The Coordination Hypothesis

The prospective diners in Stevenson’s restaurant case face a ‘bargaining problem’. They have a common goal of dining together which they would best serve by coordinating their actions, and they apparently have indeed decided thus to coordinate their actions. But there are different ways in which they could coordinate to realize their shared end, and they have preferences for mutually incompatible courses of coordinated action. It is these preferences that put them in disagreement. And it might be hypothesized that they only put the parties in robust disagreement because they are preferences for mutually incompatible courses of coordinated action, in a context where the parties have together decided to coordinate their actions. We might say that such preferences in such a context suffice for robust non-cognitive disagreement. Call this the Coordination Hypothesis.78

The Coordination Hypothesis can be seen as a way of giving substance and detail to the Reason-to-Consider Hypothesis, as it applies to non-cognitive disagreement. It allows us to answer some of the questions that my sketch of the latter hypothesis raised. (1) To ‘hear and give consideration to’ a preference, one must be a party to an agreement to coordinate actions in pursuit of a common end. Hearing and giving consideration to a preference involves, we might say, hearing the preferences of the other parties for different courses of coordinated action, and deciding whether or not they require you to adjust your own demands, or the outcome of the negotiation that you are aiming for. It is plausible that any party to such an agreement has reason to hear and give consideration to the preferences of the other parties, when deciding on a coordinated course of action. She has this reason because she has a goal that would be furthered by cooperating with the others, and cooperation would potentially break down if she were not responsive in some degree to the other parties’ relevant preferences. (2)

78 _{Cf. Gibbard’s suggestion that it is an important feature of Stevenson’s examples that the}

49 Only reasons of this sort make a difference to the robustness of disagreements in preference (for all the Coordination Hypothesis says). (3) However there is no real need to rely on the normative notion of a reason here; fundamentally, it is being a party to an agreement of the relevant sort that matters. (4) At this stage I have only presented the coordination hypothesis as providing a sufficient condition for robust non-cognitive disagreement.

The Coordination Hypothesis seems to make only true predictions about the cases we have considered. It would be natural to think of Mr. and Mrs. A in Stevenson’s invitation case as facing a coordination problem, just as the parties in the restaurant case do. They have a common goal of hosting a successful party which they would best serve by coordinating their actions, and they apparently have indeed decided thus to coordinate their actions. They disagree (on at least some plausible interpretations of the case) about which of two incompatible courses of coordinated action to pursue, each of which involves inviting a different guest. The Coordination Hypothesis does not falsely predict disagreement in Flat (Preferences), Retail, or Rival Hostesses. None of the parties in these cases appear to have decided to coordinate their actions, nor do they evidently have any common goals that would be served by cooperation.

Despite these merits, the Coordination Hypothesis cannot explain all of our intuitions about robust non-cognitive disagreement. There are cases of robust non- cognitive disagreement in which the parties cannot be assumed to have decided to coordinate their actions. Consider a third case from Stevenson:

John’s mother is concerned about the dangers of playing football, and doesn’t want him to play. John, even though he agrees (in belief) about the dangers, wants to play anyhow. … [T]hey disagree.79

I did not quote this case earlier because, although it is plausibly a case of disagreement, I don’t think Stevenson’s description is detailed enough to establish that the disagreement is robust. But imagine the following two exchanges, the first between John and his mother, and the second between two eavesdroppers who have overheard this exchange:

Football (Mother and Son)

Mother: Why are you wearing football shoes in here? You know I don’t

approve of shoes in the house. And you’re leaving dirt everywhere!

John: Sorry! I’ll take them off.

50

Mother: I’d prefer that you didn’t play football anyway. It’s dangerous.

John: I know, but I want to play. I love football.

Eavesdropper A: [To Eavesdropper B] Sounds like a disagreement.

Eavesdropper B: [To Eavesdropper A] I don’t think they disagree. They just prefer

different things.

(The opening lines of this dialogue are meant to establish that a certain sort of relationship exists between John and his mother. I included the Eavesdroppers because putting the conciliatory claim in the mouth of John or his mother would have sounded odd.)

Conciliation seems inappropriate here; John and his mother disagree robustly about whether John is to play football; there is intuitively an unresolved issue, a ‘matter to be settled’, between the two. And John and his mother do not face a coordination problem. Their disagreement cannot be about how to coordinate their actions, for, of the two parties, only the son is contemplating performing an action. It would not be unreasonable to assume that the parties have a common goal—a common desire to see their family flourish in one way or another. This would be a fairly normal goal for a mother and son to share. But it is far from clear that they are disagreeing about ways to achieve such a goal. John seems to see his playing football as a means of achieving a more private end, viz., his own enjoyment. The coordination hypothesis thus does not well explain our judgements about this case.