Debates about the meaning of “naturalism” are, I think, important, especially given the prevalence of the term. Not everyone agrees with this. David Papineau, for instance, thinks that the meaning of “naturalism” is “essentially a terminological matter” (1993: 1). For him, “the important question is which positions are right, not what to call them,” and the proper course, given the nebulous meaning of the term “naturalism” is to “address the substantial philosophical issues first, and worry about terminol- ogy afterward. Once we have worked out which commitments ought to be upheld by philosophers who aspire to ‘naturalism’, then we can agree to use the term accordingly” (ibid.)
However, it seems clear to me that “naturalism” has become somewhat of an honorific label and I think that this result is detrimental. For we do ourselves and others a disservice if we fly the banner of
naturalism while not quite understanding the commitments involved. At the very least, we often unwit- tingly equivocate while discussing naturalism, what follows from adopting naturalistic views, and whether and how different positions that are often labeled as naturalistic hang together. To me, the work to be done in getting clearer on a definition of naturalism, or at least what is minimally required for naturalism, is part and parcel of work on the “substantial philosophical issues;” minimally, a more precise vocabulary facilitates fruitful discussion. We should do everything in our power to deflate no- tions that have become puffed-up, partisan indicators. Much recent work has gone into refining the definition of “physicalism,” and as a consequence, I think, the whole area of debate has been improved. I do not think this work indicates that getting clear on physicalism is “essentially a terminological mat- ter,” apart from some other investigation into the veracity of our beliefs.
In section III, I aimed to demonstrate that ontology could be settled by appeal to the very same theoretical desiderata that are routinely employed to adjudicate between competing scientific theories. This methodological admonition to set “philosophical” concerns on the same level as scientific ones— qua the fundamental naturalistic impulse—is much more that a stipulative terminological matter. Far from showing merely that only those who cleave to the fundamental naturalistic impulse should be called naturalists, I have also shown that acceptance of a methodology fixes some substantive beliefs. Here, a question about what naturalism is—a supposedly terminological matter—has revealed the con- nection between methodological commitments and other beliefs, in this case ontological beliefs. Thus, getting clearer on the central features of naturalism, we have gained some insight about which views ought to be upheld: those who espouse philosophical continuity with the empirical sciences ought to deny the existence of super-natural entities and they ought to do so for purely methodological reasons.
Section IV gained a similar result. Methodological considerations are also able to fix further beliefs about semantic reduction. A look at Railton’s use of reforming definitions (IV (a)) showed that questions about the reduction of moral property terms to complexes of natural properties would have to be set-
tled in the much the same way as terms are reduced in scientific practice. For instance, reduction of “water” to “H2O” grew out of an accumulated background molecular theory, replete with laws of pro-
portional combination of elements, and became justified by a dramatic enlargement of our understand- ing of the properties of water when considered as a chemical combination. Macro properties of water, such as surface tension and conductivity, became explicable in light of its micro-chemical composition. We found the case of reduction of moral property terms like “right” to be of a different sort. In this case we are not presented with an entrenched background theory, nor has treatment of moral properties as natural properties lead to a greater understanding of morality in the same way as treating water as H2O
did. Naturalists committed to the fundamental naturalistic impulse, should therefore be cautious about acceptance of broad semantic doctrines concerning the reducibility of moral property terms to com- plexes of natural properties, for in this case it appears as if Railton and those who follow him have elected to make the semantic decision by some criteria quite apart from the ordinary goings-on of scien- tific practice. For in the “water” to “H2O” case, much more was needed than reforming definitions, a
coherence with well supported molecular theory and a continued demonstration the benefits of chemi- cal composition were both important in vindicating a change in vocabulary. With Railton’s proposal, it seems that these desiderata have not been satisfied. Again, far from a mere stipulative suggestion about the meaning of “naturalism,” I have tried to show how far methodology reaches. Something as austere as the fundamental naturalistic impulse can go a long way in fixing our sundry beliefs—as we have already seen with respect to ontology and Railton’s semantic reduction of moral terms.
Finally, in section IV (b), I wanted to take a look at another kind of semantic reduction popularized by the Canberra Plan of analyzing moral property terms. Here, conceptual analysis of folk theories of morality was supposed to show that moral property terms like “right” are analytically reducible to what ever other terms play the same functional role. The Canberra Plan analysis urges that there is a prior investigation at the conceptual level to be carried out before having a look at our best going theory to
see if there in fact is such a thing that plays the rightness role. Conceptual analysis, so it is claimed, is necessary in order to set the agenda for scientific research to ensure that we are seeking a person and not a handbill. I have suggested that conceptual analysis is not crucial to scientific practice. When, for instance, “water” was identified with “H2O” what was crucial was that chemists were able to demon-
strate that they had not changed the subject and that our talk of water could be appropriated by all our talk of H2O. This appropriation is justified, again, by general scientific considerations—that it coheres
nicely within a working background theory and that it fosters greater explanatory power—not because of anything about some folk notion of water. This reading of the Canberra Plan deflates the claim about the special status of conceptual analysis; this reading of the Canberra Plan follows directly from the fun- damental naturalistic impulse. Again, methodology fixes further beliefs about conceptual analysis.
I have not merely stipulated that naturalism means first and foremost a commitment to the fun- damental naturalistic impulse. Instead, this commitment is part of the history of the term; it comes, so to speak, preinstalled. To understand a term, I think, is to understand the history of its usage. Quine gave powerful expression to the idea that all areas of philosophy are amenable to empirical adjudica- tion, even those areas, like logic and metaphysics, that seem to be extra-empirical if anything is. Quine suggests that nothing really is. This is the simple but radical starting point of naturalistic philosophy in America, and I cannot understand any usage of term “naturalism” that would dispense with its roots in the fundamental naturalistic impulse. What this means is that recent usage of the term that has focused on only the “substantive” naturalistic positions—physicalism or semantic reduction—has found history obsolete. “Naturalism” originally and primary indicates a method of doing philosophy. It is cavalier to use “naturalism” indicate positions that might be gained in any old way, by divination or coin-flips. Again, this is not mere stipulation. To say that naturalism is indicative of a method of doing philosophy is to pay due homage to the way in which attempts to naturalize various domains of philosophy, like epistemology or metaphysics, was first a revolution of method, not of substance. However, this does
not mean that substantive positions do not follow from methodological considerations coupled with a going world theory—as the foregoing sections have shown.