalaja has noted how the situation in the newly independent African giant was made worse by the cold war

countries desire to intervene in the matters of Congo. The first elected prime-minister, Patrice Lumumba, was assassinated in 1961 with the blessing and help from Belgian and US officials, who saw Lumumba being too close with the Soviet side in the cold war. After a few years of chaotic internal politics and secession movements in the east, the chief of staff of the Congolese army, Mobutu Sese Seko, organized a coup and became the leader of the country. Nzongola-Ntalaja has emphasized that Mobutu’s promise to fight the socialist threat, which guaranteed him the backing from the western countries, was essential for his long and disastrous cling to power (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002, 141, 270- 273). During the cold war era, the threat that the other side posed often overrode concerns for good governing and human rights. Mobutu undoubtedly knew that and used it to his own advantage. In today’s political climate, where media and various watchdogs are on the alert looking for misuse and scandals, backing a leader like Mobutu with billions of dollars would not be easy I reckon.

Anthropologist Janet MacGaffey, who has researched anthropology of economics, has brought up how Mobutu was not ashamed of stealing the country’s wealth to his own benefits. On the contrary, he even declared publicly that all what can be bought, will be bought in Congo. Hence, according to Mobutu’s reasoning, to acquire a position of power made it a genuine barter tool that could be used in efforts to garner wealth and to escape responsibilities (MacGaffey 1991, 33). That Mobutu managed to do exceptionally well according to Emoungu. In 1966, an estimated 60 percent of the state budget was stolen by Mobutu’s new elite (Emoungu 1987, 291). Another testimony of the width of Mobutu’s kleptocracy was that in the early 1990s his personal assets were estimated to be around five billion dollars, roughly the same size as Zaire’s international debt at the time. All this while the GNP per person was among the lowest around, reaching only 130 dollars annually (Berkeley 2001, 111,

Emoungu 1987, 288). Congo, equaling Western Europe in area, and rich in both population and natural resources, had a budget of mere 300 million dollars in 1996 (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002, 158). Even from that sum most likely a lot vanished into the corruption in the state-system. In a way Mobutu symbolized what is wrong with African politics, embezzling the national wealth, and devising a one-party rule, none of which was totally unheard of in Africa or elsewhere, but the extent of the sickness in Congo seemed to be unfathomable.

The excess and the duration of Mobutu’s plunder was disastrous for the nation as a whole. It was not just the money that vanished into the pockets of the ruling elite. It also had an effect on all the people in the country. According to Nzongola-Ntalaja (2002, 152), the long-running theft of the state’s assets and

the corruption found its most devastating effects for the Congolese citizens in the diminishing national economy, disintegrating social relations, and in the near total eradication of the state. In the 1970s, it had become apparent that Mobutu’s style of rule, where different factions were pushed against each other, was on the brink of collapse according to historian Timothy Raeymaekers. Mobutu’s answer to the economic and social disruptions was a program to nationalize the economy, which resulted in investors leaving the country. The state’s already weak measures to provide social services for its citizens deteriorated to the level of being close to non-existent (Raeymaekers 2009, 61). The

nationalized state companies and their resources found their way into the hands of Mobutu’s extended family, accomplishes, and patrons in the privatization program. Mobutu’s power was so great that he could do almost anything he wished (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002, 141).

Sooner or later, the flow of money and the silence from the critics in a dysfunctional system must come to an end, and for Mobutu events took a turn for the worse starting from the late 1970s. Anthropologist Benjamin Rubbers has shown how towards the end of the decade, the economy of Zaire cave in as a result of falling copper share prices, lackluster performance of the nationalization program, and wrong decisions on economic policies. IMF’s (International Monetary Fund) adjusting measures in the early 1980s made the situation even worse. During the period from 1980 to 1985, the number of people working in public offices halved, and the salaries of those remaining in their positions kept falling (Rubbers 2004, 319-320). For a long time, the state had been there, without providing anything for the citizens. Congolese must have gotten used to it to the extent that they learned how to cope without the state, or in some cases more likely, despite the state. Even though self-reliance was the customary reality for most of the Congolese, everything and everyone has a breaking point, and that goes for Congolese people, politics, and economics as well. After decades of corrupt administration and

diminishing economy, Congo, and its’ people arrived to the 90s in a bad state. One of the victims of the post-independence development was the educational system.