Consequences of Dual-Processing

2.4.1Heuristic vs analytic processing

Seminal works of Tversky and Kahneman (1973, 1983), Kahneman and Tversky (1984) and Kahneman (2011) provide a detailed insight into people’s heuristic decision making and judgment. These authors claim that Type 2 processing is rarely activated due to human laziness. Therefore, if a satisfactory answer cannot be found quickly through Type 2 processing, the human mind tries to answer those questions by substituting them with related, easier questions that can be answered through Type 1 processing. Kahneman (2011) calls this procedure heuristics and argues that it helps find adequate, however often imperfect, answers to difficult questions. Put simply, Type 1 processing is believed to quickly propose intuitive answers to questions as they arise (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002).

In human reasoning, both types of processing can be concurrently active and to provide a more accurate answer to a question, analytic Type 2 processing needs to endorse heuristic Type 1 processing. Type 2 processing has the opportunity to reject the intuitive answer evoked by Type 1 processing or to modify it by including other information. However, Type 2 processing often supports intuitive answers, without much examination of whether they are appropriate or not (Kahneman, 2011). Similarly, J. Evans (2006) concludes that heuristic responses lead to biases and they can control behaviour directly unless analytic reasoning interrupts and improves them. Heuristics can be perceived as providing default responses that may or may not be constrained and reformed by analytic reasoning. Therefore, Type 1 processing can produce responses that are non-optimal in a particular context, unless they are overridden by Type 2 processing.

Kahneman (2011) further claims that while Type 1 reasoning derives conclusions about individual cases from properties of categories, it is only Type 2 processing that is capable of statistical analysis. De Neys (2006) adds that human beings are prone to various errors in logical reasoning and judgements. This point is particularly clearly expressed by Gigerenzer (2004a) who observes that even though the probability of being killed in a car accident is much higher than a chance of dying in a flight catastrophe, people often perceive travelling by car as a safer option. In such situation, heuristic processing predominates, and people’s reasoning is influenced by stereotypes and vivid or salient recollections (Kahneman & Tversky, 1974; Klaczynski, 2000).

21 Given that heuristic processing tends to lead to inferior results of decision making, brand managers of ethically endorsed products would like to see consumers thinking analytically rather than heuristically. Analytical and slow information processing of claims concerning fair prices paid for the produce and decent labour standards of Third World producers is likely to lead to greater preferences for the endorsed products compared with hasty heuristic decision making. As mentioned earlier, the inferiority of heuristic decision making is believed to be associated with several types of bias, among which cognitive psychologists recognise halo effect, availability bias, jumping to conclusions, focusing illusion, framing effect, anchoring effect, belief bias, pattern seeking, and causal explanations (Epley & Gilovich, 2006; J. Evans, 2008; J. Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005; Gigerenzer, 2004a, 2004b; Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009; Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982, 1984; Klaczynski, 2000; Schwarz et al., 1991; Strack & Mussweiler, 1997; Torrens, 1999; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973; Vis, 2018). Although being important concepts that help understand human heuristic processing, all the aforementioned types of bias are of little relevance in respect to the research questions of this thesis and therefore they are not discussed in detail. However, another type of bias, namely mere exposure, is directly relevant to the present research and as such, requires a detailed explanation.

2.4.1.1Mere exposure effect

One of the types of bias that affects correct judgements and optimal responses is exposure to familiar stimuli. Robert Zajonc conducted several experiments demonstrating that when people are exposed to a familiar stimulus, they are likely to rate it more positively than another stimulus, which was not previously shown to them. Zajonc (1968) called this link between repetition of a stimulus and the positive attitude people have for it a mere exposure effect.

Kahneman (2011) and Zajonc (1980) argue that the mere exposure effect operates outside of conscious processing as it does not depend on consciousness at all. It happens even when repeated stimuli are presented to respondents very quickly, so they are not aware of having seen them (Zajonc, 1968). Hence, it is logical to conclude that in such a situation, Type 1 reasoning processes all information without activating Type 2 processing at all. Zajonc (1968) further argues that the mere exposure effect is not distinctively attributed to humans but is also shared with animals. To survive, organisms react with fear and withdrawal to novel stimulus

22 in a frequently dangerous world (Kahneman, 2011). Furthermore, repeated exposure to stimuli is followed by nothing bad, hence it eventually becomes a safety signal. Since safety is good, humans (and animals) develop a more favourable attitude towards such stimuli (Zajonc, 1968).

The effect of familiarity with the stimuli is also discussed by Gigerenzer (2004b) and Gigerenzer and Brighton (2009). Called the recognition heuristic, such familiarity assumes that if there are two alternatives where one is recognised and the other is not, then the recognised alternative has a higher value in respect to a given criterion (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002). The recognition heuristic is a well-known phenomenon in consumer behaviour. Coates, Butler, and Berry (2004) found that previous exposure to brand name increased the chance that such brand would enter the consumer’s consideration set. Sometimes, brand recognition may even be more important than some attributes, e.g. quality. Hoyer and Brown (1990) discovered that, in a blind test, an unbranded container of high quality peanut butter was preferred to unbranded containers of low quality peanut butter. However, when researchers attached a familiar brand label to one of the containers of low quality peanut butter, consumer preferences were shifted in favour of the low quality product with the brand label.

