Constructive Intervention ,

as being a loser at the negotiation table.

1.4.3 Constructive Intervention ,

The term ‘constructive intervention’, originally posited by Anwar Ibrahim, has not been given a conceptual definition other than its literal meaning¹⁹. This is because at the July ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) which met in Manila, members abandoned this idea, which they saw as an encroachment on their national sovereignty (Carlyle, 1999:67-70).²⁰

When this term was revived in the wake of the Cambodian coup, no specific parties came out with a clear operational definition of what ASEAN leaders meant when they said that sending ASEAN envoys to Cambodia was an act of ‘constructive intervention’, rather than interfering with Cambodian domestic politics. However, other concepts such as intervention and preventive diplomacy have been given their own clear conceptualisation. The term ‘constructive intervention’ was toned down later, and renamed ‘flexible engagement’ by Surin in his ‘non-paper’ circulation during the 1998 AMM (Funston, 2000:11).

19 Anwar Ibrahim provoked controversy by advocating “constructive intervention” in the affairs of other ASEAN member states, including assistance for electoral systems, civil society, rule of law and other reforms. Though it carefully avoided explicit support for democratic transitions, the proposal made no headway because it threatened so many sitting heads of ASEAN states, including Anwar's boss, Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, who later jailed Anwar for six years on what were alleged as trumped up charges.

20 Surin Pitsuwan’s non-paper did not get the support needed by the majority of meeting members.

Only the representative from the Philippines supported him, while the others strongly protested against putting the paper on the official agenda.

The terms ‘interference’, ‘intervention’ and ‘prevention’ have been used regularly and interchangeably, but sometimes in a misconceived manner. Interference is defined as a policy of intervening in the affairs of other countries (Webster Dictionary). The concept of non-interference in member states’ internal affairs was explicitly enshrined in ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation ²¹ – famously abbreviated as TAC (Aseanweb).

Intervention is defined as any interference that may affect the interests of others, especially of one or more states with the affairs of another; the intervention of one state in the affairs of another is typically unwelcome, but some cases of mediation between states may be referred to as intervention (Webster Dictionary). Intervention, unlike interference, has a more physical connotation than interference. Intervention is sometimes associated with military deployment rather than just the utterance of words.

Intervention, according to former ASEAN Secretary General H.E. Rodolfo C Severino Jr. (2002), “…in recent times has taken five principle forms – rhetorical and diplomatic gestures and pressures, economic sanctions, legal instruments like the international criminal tribunals and the International Criminal Court, covert action, and armed force” He argued, furthermore, that interventions in international conflicts often take place in the name of protecting human rights.

21 Refer to Appendix C for the treaty.

“…(I)nternational intervention is justified when human rights violations by a state, or another entity exercising power, is so egregious and so broadly destructive as to call for the international community to protect the victims”.²²

Intervention has international legal legitimacy. The UN Charter gives the Security Council the power under Article 24(1) and Chapter VII to take any measures necessary to “restore international peace and security”. These provisions allow the Security Council to authorise action based on subsequent agreements such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. If consensus can be reached in the Council that a humanitarian disaster is a threat to international peace and security, then the UN can take decisive action. The ‘Kosovo model’ suggests, moreover, that a state or coalition of states may intervene without explicit Security Council approval.²³ Desperate times needed desperate measures – Kosovo, the NATO alliance argued, was facing a Serbian ethnic cleansing campaign.

Under the UN Charter, the Security Council determines the existence of threats to peace. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the use of force by states (except in self-defence), and Article 24(1) gives the Security Council the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. These provisions were enacted following World War II in an attempt to establish a collective security mechanism that would regulate aggression between states and prevent anarchy.

22H.E. Rudolfo Severino Jr.’s speech at the ASEAN Scholars’ Roundtable, organised by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and the Singapore Institute of International Affairs Singapore, 3 July 2000.

23 From March 29 to June 9 1999, the NATO alliance, led by the world's only superpower, the US, waged war on a lone republic in an already conflict-ridden region. The combined population of NATO’s 19 countries exceeded Serbia’s 11 million people by a factor of 65. NATO’s annual defence budget was 25 times larger than Serbia’s entire economy. Its armed forces outnumbered Serbia’s by a factor of 35.

