Gary Spruce
CONSTRUCTING AN ASSESSMENT MODEL
In addition to being perceived as having validity by all those involved with it, an assessment system should provide ‘good quality information about pupils’ performance without distorting good teaching practice and therefore learning’ (Gipps, 1994). Furthermore, it should be aware of the uniquely personal nature
of creativity, recognizing that creativity is not only integral to the arts but is central to the entire educational process.
It seems to me that in constructing such an assessment model we are required to redefine our perception of the nature of intelligence and our concept of what constitutes objectivity. Having done this we can then proceed to devise a model which adopts a more holistic view of the assessment process and therefore a more appropriate one for the arts.
The perception that the arts are unconcerned with cognitive experience is based on the idea of intelligence as a unitary and fixed function. However over the last decade there has developed the idea of the arts as constituting a distinct and unique ‘way of knowing’. The arts as a way of knowing has become something of a clarion call for arts educators. Essentially it is a means whereby the terms of reference of much of education can be redefined in favour of the establishment of a coherent arts curriculum. It has been interpreted in different ways by a number of arts educators—particularly Abbs (1985), Best (1992), Ross and Mitchell (1993). However, I wish to consider it, perhaps somewhat tangentially, from the perspective of two particular publications: Howard Gardner’s Frames of Mind (1984) and the Gulbenkian Report, The Arts in Schools (1982). Gardner, whose book is subtitled The Theory of Multiple Intelligences, argues for the existence of a number of intelligences: linguistic, musical, logical-mathematical, spatial, bodily-kinaesthetic and personal intelligence. Having defined this multiplicity of intelligences, he draws attention to the fact that only two are developed to any degree during formal schooling: the linguistic and the logical-mathematical. Gardner is therefore suggesting that much of a child’s cognitive potential remains unexploited and particularly that which relates to the artistic and aesthetic. Perhaps then, as Peter Abbs suggests, the educational debate should centre around this failure rather than ‘the present massive and barbaric retreat into “basics”’ (Abbs, 1985).
Gardner’s particular way of thinking about intelligence obviously has great significance for assessment in arts education. For if one accepts his theory of multiple intelligences, then it follows that there must be an equal multiplicity of ways of assessing cognitive development. It is no longer satisfactory to apply the psychometric model to learning irrespective of its appropriateness to the learning model. This was clearly the view of the Gulbenkian Report, which said:
Like others before us, we reject the view that the only valid kinds of knowledge are those that are open to deductive reasoning and empirical tests. The ways of getting knowledge are not limited to the intellectual, book learning or scientific kind. The aesthetic the religious and the moral are quite as these others at conveying knowledge. In our view, public education has been too devoted to particular kinds of knowledge at the expense of others which are of equal importance.
(Gulbenkian Report, 1982: para 24; emphasis added)
Furthermore, what follows naturally from this, is a redefinition of what we mean by objectivity. The first misconception we must dispense with is the idea that objectivity and subjectivity are mutually exclusive and that in matters other than of concrete fact it is possible for an assessor to be totally objective:
rather than treating subjectivity and objectivity as exclusive alternatives, we should think of them rather as two poles of a spectrum…. At one end we might find entirely subjective remarks…such as “I like strawberries”. This it is said makes no claims about the qualities of strawberries but merely reports how I, a subject, respond to them. At the other end of the spectrum there will be judgements which will be thought to be entirely objective: the judgement that triangles have three sides, perhaps. But for most of us, a large percentage of our judgements…will be more or less objective (or subjective). My judgement of Othello may be objective to the point that it avoids haste, prejudice, ignorance and the like, but my response may also be dependent on things which are part of my personal life history. The point I wish to make is that the fact that my judgement is for these latter reasons not entirely objective (since I cannot assume that we all have the same sort of psychology or cultural background) does not make it entirely subjective.
(Lyas, 1992:377) Gipps (1994) expands on the relationship between objectivity and the assessor, further arguing that absolute objectivity is simply not possible:
The modernist view is that it is possible to be a disinterested observer while the post-modern view is that such detachment is not possible: we are social beings who construe the world according to our values and perceptions, our biographies are central to what we see and how we interpret it…reality is constructed by the observer and there are multiple constructions of reality.
