This dissertation contributes to the literature on learning from disaster in multiple ways. The emphasis on concepts like ‘organizational field’ and ‘institutions’ helps to understand how learning from disaster is constrained by institutionalized practices, discourses, and power relations. I introduced the notion of ‘field-level learning from disaster’, which recognizes these factors and relates to a higher level of analysis than the common organizational perspective on disasters. Also, this dissertation contributes to the political perspective of learning from disaster by investigating how established and marginal actors in an organizational field contest each others’ interpretations and suggested solutions and strive to protect their interests. Previous studies tend to portray politics of learning from disaster as a process dominated by powerful actors, such as corporations and government bodies. These actors constrain the search for causes and aim to maintain established institutions and authority relations in place (e.g. Brown, 2000; Elliott & Smith, 2006). This dissertation highlights how learning involves marginal actors and communities struggling to initiate radical changes and overcome defensiveness by established powerful actors. However, if marginal communities are unable to convince established actors to adopt new knowledge, learning from disaster will likely be ‘paradigmatic’ (Deschamps et al., 1997) – i.e. focused on refining established knowledge, practices, and goals, while leaving deeper assumptions, values, and beliefs unchanged. As such, this study provides new insights in
IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
PRACTICE
This dissertation also has practical implications. It contributes to a better understanding of how disasters are caused and how learning occurs following a disaster. Hence, it provides new knowledge on how disasters may be prevented.
As mentioned in Chapter two, I argue for the need for professionalization in occupational training in the offshore drilling industry to improve risk management. I claim that the
nature of training needs to change to better equip the offshore workforce for increasingly
complex operations. A broader conceptualization of worker competence is necessary, including both technical and non-technical skills, as well as an understanding of complex system dynamics. Also, some degree of standardization will resolve harmful variability in training across organizations. I argued standardized training should address at least non- technical skills and system risk management.
Chapter two also indicated that an institutional perspective on disaster causations has important implications for learning in practice. Industrial disasters partly have institutional origins that are not specific to the involved organizations, but may be more widespread in an industry. These may drive the recurrence of similar disaster development patterns within and across organizations in an industry. These findings imply that investigations teams should aim to identify institutional contributing causes beyond the organizational setting in which a disaster occurred. This could be achieved by comparing the causation pattern with other investigated incidents and disasters, either within or outside the organization. Furthermore, I hope these insights will motivate managers and safety professionals to perceive disasters in other organizations as opportunities for improving safety practices in their own organization. A common response in the wake of a disaster is ‘it could not happen here’ (Smith & Elliott, 2007). Chapter two shows that such claims ignore the role of the institutional environment in disaster development, and are clear illustrations of a dangerous “myth of infallibility” (Sagan, 1994). Recent incidents in the North Sea region, like the Bardolino near-miss and Elgin gas blowout have indicated that disasters similar to the Macondo blowout could definitely happen in the North Sea as well.
This dissertation also has implications for how actors learn from disaster. It posits that learning from disaster per definition is not a neutral process but characterized by struggles between competing interests and perspectives (Coopey, 1995). Learning tends to be shaped privileged actor groups. This has important implications for what is being learned, and what is not. This dissertation showed that the technically oriented drilling community had a strong influence on field-level learning from the Macondo disaster. As such, the majority of lessons learned in the North Sea region focused primarily on technical improvements: of preventive, containment, and response equipment; technical procedures; and technical training. Instead, the non-technical HF community had less opportunity to influence the field-level learning process. As a consequence, few changes were implement to address human and organizational factors, despite convincing evidence in accident research that these factors play a fundamental role in creating safe and resilient organizations (e.g. Reason, 1997). Hence, the drilling industry missed out on the opportunity to ‘stress test’ established knowledge and enrich their techincal perspective with new insights from other communities and actors to drive more robust learning. I discovered that for marginal communities to contribute to field-level learning, they have to strategically translate their knowledge and learning proposals to explicitly link them to dominant discourses and values.
A more participative perspective on learning as opposed to a technocratic ‘expert’ notion of learning may provide voice to alternative insights and knowledge. Disasters are complex phenomena (e.g. Perrow, 1999), hence, diverse bodies of knowledge from diverse epistemic disciplines – engineering, psychology, sociology, anthropology, economics, political sciences etc – are necessary for understanding how disasters develop and may be prevented. I propose that oil companies and associations should stimulate an open discussion with other field members, providing marginal communities with the opportunity to voice their perspective, and actively seek out new insights and knowledge. Pluralistic discussions are fundamentally important in the context of risk. The central question ‘what level of risk is deemed acceptable’ cannot be answered from a technocratic approach of rational calculations. Such ethical questions should be the subject of democratic learning and risk governance processes (Beck, 1992; Renn, 2008).