2.5 Disciplinary and Curricula Knowledge 70
2.5.3 Knowledge Typologies 72
2.5.3.3 Consensus Typologies 74
Jones (2011) argues that the typologies (discussed below) that have received the most attention from researchers are those of Hagstrom (1964), Hargens (1975), Zuckerman and Merton (1972), Lodahl and Gordon (1972), Biglan (1973a) and Becher (1989).
Hagstrom’s (1964) classified knowledge on the basis of consensus among scholars of each other’s contributions. Scholarly anomie or lack of solidarity was the main reason for lack of consensus. Hargens (1975) extended Hagstrom (1964) study of a single discipline to a systematic comparison of disciplines. In a parallel to Durkheim’s notions of solidarity, Hagstrom (1964) postulated that there are two dimensions of social integration: normative and functional integration. Normative integration defined as the degree to which members of a discipline agree on norms, values and beliefs essential to research in their subject (Hargens, 1975). Functional integration is defined as the harmonising of information and behaviour related to specialised contributions of a discipline’s constituent units, for example, if there is professional communication among a discipline’s members and if they are aware of each other’s work (Hargens, 1975).
Zuckerman and Merton’s (1972) disciplinary approach classified disciplines on the basis of disciplinary codification. By codification they mean the “the consolidation of empirical knowledge into succinct and interdependent theoretical formulations” (Zuckerman and Merton, 1972: 303) about which there is consensus. Lodahl and Gordon (1972) extended Kuhn’s (1970) paradigm development concept to show the level of consensus by comparing disciplines. Consensus denotes certain theories
and findings that have been proven and accepted and can be used as the basis for future investigations (Lodahl and Gordon, 1972).
Biglan’s (1973a) typologies of hard versus soft, pure versus applied and life versus non-life disciplines have been widely applied to distinguish between disciplines. This typology is based on a concern with similarities and differences in different fields (Alise, 2008) and particularly with faculty members’ perceptions of the subject matter in different disciplines in their fields (Biglan, 1973a). The dimensions on the typology involve the degree to which a shared paradigm exists in the field, the degree of concern with application of disciplinary knowledge and whether or not the discipline is concerned with life systems (subject matter makes reference to any type of living thing) (Alise, 2008). Biglan (1973a) proposed the following disciplinary typology to distinguish disciplines in higher education institutions (see Table 2.8):
Hard Soft
Life Non-life Life Non-Life
Pure Biology Biochemistry Mathematics Physics Sociology Psychology Literature Linguistics Applied Agriculture Medicine Civil Engineering Computer Science Education Nursing Accounting Law Goel (2010)
Table 2.8 Biglan's (1973a) typology
Disciplines are distinguished on the basis of the Kuhnian notion of paradigm as to whether they have “consensus or sharing of beliefs within a scientific field about theory, methodology, techniques and problems” (Lodahl and Gordon, 1972: 58). The paradigm determines whether the discipline is hard or soft while applied or pure refers to the extent of concern with practical application of the discipline. High paradigmacity leads to increasing specialisation, higher functional differentiation, interdependence and cooperation while low paradigmicity results in low differentiation, interdependence and social connectedness (Muller, 2008). Hard disciplines have a high degree of paradigmatic consensus while soft disciplines have more nebulous paradigms and pure has little concern for practical application (Alise, 2008). The focus areas for disciplines are as follows: hard-pure focuses on mastery of the physical environment; hard-applied on problem-solving and knowledge
application for the creation of products; soft-pure on creative and intellectual pursuits and soft-applied on personal growth, reflective practice and lifelong learning, and on professional practice enhancement (Goel, 2010).