While the Security Council has primary responsibility to authorise the use of force, some states feel that certain members of the Council might prevent humanitarian interventions from taking place. The question for international law is whether primary responsibility equals exclusive authority. The legal and moral authority of the Security Council cannot be overturned lightly, but adherence to this authority might prevent a necessary intervention from taking place. Opinions differ among states over the primacy of the Security Council: many want to uphold its role, while others point to its inherent flaws and the way it is dominated by the veto-holding Permanent Five (the US, Russia, Britain, France and China).

1.4.4 Conflict

One of the main reasons that this study is important is the existence of conflict and conflict management. Wallensteen (1989), in his book ‘Peace Research:

Achievements and Challenges’, categorised conflicts into three types. The first type is Classic Wars, which involve two governments using their military forces against each other. The second type is the Wars of State Formation, involving one government and an opposing internal group demanding autonomy for a particular group. The third type is Internal Wars, which are conflicts over the control of government within a given state. The first type is also known as inter-state conflict and the second and third types as intra-state conflicts. The main emphasis of this study will be on the second and third types of conflict, which are on occasion termed as civil wars or internal conflicts (Lewer, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1995:2).

These conflicts are also referred to as the ‘International-social Conflict (ISC)’ by Ramsbotham (1995) and Miall (1992), as some conflicts start within a state but then spill over to the neighbouring states, while international conflicts often exacerbate domestic conflicts (Miall, 1992:31-63). Scholars in conflict management (CM) studies sometimes find it hard to give a unanimous definition on what are the parameters or scope of conflict, as most conflicts start as a domestic affair but further escalate to become inter-state or, for that matter, regional conflicts at times.

Conflict is also defined as a norm in a relationship, and it exists when there is an apparent situation in which at least two parties, or their representatives, try to pursue their perceptions of mutually incompatible goals by undermining, directly or indirectly, each other’s goal-seeking capability (Sandole, 1988:1). Therefore, although conflict is a natural process in life, the way it is managed is most important.

In studying a particular conflict, some of the most important aspects that will be looked into are the parties involved, issues, background of the conflict, and the conflict management methods used and their outcomes (Kamarulzaman Askander, 2000: 11). The Southeast Asian region has many unresolved conflicts. However, for the purpose of this study, only certain conflicts involving Malaysia will be covered.

Malaysia has been chosen as it has unresolved conflicts with almost all of its frontiers.

It has outstanding claims with Singapore concerning Pulau Batu Putih and outstanding claims with Indonesia in the Borneos. Malaysia is also involved in the Spratly Islands claims with five other co-claimants including Vietnam and China, and still facing the Philippines on its Sabah claim.

One of the conflict management (CM) approaches to solving conflict is what has been termed as ‘preventive diplomacy’, which is one of the three-fold objectives of the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). This organisation was established in 1994, with three outline approaches to maintain peace and security in the ASEAN region. The other two approaches are confidence building measures (CBMs) and the last stage of CM – the formulation of conflict resolution mechanisms – which until now has not been touched upon by the ARF members.

Preventive diplomacy is a diplomatic, political, military, economic and humanitarian action taken by governments and organisations to prevent inter-state disputes (Acharya, 1999:19). This is a more pre-emptive measure, rather than reactive.

However, as the Americans insist that preventive diplomacy must be backed up by military force and the willingness to use it, it has somehow dampened the popular ASEAN approach of CM by non-military alternatives (Gates, 1996:47). ASEAN does not have the concerted military cooperation that the United Nations has.

The nearest that the ASEAN countries come to a military alliance is in the form of bilateral military exercises. This cooperation is conducted on a frequent and bilateral basis, and includes the exchanges of military representatives at national defence institutions, periodic security consultations and a series of separate, bilaterally combined military exercises.

As regional conflicts become more complex and challenging, a review of the effectiveness of ASEAN in managing regional conflicts is timely. ASEAN must be seen as more decisive and forceful (like Western organisations such as NATO, or

even the UN, that cast votes to make decisions) and bold enough to discuss sensitive issues and become more proactive rather than reactive (Anwar, 1997; Pitsuwan, 1998). Nevertheless, the question remains whether ASEAN, and particularly its members, is ready for such a huge step. A brief history of the non-interference principle in ASEAN will shed some light on its origin and put this research into perspective.