Constituting Self-Regulating Authorities

The constitution of self-governing authorities is central to government of the local in advanced liberal democracies (Isin, 2000). These authorities would exercise their freedom without overt interference from the centre. This was undertaken through a problematisation of the pervasive role of government in peoples' lives. Large state bureaucracies were criticised as inefficient, unmanageable and unresponsive to the needs of their clients (Palmer, 1988; Treasury, 1987). The existing regimes of practice characterised by a plethora of local authorities with heterogeneous functions were condemned as inefficient

and out of control. A system which had been deemed necessary for the well­ being of New Zealanders was now portrayed as problematic (McKinlay, 1990; Treasury, 1 987). This problematisation laid the foundation for reconfiguring the welfare state through adopting newer forms of governing the local.

There emerged a convergence on the need to move away from a highly centralised form of government to one where authority was devolved. The discourses of decentralisation and devolution were mobilised as the

appropriate form of ensuring the well-being of the regions. While the meaning of these two terms are problematic, devolution implies a transfer of power, authority and responsibility from a national to a sub-national level, while decentralisation includes the first two elements but excludes the third, responsibility (Boston, et al., 1 996; Martin, 1 991). The ambiguity of devolution made this discourse governmental because it potentially appeals to all people. This ambiguity mutes resistance and enrols people to their own government in the belief that their desires are being fulfilled (cf. Power, 1997).

The governrnental ambitions associated with the discourse of devolution followed from the State Owned Enterprises Act 1986. This legislation was based on the rationale that government hardly had control over the large state bureaucracies which had become unmanageable, unresponsive and inefficient as well. Devolution promised a way of managing these bureaucracies so that they would be responsive to client needs and be efficient yet amenable to control by the state (Palmer, 1988). This arrangement entails a balancing between freedom and control that was to characterise the local government reforms in New Zealand:

First, where government money is involved, it is necessary to have adequate checks and balances so that one can be sure that money was actually expended on the purposes for which it was appropriated. There is therefore a need to have sufficient audit trails to allow for such monitoring and a need for sufficient accountability mechanisms within the structures to which the power is devolved to ensure that they can be held accountable for what they have done and to enable us to know who they are. In my judgment, this does mean clear statutory lines of authority and control because, in the end, in a society which is

functioning under the rule of law, it is necessary for the protection of us all to ensure that the law is clear about who can do what to whom and under what conditions (Palmer, 1988, p. 4)

There however appears to be little difference between the position espoused by Palmer (1988) above and the regimes of practice of local government prior to the reforms. Both regimes represent a central government keen to retain control over local authorities. This state of affairs is evidenced by the way Bush (1980) described the relationship between central and local government:

Probably the foremost compendious principle is that local bodies, being subordinate partners in government, and also statutory creations, must bend to the will of parliament. This, in effect, is central government. Local bodies are in no sense puppets of the state: the paramountcy of Parliament means first, an absolute right to bestow and resume powers, and secondly, the right to exercise various measures of surveillance. Thus the relationship between local government and the fount of authority is one of dependence and conditional accountability. Local bodies exist by virtue of acts of Parliament which also specify in what activities they may permissibly indulge (Bush, 1980, p. 233)

The difference between these two positions lies in the discourse that accompanies the post-1984 reforms. This discourse espoused local authorities that exercise their autonomy and through which they are brought into the nexus of power relations with the state. The reforms to local government therefore reflected the dialectic of advanced liberal democracies: that while

government would wish to see the regions exercise their freedom, there was need for control especially "where taxpayers' money was concerned". Central government would however, not want to appear to be too intrusive. This distinction was to be achieved through active agents subject to the expertise of audit, monitoring, accountability and legislation. The reformed authorities would however enjoy high levels of regulated freedom while under the previous regimes, central control over local authorities was more direct and overt. As will be shown later, this distinction would prove to be problematic and would excite continued clamours for absolute autonomy. The Labour Party spokesman for employment and labour relations was to lament that "in spite of the reforms, "the level of control through the centre is as high today as

ever. Given the amount of form filling that goes on, it may be even higher" (Maharey, 1996).

The intentions of the government on the devolution of powers was nowhere clearer than in the discursive formations associated with the Local Government Amendment Act (No. 2) 1989. While opposition members argued that local authorities should be left alone to decide what reforms they should undertake and had in fact done so already, the government interpretation was that local authorities instituted these reforms because of the threat of legislation. The central government maintained that autonomy is conditional on local authorities conducting themselves as desired by central government:

It stands out, because the local authorities concerned have been absolutely clear about what the Government intended to do. The local authorities have known that the Government would do it for them unless they cleaned up their act. That is another good aspect of the kind of pressure the Government has put them under. They have responded to the challenge and reformed themselves, and some of them have done it quite well. However, as with all forms of reform, there are some that need more than just the threat of legislation. There are some

that need the legislation to ensure that they change a. Elder, M.P., Hansard June

28, 1988).

The local would be governed through autonomous agencies who would meet the principles set by the central government while exercising their choice. The Local Government Act (No. 2) 1989 following similar developments in the public sector set out to constitute such units. The reforms magnified the field (Dimaggio and Powell, 1983) of local authorities, potentially intensifying their surveillance. The constitution of autonomous authorities multiplied the agencies involved in the government of the local in New Zealand. These came to include not only regulatory agencies (see Hood, James and Scott, 2000; Hood, James, Scott, and Travers, 1998) but voluntary agencies, businesses, citizens, communities and consumers (see Hoggett, 1996). Local government came to denote more than functions and services by a body limited by boundaries, but the multiple agencies and technologies for directing the conduct of people delineated by geography (see Flint, 2003; Rose, 2000; Isin, 2000). This autonomisation took the form of structural changes to the local

authorities, specification of objectives and separation of functions based on this specification, and the establishment of markets within local authorities.