Becher’s typology distinguishes between “the social aspect of knowledge communities and the epistemological properties of knowledge forms” (Becher, 1989: 1). He questions whether Kuhnian analysis of differences in degree of consensus is not as a result of historic or social circumstance and, therefore, little to do with the nature of the discipline. He proposes ascribing a tribe (academic culture) to each territory (disciplinary knowledge) discipline with each tribe having its own cultural and cognitive style. A territory is the cognitive perspective while a tribe is the social perspective. The relationships between tribes and territories are emphasised because “in practice, academic cultures and disciplinary epistemology are inseparably interwined” (Becher and Trowler, 2001: 23). The different cultural and cognitive styles of the tribes essentially look at the ways in which academics in the different tribes behave and their attitudes to their disciplines. Each tribe has a stake in defending its territory (disciplinary boundaries) to the detriment of intellectual cohesiveness (Becher and Trowler, 2001).
Becher (1989) finds Biglan’s hard, soft, pure and applied categories useful as he argues they are more subtle distinctions of the cognitive dimension. Hard disciplines have higher social connectedness, teaching collaboration and thus are more likely to spend less time on lesson preparation and teaching than soft disciplines (Muller, 2008). Hard disciplines spend more time on research with postgraduates while soft disciplines supervise more outside their own specific areas and research and publish less as a result (Muller, 2008).
Becher adds a social context in his typology of knowledge to the four sets of properties in the cognitive dimension (Alise, 2008). To categorise this dimension he proposes a spectrum between convergent (tightly knit disciplines with clarity on mutual cohesion and identity) and divergent (loosely knit disciplines) and urban (narrow study area) and rural (broader study area) (Becher, 1989). Becher does raise two caveats about his typology. Firstly, that forms of knowledge will change with the passing of time (Becher, 1989). Secondly, the boundaries between hard and soft, pure and applied cannot be applied precisely as there are differences within one so-called homogenous discipline (Becher, 1989).
Tables 2.9 and 2.10 illustrate some of the main aspects of Becher’s (1989) typology:
Hard pure Pure
Science Hard applied Technologies
Soft pure Humanities and Pure social sciences Soft applied Applied social sciences Competitive, gregarious, politically well- organised, task oriented, high publication rate Entrepreneurial, cosmopolitan, role oriented, patents rather than publications, contract work Individualistic, loosely organised, person oriented, low publication rate,
funding less important
Status anxiety, prey
to intellectual fashions, power oriented, low publication rate, vulnerable to funding pressures Muller (2009: 211)
Table 2.9 Cultural style of tribes
Hard pure Hard applied Soft pure Soft applied e.g Physics e.g. Mechanical
Engineering
e.g. History e.g. Education
Cumulative, iterative; Atomistic; Concern with universals; Impersonal; Value-free; Consensus over significant questions Purposive; Pragmatic;
Know-how via hard knowledge; Mastery of physical environment; Uses both qualitative and quantitative approaches Reiterative; Holistic; Concern with particulars; Personal; Value-laden; Lack of consensus over significant questions Functional; Utilitarian; Concern with enhancement of semi-professional practice;
Uses case studies
Becher and Trowler (2001)
Table 2.10 Cognitive style of tribes
Underpinning the above typologies is the notion that all fields have paradigmatic development based on their consensus level (Jones, 2011). This is in keeping with a
Kuhnian (1970) notion that the most powerful stimulus for the development of highly specialised discipline is commitment to a paradigm and that the paradigm determines the discipline. Sayer (1992: 73) takes issue with Kuhnian notions of paradigms and argues that they do not take into account redundancy and tensions that are unresolved between theories nor do they address issues of overlap between theories, the implication being that theories are:
… all tightly welded together by relation of logical entailment into a monolithic block. It then appears that there can be no shades of difference of meaning, only either total conformity (within paradigms) or total incompatibility (between paradigms).
Biglan (1973a) and Becher’s (1989) typologies also operate from a paradigmatic basis but look at variations between disciplines not within a discipline, their thinking is that the discipline determines the paradigm which is static (Alise, 2008). The classification approaches centre on the role of academic and on what they do. They speak to academic perceptions, practices and experience, attitudes and behaviours. Alise (2008) argues that Biglan’s classification system is more cognitively based as its concern is with the structure and production of knowledge. However, Biglan’s (1973a) typology has a focus on faculty’s perception of their own work and that of their colleagues (Alise, 2008) and not on how the intrinsic principles of knowledge develops and builds.