Considering intentionality as the antecedent to behaviour in the context of foreign direct

5.5.4.1 Defining intentionality

Edmund Husserl is usually credited as being the founder of the School of Phenomenology, which is the study concerned with the mental construction of cognition out of raw sensory data. A phenomenon is an experience of an object by a subject; therefore the experience of

the object, rather than the object itself, is the phenomenon. This is due to what phenomenologists call intentionality (Castillo, 1997, pp17-19).

Intentionality is the processing that goes on in the brain between perception and cognition. In phenomenology perception is the intake of raw sensory data through sensory mechanisms. Cognition is the end product of the brain function in which an object is processed as knowledge. Because of intentionality, cognition is partially structured by experiences. A person therefore automatically and pre-cognitively intends what he will experience based on knowledge that is already stored in long-term memory. The concept of intentionality therefore recognizes the integration and the influence of values, attitudes and knowledge that people acquire and carry with them, and use continuously as the basis for cognitive schemas that help shape and construct experiences. These cognitive schemas develop from content and meaning into raw sensory data, turning that data into a cognition or knowledge of the world. As cognitive schemas are largely based on cultural patterns of thinking and personal experience, a person’s experiences are a construction based on the factors that influence intentionality; and therefore the object itself may remain unknown (Castillo, 1997, pp17-19).

However, because intentionality is an automatic process for a person the cognition appears to be completely natural and real. The object always appears in cognition as a completely separate entity with its own qualities independent of the person even though the person has been an active participant in the construction of the experience by shaping the content and meaning of the object. The object consequently becomes reified (made real). People therefore collectively project onto an object at a level of reality that the object does not actually possess. Yet, the people themselves are not aware that it is their own collective cognitive processes that are accomplishing this and they believe in the things that they experience. Because intentionality is highly variable, objects can be collectively reified into a variety of different experiences in different cultures, each contradicting the other. Yet each of them will appear completely true and real to the people in that culture (Castillo, 1997, pp17-19).

Paprzycka (1996, pp.5-6) defines intentional psychology as a framework for explaining human actions. As such it is neither individualist nor non-individualist, as both the individualist and a non-individualist can explain their actions in terms of the desires of their agents. Individualists proclaim that it is intentional psychology that can be used as a framework to explain human behaviour, while the non-individualist points to a variety of already existing social science research. The individualist approach is a commitment to the thought that we always act on our own beliefs. Non-individualists argue that we behave to fulfil expectations of the group and our decisions are not entirely our own. Note that rational choice theory, related to intentional psychology, is a formal theory which tries to capture conceptual dependencies between such concepts as desire (utility), belief (probability), choice and rationality. The rational choice theory does not raise the question of whose preference the agent is realising. Is the agent acting on his own desire, or the desire of the group?

In perspective, intentional psychology can ensure that one’s attitude reflects one’s actions. Aside from providing us with a multitude of attitudes to choose from, it leads to instructive conceptual tensions. What is instructive about them is that they arise exactly at the places one would expect them to arise if the intentional framework were geared towards giving us a picture of ourselves as independent, strong-willed individuals (Paprzycha, 1996, pp.5-6). Nadeau (1996, p.20) mentions that the very first objects of economic analysis (such as the perception of the strategies of other economic actors, the planning of an action directed at reaching a goal, deliberation, calculation and decision) require the fine-tuning of an entirely specific language which cannot be reduced to the language of the natural sciences.

Although social actors may have clear intentions, we term these processes emergent because their intentions are not directed at transforming other levels of analysis; changes in other levels nevertheless emerge as their by-products. The intentions of some social actors foster changes that influence other levels of analysis. In these processes actions are guided towards attaining the desired outcomes, via evolutionary changes. While it is clear that the achievement of outcomes is not assured, the intentions are clear and precede the decisions and actions that are taken. For example, innovators may aim to alter the dominant

technology and the characteristics of industry in which they compete, or legislators may try to induce the transformation of the industry (Cuervo-Cazurra & de Holan, 2002, p.3).

5.5.4.2 Constructing a model of intentionality

As introduced by Ajzen (2002, pp.2-5), human behaviour is guided by three different considerations: beliefs about the likely outcomes of the behaviour and the evaluations of these outcomes (behavioural beliefs); beliefs about the normative expectations of others and motivation to comply with these expectations (normative beliefs); and beliefs about the presence of factors that may facilitate or impede performance of the behaviour and the perceived power of these factors (control beliefs). In terms of FDI, two other factors play a role in intentionality. They are the level of risk that the investor perceives, combined with tools that he has to manage the risk; and the time horizon that the investor requires to manage the project, either short or long term.

Therefore, the intentionality of foreign direct investors can be modelled as follows:

I = ∫ (A, Sn, Ep, Ra, Th) where,

A = Attitude I = Intentionality Sn = Subjective Norm Ep = Perceived Environment Ra = Attitude towards Risk Th = Time Horizon

Figure 5.1 is a schematic representation of the proposed model. Behavioural beliefs produce a favourable or unfavourable attitude towards the behaviour; normative beliefs result in perceived social pressure or subjective norm; control beliefs give rise to perceived behavioural control; risk and risk management strategies give rise to the attitude towards risk; and the time horizon gives rise to attitude towards time. Note that, in combination, attitude towards behaviour, subjective norm, perceived behaviour control, attitude towards risk and attitude towards time lead to the formation of a behavioural intention. People or

firms will be expected to carry out the intended action when the opportunity arises. It is therefore assumed that intention is the immediate antecedent of behaviour (Ajzen, 2002, p.1).

Figure 5.1: A diagrammatic representation of intentionality as it applies to a decision- making model of a foreign direct investor

(Source: Partially derived from Ajzen, 2002, p.3)