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of Nigeria in African decolonization politics in the United Nations from 1960 upwards within the context of the title of this dissertation.
SECTION TWO: A FOCUS ON NIGERIA
4.7. The Role of Nigeria in African Decolonization Politics in the United Nations, 1960-1994
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the precarious state of affairs in the colonies especially on the African continent. We commence with a reflection on the historical background to decolonization politics. This will then lead us to the general analysis of the theme under study. A study of this kind as implied above, demands that one begins by historicizing the very origins of decolonization politics in the U.N before zooming in on the different roles played by various actors (Nigeria included in the process). In light of this, the following questions will be provided with detailed answers under this section:
Why were the issues of decolonization politicized in the UN and what were the roles played by Nigeria and other actors in this regard?
By the end of World War 11 in 1945, the international system metamorphosed into a bipolar one with the emergence of two major superpowers which wielded military and political power in an antagonistic fashion. These countries were the United States of America in the western hemisphere and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the Eastern orbit. This situation, suffices to say, was occasioned by the compelling realities at the time. First, among these was the defeats inflicted on both Germany and Japan by the allied forces. Second, was the significant loss of influence by France and China - although considered as major powers, but were, in fact minor ones. Great Britain, on the other hand, having undergone a gruelling and devastating six years of war, could not muster the strength required to support its superpower status(Baker, 1968).The post-World War 11 period triggered a new dimension in international politics as new political and military camps surfaced shortly after the laying down of arms by the warring parties. Consequently, the wartime synergy among the allied powers which had become the foundation upon which the new world organization was erected, paved way to a deep-rooted competition between the United States and the Soviet Union and their allies respectively.
To the American nation and its predominantly western allies, the expansionist activities of the Soviet bloc and its communist ideology posed a huge menace which, if allowed to flourish could have grave implications for their national interests which included economic, political and
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military aspects. In Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union sought to exert its influence in the entire region. Having been spurred by the desires for security, it demonstrated that the states of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, Albania, Yugoslavia, and Finland had governments that were friendly to the USSR. It was against this background that communists in these countries, with the aid of the USSR authorities, formed a coalition of governments with the socialists and other parties which showed interests (Baker 1968).The Soviet’s idea of forming a coalition government with these states was strategic for two reasons. First, the Soviets believed that such an arrangement would prevent the west from making ideological incursions into the region.
Second, they also believed that a fully integrated communist Eastern Europe could act as a springboard for their ideological expansionism across the world. In other words, the Soviet’s plan was to use its sphere of influence as a platform for the spread of communism to other parts of the globe. From the standpoint of the Western world, Eastern Europe under the dominant control of communists portended danger if not contained; as the threat of communist expansion assumed a frightening dimension because the communist had exported their ideology to other parts of the world. For instance, the Soviets had attempted to establish a foothold in the Middle East and in the Turkish Straits. In the Middle East for instance, Soviets delayed the withdrawal of its troops from Iran to obtain economic and political concessions from the Iranian government (Baker, 1968).
The Soviets also attempted to bring the Turkish Straits under its ideological influence during the Cold War era territorial conflict between the Soviet Union and Turkey. Turkey, a neutral European state throughout most of the World War 11 period, came under pressure from the Soviet government which requested that Russian ships be allowed freely through the Turkish Straits, which linked the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. According to Baker (1968:7) the Soviets also proposed to “participate with Turkey in the organization of the defence of the Straits”. The Turkish government in a swift response rejected the Soviet’s requests. This, then,
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aroused tensions in the region as the Soviets could not swallow the humiliation it suffered as a consequence of the rejection of its request with regard to the Straits. This later culminated into a show of naval force by the Soviet Union which was targeted at forcing its way through.
The crisis would later serve as a decider in the invocation of the Truman Doctrine by the United States government due to the fact that Turkey was looking potentially vulnerable to Soviet naval superiority. The Turkish government apparently worried by the situation was left with no other option than to turn to the United States and NATO for protection and membership respectively. This development from the Cold War perspective was a triumph for the United States and its allies as they added another European state -Turkey to their camp having pushed back their arch-rival – the Soviets away from the Turkish straits.110 In Korea, which was jointly occupied by the American and Soviet forces, negotiations to put in place an independent government failed due to the scheming of the superpowers for influence in the region. The American and Soviet governments both demanded that the government of Korea when constituted would not fall under each other’s influence. In addition, the collapse of the American – sponsored talks in China aimed at settling the differences between the nationalists and Communists in that country brightened the prospects of a Communist triumph, as the situation eventually culminated into the addition of a major state to the Socialist camp.
In a nutshell, the above scenario can be summarized as follows: Turkey joined the American led Western bloc while the Soviet Union outsmarted America in the race for global influence with the recruitment of Korea into the Socialist camp. This intense competition between the Soviet Union and the United States could not have been explained better than by President John Kennedy of the United States in 1963 who described the acrimonious relations as the global competition between the communist bloc and the non-communists. He submitted that the African continent was regarded by his country as the manipulative field in the contest.
110 “Turkish Straits Crisis” Teaching American History,
www.teachingamericanhistory.org/static/neh/interactives/Coldwareurope/map/data/info_10.html (Not Dated)
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According to Meredith (2006) this was the situation which pervaded the world for fifteen years prior to the emergence of Nigeria as an independent country. Thus Nigeria was born into it.
