Copticness and the land

The etymology of the word and its history may create the impression that "Copticness" is firmly rooted and can be define in terms of the Egyptian space. For Copts, Egypt is the soil that holds the footprints of the Holy Family; the ground that absorbed the blood of the early martyrs; and where the Virgin Mary has regularly made her appearance over the past decades (Walkin 2001: 19). Whilst Copts are largely concentrated geographically in Upper Egypt (particularly in Assiut, Minya, and Sohag) and in certain suburbs of Cairo, there is no isolated region of the country in which they form a vast majority to claim territorial attachment (Meinardus 2010, 29). Rather, they are scattered throughout the country.

That national loyalty linked to a territorially bounded state can coexist with retention of religious identities, or even more, that religious identities themselves can constitute a source of nationalist sentiment challenge basic assumptions underlying the arguments of Benedict Anderson in his 1983 book, "Imagined Communities:

Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism". Here, Anderson examined

how nationalism led to the creation of nations, or as the title puts it, "imagined communities". In his nomenclature, an "imagined community" does not mean that a national community is fake, but rather refers to Anderson's belief that any community so large that its members do not know each another on a face-to-face basis must be imagined to some degree (Anderson: 22).

While the term "imagined community" is helpful in describing the Post- Shenouda Coptic community in that it created imagined bonds among people

80 claiming a common identity, Anderson's understanding of "nation" is not. His assumption that the secular nation is "part of the universal history of the modern

world” (Anderson: 11) is challenged by Partha Chatterjee (1996) arguing that this is a

Eurocentric reading of nationalism that extends the European experience to the non- European world, which, unlike Europe, was colonized (Chatterjee: 216). For him, anticolonial nationalism had two domains: the material or Western, which was rejected, and the spiritual, by which one sought to retain the essence of indigenous spiritual culture (Chatterjee: 217). Chatterjee uses the term "spiritual," rather than "religious” to argue that such nationalisms seek to create a modern national culture that is not Western” (Chatterjee: 217).

Considering this possibility of a "spiritual nationalism", where Egyptian nationalism failed to unite Egyptians, Coptic nationalism succeeded. The Coptic revival managed to develop its own nationalism centered on the Church (Van Doorn- Harder: 23). What started out as a theological-nationalist separation in Chalcedon, settled in the Ottoman milla and then revived as a national church, cemented into a religious community during the revival of the 19th and 20th centuries. In Chatterjee's terms, these individuals can view themselves as a party or nation that Pope Shenouda III popularized as "EsShaab El Qipty" ("the Coptic people") (El Manawi: 192).

Smith further supports this challenge to Benedict Anderson's theory of secular nationalism when he maintains that modern communications technology has turned loyalty away from secular nationalism and back to religious identity. Following Copts who emigrated because of fear of recent persecution or for better economic opportunities (especially after President Nasser's nationalization decrees) (Meinardus: 124), the Coptic Church takes pride in the rapid expansion of Coptic dioceses overseas (Gabra 2014: 137-139). Outside of the traditional Coptic areas in Egypt, Sudan and Libya, the largest Coptic diaspora populations are in the United States, Canada and Australia, followed by smaller communities throughout Europe and Gulf States (Elsässer: 77). As this study is being written, Coptic Orthodox Church boasts of having churches in 79 countries around the world in six continents (Girgis 2016).

81 The expansion of overseas dioceses clearly reflects the desire of the church to minister to its flock abroad to consolidate of church authority, but this was spurred in recent history by activist tendencies of some diasporic Copts who interfered with the intentions of church leadership. Using new modes of communication, the Copts abroad keep alive the memory of a long-lost momentum and of past and current violence, documenting in detail every incident of what they deem anti-Coptic behaviour. Through social media, websites and pamphlets, some have taken on a specific role in defend the Coptic community back in Egypt (Iskander: 110).