Relating the concept of the mere exposure bias to the present research, consumers are likely to have higher preferences for the endorsing logos with which they are familiar. Consequently, brand managers may be better off associating their brands with well-known endorsing logos compared with less known/unfamiliar logos. However, this premise requires an investigation as, as will be discussed in Chapter 3, consumers are often sceptical of ethical endorsing logos and may not necessarily prefer them over other less familiar logos, for example those that do not carry any ethical claims.

2.4.2Different approach to heuristics

Gigerenzer (2004b) raises doubts whether heuristics should be associated with one type of processing only as he questions the existence of dual-process theory in principle (see further discussion). His concept of heuristics proposes that humans make decisions relying on a repertoire of heuristic strategies by selecting from an adaptive toolbox of heuristics and this selection is believed to be a function of environment (see also Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009; Marewski, 2010). Furthermore, Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier (2011) agree with Kahneman

23 (2011) that heuristics ignore part of information in order to make quicker and easier decisions than more complex methods but, contrary to Kahneman’s (2011) view, they argue that heuristics also do this to make more accurate decisions. Furthermore, Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier (2011) propose that several types of heuristic can be used (e.g. recognition heuristics, discussed earlier). The authors conclude that there is no simple dichotomy between heuristics and non-heuristics and that various heuristic strategies can ignore more or less information. Depending on circumstances, a chosen heuristic would help a person to make the best decision.

2.4.3Heuristics in dual-process models of persuasion and attitude change

Within the social psychology discipline, dual-process models have been mostly applied to examine phenomena in the area of persuasion and attitude change (Smith & DeCoster, 2000). Among the best-known models of persuasion are the heuristic-systematic and elaboration likelihood models proposed by Chen and Chaiken (1999) and Petty and Cacioppo (1986), respectively. It is important to elaborate briefly on the two aforementioned models in this study as these possess several similarities with the dual-process theory of human cognition and are often used to explain how consumers make decisions and how they are persuaded by marketing communications (Cho, 1999; Kerr, Schultz, Kitchen, Mulhern, & Beede, 2015; Zhang, Zhao, Cheung, & Lee, 2014).

Chen and Chaiken (1999) consider heuristics as one of the two core elements of their heuristic- systematic model (HSM) of persuasion. This model coincides with works of other dual-process theorists and proposes that if a message is well-reasoned, logical, and supported with data, it will persuade and, if it is not, it will fail to convince. In this situation, when a message recipient is unable and/or unmotivated to process, they use heuristic supporting features (e.g. Dad is usually right) in order to process the message without more effortful elaboration (Crano & Prislin, 2006). Therefore, heuristic Type 1 processing activates and applies judgemental rules and requires minimal cognitive resources from the processor. Unlike heuristic reasoning, systematic Type 2 processing involves a relatively analytic and comprehensive thinking and requires cognitive ability, capacity and motivation (Chen & Chaiken, 1999). The heuristic- systematic model assumes that attitudes caused by heuristic features are less resistant to counter

24 pressures, less stable and less likely to drive behaviour than those caused by more thorough processing (Crano & Prislin, 2006).

Petty and Cacioppo (1986) presented a similar model of dual-processing called the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM), which emphasized two major routes of persuasion and attitude change. The first is the central route and assumes that a person carefully and thoughtfully considers the true merit of the information presented. This high elaboration route requires extensive issue-relevant thinking (Type 2) and appears when both motivation and ability to engage with the message are high (Petty & Wegener, 1999). Two types of processing may occur in the high elaboration route. Objective elaboration appears when an individual is motivated and is able to examine the true merit of the message. Biased processing occurs when an individual possesses a strong, prior opinion about a message topic (e.g. brand loyal) and responds consistently with his attitude instead of scrutinizing the message (Lien, 2001). The second route, called peripheral, assumes that persuasion is more likely to occur as a result of some simple cue (e.g. an attractive source) without necessitating examination of the true merits of the information presented (hence, heuristic Type 1 processing occurs; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). In this case, motivation and/or ability to engage with the message is low. The assumption of ELM is that if the scrutiny argument increases, central cues become more important determinants of persuasion (Lien, 2001).

There are yet two more theories of how people process information that share many similarities with the dual-process model of heuristic vs deliberative thinking. These are the fuzzy-traced theory proposed by Reyna and Brainerd (1995; see also in Reyna, Lloyd, & Brainerd, 2003) and Epstein’s (1994) cognitive experimental self-theory (CEST; see also Epstein & Pacini, 1999). Broadly speaking, gist (fuzzy-trace theory) and experimental (CEST) representations match the heuristic Type 1 processing while verbatim (fuzzy-trace theory) and rational (CEST) accounts represent deliberative Type 2 processing. The range of similar theories of human cognition imply that the dualism in human judgement and decision making in fact exists and therefore such theories can serve as a useful framework to investigate consumer behaviour.

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