Two years into hostilities, the United States leveraged on its foreign policy resource to determine the doctrine of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin - this, from the American perspective, would help formulate a sound foreign policy toward the Soviet Union. Consequently, by March 1947, American foreign policymakers had produced a strategic response when they initiated a new foreign policy architecture which would guild the United States Cold War behaviour.
The Cold War policy of the United States was captured by George Kennan as follows: “…the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies”.111 The foregoing thus became the basis of the United States engagement with the Soviet Union vis-à-vis the Cold War struggle. While the United States lacked the clout to completely halt the ascendancy of the communist movement, American policy makers and strategists were however convinced that they could employ their policy of containment effectively against their bitter rivals and thereby force the Soviets to demonstrate a far greater level of moderation and decency in its ideological campaign and expansionist agenda. The American calculation was that this would culminate into a collapse or at least in the immediate time a softening of Soviet power. The Cold War policy of containment of the United States was initiated and made public in March 1947 by President Truman. This subsequently became known as the Truman Doctrine.
President Truman had in an address to the United States Congress stressed the importance of providing economic and military assistance to Greece and Turkey following Britain’s decision to curtail its assistance to these countries. In his speech to the Congress, the President argued that the United States must act promptly to rescue the countries from Soviet vulnerability. The
111 Kennan, G.” The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 4 cited in (Baker 1968) “The United States and Africa in the United Nations: A Case Study in American Foreign Policy,” Imprimerie Offset Composition Services, INC, Washington D.C. p. 8.
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President said, “The very existence of the Greek state is today threatened by terrorist activities of several thousand armed men, led by Communists, who defy the Government’s authority…”112 The foregoing is indicative of the fact that the Cold War was basically a struggle about ideologies between the Soviet Communist bloc and the capitalist Western countries led by America. As a phenomenon that is rooted in tangible conflicts of interest between the Soviet Union and the United States blocs who viewed each other’s military and political actions with a high degree of suspicion, the Cold War led to the exacerbation of tensions across the world thus making it difficult to reach an agreement that could bring about peaceful settlement.
As a matter of fact, many countries in Europe and other parts of the world remained divided along ideological lines for an upward of 40 years. The Soviet Union also came up with their Cold War policy toward Africa through what became known as the Soviet Africanist Coordinating Conference, which was held at the Ethnographical Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences in February, 1957, in Moscow. By 1961, a definite Soviet policy toward Africa had emerged. As Alexander Dallin opined, the sole objective of Soviet policy was to “. . . deny Africa to the West, and especially to deprive the United States and its allies of political influence, economic opportunities, and strategic bases in Africa.113 The foregoing is instructive given that the realist power theory which was used in framing this study argues that state actors that make up the international system are driven primarily by their national interests which they pursue under moral concerns. The African policy and the vehement manner in which colonialism was attacked by the Soviet Union later in the course of the debates on the question at the UN further affirms the relevance of the realist theory to this study. During this period, the ideologically belligerent blocs – the East and West scrambled for recruits from the then existing countries and the newly emerging ones. The conflict was dubbed the “Cold War” because it was a non-physically combative crisis. Troops of the Soviet Union and the United States never came
112 Ibid, p. 8.
113 See Dallin. A. (1963), “The Soviet Union: Political Activity” in Zbigniew Brzezinki’s Africa and the Communist World (Stanford: Hoover Institution), p. 13.
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into direct military combat because of the fear that such direct contact would have had the potential to escalate into nuclear conflict. The Cold War, for the period it lasted, remained essentially a fierce battle between the major power blocs who struggled against each other for influence throughout the world (Steans and Pettiford, 2001).
In summary, it has been demonstrated thus far that the Cold War was ideologically driven. To put it simply, the quest for relevance and influence across the globe propelled it; while the necessity of preserving the national interests of both camps sustained the war until it ended in 1989. The question now becomes: how did the Cold War influence the course of African decolonization in the post-1960 decades especially in the United Nations which became the most powerful platform where the struggle against colonialism was fought with genuine interests by the forces of liberation on one hand, and the colonial forces and their tactical supporters on the other? The answer to this lies in the fact that both the Soviets and the American blocs, as argued above, were motivated by their national interests which they sought to advance at each other’s expense thereby making the war even fiercer.
This, suffice to say, was what later influenced the dispositions of both blocs to issues of decolonization, especially from the Soviet and American perspectives – the major and the most powerful blocs of the 20th century. The foregoing therefore provides the historical basis for the discussions and analyses of events from the year 1960 upwards which will be considered next.
In light of the above synopsis, the post-1960 analysis will fall under two major historical periods given that the study spans a period of 34 years. The first, 1960-1971, will examine the attempt to politicize the issues of decolonization, the debates it generated, the responses and counter responses of the discordant blocs and other member states and, finally, the voting pattern on colonial issues. It will also consider the attempt by the West to frustrate the implementation of UNGA anti-colonial resolutions. The second period, 1971-1994, will examine Nigeria’s political roles in its capacity as the Chair of the UN Anti-Apartheid Committee.
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