The influence of diasporic Copts in Muslim-Christian relations through lobbying has been a particular matter of concern since the 1970's. Although Coptic diaspora are not a monolithic block, they have attracted attention back home for embracing a discourse of persecution, discrimination and human rights (Iskander: 111), in opposition to the national unity discourse that Copts in Egypt have embraced under the control of the church (Huslman: 27). This was particularly alarming when independent Coptic publicists demanded representations to the US Congress to politicize the so-called "Coptic question" by labelling it as persecuted minority in an Islamic state (Henderson: 157).

In 1981, when President Sadat visited the United States for peace talks with Israel, he was surprised by protests from Copts affiliated with the American Coptic Association (ACA). Along with the Canadian Coptic Association, the ACA took out a full-page advertisement in the Washington Post accusing the President of lacking

"courage in handling the systematic assaults launched by Muslim fanatics against the Christians of Egypt "(Haddad: 217). While the ACA was not speaking for all

Copts, not even all diasporic Copts,62 their political voice could not be ignored. When Sadat returned to Egypt, he accused the Pope – whose relationship with Sadat was already uneasy - of inciting the Coptic community to mobilize against Sadat and

62 _{Two days prior to the ACA advertisement, twenty-six Coptic churches in the United}

States and Canada took out their own full-page advertisement saying that the clergy and congregations of the Coptic Christian Orthodox Church ‘welcome President Sadat to the United States of America and pray ... for the success of his peace mission for the Middle East". See "Welcome President Sadat to the United States of America", New York Times, 3 August 1981.

82 utilize their political allies in the United States. This intervention and criticism of the Egyptian government ultimately lead to Shenouda's banishment (Haddad: 209).

After his house arrest and exile, Shenouda would claim that Copts are thoroughly integrated within the Egyptian state. He defended that the "Copts are no

minority. They do not qualify for the definition of minority. They are not the blacks of the USA nor the Muslims of Germany. They are part of the texture of society, part of the history of Egypt" (Smith: 68).

Shenouda specifically rebuked overseas Copts for blaming the Egyptian government for terrorism and for publishing harmful materials without consulting the church declaring that those who publish such blasphemous material against the Egyptian state ”can no longer be identified as Egyptian" (El Banna: 41). Elite Copts, such as geologist Rushdie Said, also accused the extremism of diasporic Copts as

"harmful to the Copts in Egypt, because it makes the people of Egypt think of us as disloyal" (Salama 1996). Their sensationalism enabled them to secure the attention

of the international community for the diaspora activists without reflecting the reality in Egypt, and since they are not under church supervision, they do not suffer the consequences of their remarks. Furthermore, they cannot accurately describe that alleged plight given that diaspora Copts often left Egypt due to bitter encounters with discrimination (Sedra 1999: 229).

From examples like these we can understand why more often than not the concept of long distance nationalism has a negative connotation. Long-distance nationalism, according to Anderson, is as a set of identity claims and practices that connect people living in various geographical locations to a specific territory that they see as their ancestral home (Anderson 1998: 70). The drawback of diasporas is that they are considered marginal groups who do not give up easily on matters that are related to homelands and conflicts and they are usually reluctant to make concessions for peace (Basser: 6).

Schiller argues that long-distance nationalism does not necessarily refer to malignant activities (Schiller, 2004: 570). To that end, a great source of pride of the Coptic Orthodox Church is the active mission that it has developed in Africa, setting up churches from Sudan to South Africa. According to Karim - the leader of the missionary youth to South America of St. Mark's Coptic Orthodox Church in the

83 northern-Cairene neighbourhood of Heliopolis- the first Coptic Churches were established in South America since 1991 and regular missions to Bolivia are scheduled by both US-based Copts and Copts from St. Mark's Church in Heliopolis to provide social and medical services. Copts in the West have also become influential in promoting the cultural and academic life of the Copts and have played a growing role in financing the church in Egypt (Bishara: 23).

Anderson's view on long distance nationalism shows how the "Copticness" of immigrants is remorseless and unaccountable as it is not attached to a territorial space (Anderson, 1998:74). These developments illustrate the transnational nature of "Copticness" where national territorial borders no longer delimit membership in the nation.