Conventional Wisdom

The main research questions this chapter addresses are the following: Can peacebuilding strategies have positive influence on the level of social cohesion after civil war? Can peace- building strategies have positive effects in any given local context or do the effects depend on peculiar conditions existing in local contexts? It is a foregone conclusion among scholars and practitioners that war-torn societies have low levels of social cohesion–defined as a set of behaviors and attitudes within a community that reflect the propensity of community members to work together for a common purpose (King et al. 2010; Fearon et al. 2009). Its depletion is often attributed to civil war devastations. Civil war, it is argued, damages norms of reciprocity and trust (Posner 2004; Widner 2004); polarizes communities along sociopolitical cleavages (Maynard 1997); and destroys formal and informal dispute manage- ment mechanisms (Colletta and Cullen 2000), to name a few. But numerous scholars (e.g., Kaplan 2009; 2008; Colletta and Cullen 2000) have argued that depletion of social cohesion is often a contributor to conflict in the first place. For instance, Stewart (2006) argued that violence is often caused by social fragmentation resulting from inequalities between groups. In short, deficit of social cohesion is much a consequence of civil war as its root cause (or at least the two share the same root causes).

Regardless of the source, persistence of low levels of social cohesion is an important barrier to effective peacebuilding (Doyle and sambanis 2006; Doyle 2002). The lack of trust can get in the way of healthy social relationships, prevent people from working together for a common good and increase the risk of conflict rekindling (Kumar 1998). Likewise, Colletta and Cullen (2000) argue that without social cohesion, communities will be unable to resolve disputes peacefully and therefore be at risk of violence. The concern, then, is that if left unaddressed, deficits in social cohesion can undermine reconstruction efforts and increase the likelihood of further social tensions and violence (Doyle and Sambanis 2006: 74; Counsens and Kumar 2001). Maynard (1997) writes:

nity living standards deteriorate from the lack of cooperation in construction, mutual economic support, and demise of productivity. This results in increased dependence on outside assistance and diminished community self-esteem. Eco- nomic adversity typically contributes to scapegoating, which in a war-torn soci- ety, may lead to a continuation of the revenge cycle...predisposing the commu- nity, and possible the region, toward a return to war (in Kumar 1997: 208).

In response, promotion of social cohesion has been integral to the international com- munity’s efforts to build stable and self-sustaining peace in war-torn societies, owing in part to the prevailing presumption that postwar states have little capacity or legitimacy to replenish social cohesion on their own (United Nations 2008; Doyle and Sambanis 2008; Doyle 2002). In United Nations (UN) circles, this prioritization is evidenced by the fact that social cohesion is officially considered as one of three key pillars of postwar recovery, alongside political legitimacy and economic recovery, and it is explicitly included in most mission’s mandates (United Nations 2008). In the same vein, the World Bank has recom- mended mainstreaming social cohesion as an explicit objective in programs and policies, particularly in fragile and conflict-affected states (Brown 2013).1

Flagship activities to promote social cohesion have typically included new governance structures through CDD programs; civic education campaigns aimed at challenging preju- dices and intolerance; workshops about dispute management and resolution skills; engaging traditional leaders through training; and provision of public goods to joint development projects designed to promote trust and collective action both within and between social groups, among others (Blattman et al. 2011; King et at. 2010; Fearon et al. 2009; Mansuri and Rao 2004; Cousens and Kumar 2001; Kumar 1999). Importantly, social cohesion is typically promoted through a holistic approach, alongside other aims such as democratiza- tion and governance reforms and with the same set of multifaceted programs and activities

1_{Other actors engaged in peacebuilding and development interventions–including UN funds and agencies}

such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP); multilateral and bilateral development agencies such as the World Bank and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID); and interna- tional non-government organizations such as the International Rescue Committee (IRC), among others–have a wide range of programs and activities explicitly aimed at promoting social cohesion.

(Cousens and Kumar 2001). Thus as with political participation, peacebuilding interven- tions rely on both status-quo preserving strategies (SPs) and status-quo transforming strate- gies (STs) to promote social cohesion. SPs are necessary to provide a stable environment for positive relationships between groups to take place (Maynard 1997). STs typically aim to transform social structures by tackling the root causes of conflict and mistrust.

Reliance on the same set of strategies to promote social cohesion and other goals has to do, at least partly, with the presumption that social cohesion deficits are only symp- tomatic of much deeper problems rooted in abusive domestic structures, which need to be addressed holistically (Boutros-Ghalis 1995; 1992). Another rationale is that the many goals pursued by peacebuilders are mutually reinforcing, as the virtues such as diversity and tolerance that are central to social cohesion also important for democracy–another key goal of peacebuilding operations. Some analysts even go as far as to equate promotion of social cohesion to civil society development, which is also a key aspect of democratization. As noted earlier, the presumption is that, as Belloni (2008) remarks, ”by participating in civil society organizations, individuals learn how to confront divergent opinions and tend to develop greater tolerance for different interests and views,” which is essentially a Put- namian view of democracy promotion from below according to which greater face-to-face interactions will generate ”social capital” and socialize members into ”democratic norms through a processes of learning by doing” (in Jarstad and Sisk 2008: 185). What, then, has been the track record of international efforts to promote social cohesion?