(Gipps, 1994:288) Having therefore established that we need to redefine our perception of what intelligence is and having ceased worshipping at the temple of objectivity, we can proceed to develop an assessment model which is much less content- orientated and much more holistic in approach.
The nature of holistic assessment is that it should attempt to elicit ‘best’ rather than ‘typical’ performance and that it should be aware of factors external to the content of the test: specifically context and the relationship between assessor and assessed. As part of a definition of what characterizes good assessment, the late Desmond Nuttall in his classic paper The Validity of Assessments’ draws attention to how assessment draws inferences from a sample of behaviour: ‘every assessment is based on a sample of behaviour in which we are interested; we
tend to generalize from the particular sample of behaviour we observe to the universe of that behaviour’ (Nuttall, 1987). Gipps, in an analysis of Nuttall’s article, expands on these points, emphasizing that the quality and range of cognisance of the assessment model is of crucial importance to the delivery of an accurate sample of behaviour:
Significantly what the paper brings into the definition of the universe of behaviour is the ‘conditions and occasions’ of assessment as well as the content (Nuttall, p. 110). We know that the content, context mode of the assessment will affect pupil performance; we have to distinguish ‘between competence (the basic ability to perform) and performance (the demonstration of the competence on a particular occasion or under particular circumstances)…’ (op. cit., p. 112). What marks out educational assessment from psychometrics is a different view of the learner, and a different relationship between pupil and assessor. At the heart of this lies an understanding that performance is affected by context including the relationship between pupil and assessor, the pupil’s motivational state and the characteristics of the assessment task.
(Gipps, 1994:286) A successful relationship between pupil and teacher, which is so necessary to the successful functioning of holistic assessment, is founded upon a number of ‘pupil awarenesses’: first, that absolute objectivity is not possible and that what is being brought to bear is informed subjectivity; second, that the acquisition of informed subjectivity is one of the aims of arts education; and finally that although some assessment is, in the final analysis, judgemental, the process is essentially a collaborative seeking after ‘best performance’.
Gipps considers the key aspects in eliciting best performance are: • a range of activities, offering a wide opportunity to perform; • match to classroom practice;
• extended interaction between pupil and teacher to explain the task; • normal classroom setting, which is therefore not unduly threatening; • a range of response modes other than written.
The appropriateness of these aspects to arts education and their importance as the foundation stones of any arts-based assessment model is manifestly obvious. They have the virtue of being applicable to all areas of the curriculum whilst being particularly relevant to arts subjects, and they entirely dispense with the psychometric model of assessment which has so distorted arts education. The notion of holistic assessment therefore provides a philosophical basis for assessment which not only serves the arts well but also, of perhaps greater importance, is of equal applicability to other curriculum areas. To achieve a
universal assessment model would be to bring together hitherto disparate curriculum areas in a unity of educational purpose.
In conclusion, I wish to consider once more the conflicting perspectives of those who believe in the necessity of assessment in the arts—either from a political and/or educational viewpoint—and those who are essentially opposed to it on philosophical and/or practical grounds. Possibly there is no way of reconciling such divergent views. However, I believe Gardner comes closest to proposing an ideal accommodation. He rejects the idea of a non-judgemental approach whilst emphasizing the difficulties inherent in assessing in the arts. In doing so, he provides what I believe to be not only a framework for assessment, but also a philosophical framework for the teaching of the arts:
The future creator must evolve into a certain type of person. He or she cannot be too ready to please, too influenced by the surrounds, too upset by critical feedback. Here is where shrewd parenting and teaching come in. It is equally damaging to tell the youngster that everything that she fashions is great, as it is to rip everything that she does to shreds. The educator of the future creator needs to walk a fine line—always encouraging the youngster to stretch, praising her where she succeeds, but equally important providing support and a non-condemnatory interpretative [my emphasis] framework when things do not go well…when the most demanding creative work is being tackled, it is important to have at one’s side some other person who can provide sustenance…by later childhood, it is not inappropriate to introduce the standards of the domain and allow the student to see how judgements of quality are made. The field is not always correct; indeed the history of creativity is the history of judgements that were initially off the mark. But the point is one simply cannot do without some kind of evaluative feedback.
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